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Abstract
The traditional view of the Canadian economy from the late nineteenth century on-
ward has been one of failure relative to the United States. This thesis examines the
Canadian experience from the late nineteenth century in relation to other ‘settler
economies’. Similarities between these countries include their resource abundance,
low population density and European institutions. In the first essay, creation of
long-run, sectorally disaggregated, Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) adjusted Cana-
dian/Australian data reveals that the Canadian economy was characterised by rela-
tively strong and sustained growth in real output per capita and labour productivity.
This paper takes a first step in estimating the importance of many potentially rel-
evant factors. Results indicate that acceptance of foreign technology from abroad
was a significant determinant of success.
From 1870 to World War One, Canada performed particularly well against settler
economies like Australia and New Zealand in terms of output and productivity in
manufacturing. The second essay looks more deeply at the question of manufactur-
ing success. A novel approach is taken by applying non-parametric frontier analysis
to manufacturing census data in order to make cross-country e ciency comparisons.
Measures of Total Factor Productivity indicate that nineteenth century Canadian
manufacturing was surprisingly e cient relative to Australia, New Zealand and
South Africa.
The third essay takes a comparative approach in analysing market potential. His-
torically there has been a predisposition to view settler economies like Canada and
Australia as part of a homogeneous ‘periphery’ relative to a British ‘metropole’.
This concept serves to mask important di↵erences in the ‘peripherality’ of each
country. This study suggests the key geographical factor in explaining relative suc-
cess amongst settler economies was access to markets. Peripherality is observed
by estimating an aggregate measure of distance including adjustments for falling
transport costs, tari↵ barriers and border e↵ects. This aggregate distance estimate
is used to form a measure of market potential that can be compared with observed
trade behaviour. Focus is on the Australian colonies given their acute isolation.
Counterfactuals are then generated to quantify the e↵ects of distance on long-run
growth during the period from 1870 to World War One.
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Chapter 1
Introduction to Thesis
I Settler Economies - An Overview
The grouping together of ‘regions of recent settlement’ for comparative analysis has
long been recognised to hold untaped potential.1 Recently there has been a renewed
interest in the comparative economic history of these so called ‘settler economies’.2
The existing literature suggests the most useful settler countries for comparative
analysis with Canada are: Australia, Argentina, New Zealand and South Africa.3
Similarities between these countries include their land and resource abundance,
staples-based export-oriented development, small domestic markets with low po-
tential for economies of scale, relatively high real income per capita and inherited
European institutions. Despite these similarities only a small number of detailed
comparative studies exist. Often studies that do attempt a comparative approach
take on too much by spreading focus over time and space, serving little purpose
given the comparative benchmarks desired. Fogarty (1981)[29] raised some doubts
on the blanket comparison of settler economies. According to Fogarty (1981)[29],
comparative studies must clearly define the conditions such that countries can claim
to be settler economies, which is subject both to regional considerations and the time
frame of analysis undertaken. For example, any argument that property rights were
a major cause for divergence between settler societies seems to void one of the key
conditions on which their comparison is based. Studies that do not su↵er from these
1According to Fogarty (1981)[29] the term ‘regions of recent settlement’ was first coined in
Nurkse (1961)[68].
2Here I am referring to a growing number of journal publications from authors like Ian McLean,
Les Oxley, David Greasley, John Fogarty, Warwick Armstrong, Roberto Cortes Conde, Tim Rooth
and Boris Schedvin; several unpublished studies and graduate thesis work should also be noted.
Regions of recent settlement are now commonly referred to as settler economies.
3Some studies have also suggested Brazil, Uruguay, Chile and the American South.
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issues cover only a small subset of numerous interacting factors.
Literature on settler economies typically views divergent growth as the result of
di↵erences in trade policies (tari↵s), land policies (property rights) or geography
(staple resources and market access). Good examples are Schedvin (1990)[100],
Greasley and Oxley (1998)[32] and Sanz–Villaroya (2005)[99]. However, some key
problems arise in most analysis on settler economies. Firstly, there seems to be
too much ex-ante acceptance of one ‘smoking gun’ in explaining why some settler
societies succeeded and others failed, leaving many hypotheses untested. For exam-
ple, emphasis is often placed on Canada’s trade with the United States during the
interwar period or after World War Two. While this approach might highlight one
key factor that occurred during one particular episode it ignores a great deal of the
changes in trade policy over the entire pre- and post-war period.
Secondly, not enough relevant quantitative evidence supports the claims made in
most studies. While there are lots of qualitatively reasonable explanations for dif-
fering comparative outcomes there is little quantitative evidence in most cases. If
any quantitative approach is undertaken then it is done in isolation by assuming
away too many factors. Moreover, one policy or institutional factor is often con-
sidered but no attempt is made to determine its relative significance. For example,
trade policy is important in explaining growth but it may be the case that technol-
ogy transfer embodied in imports played a bigger role than access to United States
consumers. Another common mistake is to ignore the basic implications of neoclas-
sical growth models, especially with respect to convergence. Although institutions
show some variance amongst settler economies they were generally good and relative
growth stories may have been influenced heavily by ‘catch-up’ growth.
It should be noted that most studies are limited in the extensiveness with which
their data can meaningfully comment on comparative growth. Most studies use
only data on aggregate output that does not isolate any sectoral fluctuations in
output or productivity. At the national level, there is no way to discern if aggre-
gate patterns were directly attributable to an increased resource intensity, residual
productivity in manufacturing or other sector specific explanations. The question
of why di↵erent countries were successful is also di cult to disentangle. Relevant
explanatory variables are often assembled only for a limited number of years due to
the di culty of sourcing annual data and many studies must isolate analysis to a
very narrow period (typically only a few observations). Given the amount of varia-
tion over long periods this may be a significant issue.
National accounting estimates were unavailable until the interwar period for most
settler economies. The first estimates by R.A. Lehfeldt for the Union of South
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Africa were in 1925. The Dominion Bureau of Statistics o cially organised the
first Canadian estimates in 1925. New Zealand’s first set of estimates were o cially
organised in 1931 by the Census and Statistics Department. The Australian Gov-
ernment Statistician provided some of the earliest o cial estimates in 1886, many
decades before there were o cial estimates on the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Bel-
gium and Switzerland. Since the first o cial estimates were produced, pioneering
authors have collected and organised a great deal of data at the national level for
settler economies. Key contributors are far too numerous to list but they include
individuals such as Charles Feinstein, Colin Clark, Noel Butlin, J.T. Sutcli↵e, S.H.
Frankel, R.H. Coats, F.B. Stephens, M.C. Urquhart, Alan Green and Marvin McIn-
nis.
Recently there has been a tendency in economic history to move away from nar-
row intranational studies and turn towards international comparative studies with
the goal of answering long and broad questions on growth. The ongoing work of re-
searchers such as Angus Maddison, Steve Broadberry, Prados de la Escosera, Luiten
Van Zanden, Marcel Timmer, Les Oxley, David Greasley, Ian Mclean and research
groups such as the Maddison Project, the UN International Comparisons Project
(ICP), the International Comparisons of Output and Productivity (ICOP) project
and the World Level Analysis of Capital, Labour, Energy, Materials, and Service
Inputs (KLEMS) project have advanced the relative narrative on settler economies
in their work.4
Although good national accounting data are now available for many settler economies
there has been little attempt to draw existing data together in one unified study.
This has left gaps over the long-run and in a comparative context. In order to
conduct detailed cross country comparisons, a substantial amount of data must
be organised and analysed. Important questions cannot be answered by observing
aggregate output patterns without considering changing patterns of employment,
resource extraction, trade, etc. Moreover, Purchasing Power Parities (PPPs) have
been estimated only for modern points of reference and used in conjuction with
procedures pioneered by Bairoch and Maddison to generate the long-run aggre-
gate GDP estimates presently available. Despite the introduction of distortions in
inter-temporal comparisons, this method has served as the basis for virtually all
quantitative comparative work on settler economies.
Long-run regional and sectoral decompositions of output, employment and produc-
tivity are in very short supply. Where they do exist, other problems are common
4Examples of work by these authors are too numerous to list and many can be found in the
bibliography to this thesis.
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in comparative studies of settler economies. For example, gaps still exist in sectoral
GDP at constant prices for Canada, and no attempt has been made to regionally
decompose Canadian output by province before World War Two. This is a problem
in comparative studies on Canadian manufacturing where virtually all manufactur-
ing activity was being undertaken in Ontario and Quebec. Another issue has been
the limited scope of studies. Canada has received focus in a number of cross-country
comparisons with the United States, whilst other settler economies such as the Cape
Colony and New Zealand have been virtually ignored in comparative studies. Aus-
tralia has garnered its share of comparative studies but they have su↵ered from the
same short comings present in the Canadian literature. This thesis takes an impor-
tant first step in addressing many of these issues.
II Contribution of this Thesis
This thesis is in the spirit of recent comparative trends with a direct focus on settler
economies during the ‘long’ nineteenth century.5 Chapter two compares long-run
trends in GDP, employment and labour productivity between two of the wealthiest
settler economies, Canada and Australia. This chapter develops the only consistent
long-run sectorally disaggregated annual data sets on output and labour productiv-
ity available for Canada and Australia. These data have been carefully assembled
and checked for consistency and should serve as the most comprehensive set of data
available. Chapter two also presents a newly estimated set of Purchasing Power Par-
ity (PPP) values by sector for Canada and Australia. These 1936 bilateral PPPs are
highly detailed and push back the date on PPP estimates for Canada and Australia
by approximately fifty years.
Furthermore, chapter two makes an important contribution to the literature on set-
tler economies by analysing several of the most popular claims for relative success in
a more rigorous quantitative framework. Previous work has discussed claims on the
success of each country in isolation and these have been incorporated into chapter
two. For example, the role of technology transfer from the United States has been an
active area of research in the Canadian literature but may also have been important
for other settler economies. Another key topic has been the trade policy of both
Canada and Australia. Access to export markets and changes in tari↵ policies have
featured prominently in the literature on all settler economies. In summary, this
5The term ‘long’ is now commonly applied to the nineteenth century in order to refer to the
period running from approximately the late eighteenth century to World War One.
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chapter combines many of the standard topics for discussion on settler economies
into a unified and quantitative approach.
Chapter three focuses on the comparative development of manufacturing amongst
settler economies whilst addressing the traditional criticisms placed on this sector
in the Canadian literature. Chapter three represents the first study where manu-
facturing data from Canadian censuses have been organised into categories at the
provincial level that are consistent with national data. Chapter three further organ-
ises data for Ontario and Quebec, Victoria, New South Wales, New Zealand and the
Cape Colony into universal categories that are consistent for cross-country compar-
isons. In the spirit of recent studies on Canadian manufacturing, chapter three relies
on estimates of total, rather than partial, factor productivity to determine relative
e ciency. A non-parametric frontier approach adapted from operations research is
applied to historic manufacturing data as an alternative to more restrictive para-
metric approaches. The result is a study of manufacturing for the long nineteenth
century that is unique, not only in the work on settler economies but in economic
history more generally.
Chapter four completes the study by addressing the most important deep deter-
minant of growth performance amongst settler economies before World War One,
geography. Focus is on a comparison of the Australasian colonies, as they represent
the most distant and geographically constrained of the settler economies. A model
for market potential from the economic geography literature is adapted to a mass
of data from statistical registers and statistical abstracts. Chapter four represents
one of the most detailed studies on the role of distance in the nineteenth century,
o↵ering several counterfactuals to highlight the significant e↵ect that location and
distance to markets have played on the development of settler economies.
Beyond the economic history of settler economies I believe this thesis has broad im-
plications for long-run growth and development. Many modern developing economies
face similar growth issues as settler economies faced in the nineteenth century. Is-
sues of capital accumulation, foreign investment and involvement, structural change,
tari↵ protection for industry, resource use and exploitation, technology transfer and
geographical determinism are all important topics for modern development. Settler
economies o↵er a nineteenth century laboratory to study the interaction of these
factors. This thesis applies novel techniques to the comparative study of growth
and development.
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Chapter 2
Expectations Reconsidered: A
Sectoral Comparison Of
Canadian-Australian
Productivity, 1871-2007
I Introduction to Chapter 2
A long running debate (often termed the ‘British Failure Hypothesis’) has sur-
rounded the failure of Britain to stay ahead of early challengers like the United
States and Germany. British failure (as argued by McCloskey) centred on 3 factors:
a lack of demand, a failure to invest domestically and an entrepreneurial failure.1
This perceived failure was often based on Britain’s declining position in industry and
exhibited in statistics on output and labour productivity. In hindsight, the United
States’ large homogeneous market and potential for structural and technological
change made its early twentieth century rise as industrial leader a likely outcome.
Unsurprisingly, the nineteenth century Canadian economy is also argued to have
under-performed relative to the United States. Observers have pointed fingers at
Canadian entrepreneurs, particularly in manufacturing, who they felt lacked inno-
vative e↵ort and/or ability. This entrepreneurial failure (which I refer to as the
‘Canadian Failure Hypothesis’) was advocated by various authors and focused on
the lack of responsiveness amongst Canadian manufacturers in adapting production
decisions to domestic market conditions.2 Namely, Canadian entrepreneurs failed
1See McCloskey (1971)[58].
2Examples include Naylor (1975)[65], Levitt (1970)[51] and Watkins (2007)[115].
6
to act in a manner consistent with theories of cost minimisation and induced inno-
vation.
A great deal of recent literature has successfully attempted to restore the reputa-
tion of Canadian relative to American entrepreneurs, by challenging the claims of
ine cient input responses in Canadian manufacturing.3 However, Canadian failure
relative to the United States is still clearly visible in comparisons of real output per
capita and labour productivity. The calculation of Total Factor Productivity (TFP)
and the use of advanced econometric techniques still leaves the casual observer ask-
ing questions of Canadian entrepreneurs.4
Although some studies have exonerated Canadian entrepreneurs using more compre-
hensive measurement techniques this paper is a shift in the comparative framework.
Various endowments provided the United States with the perfect conditions for an
early and rapid industrialisation along with substantial labour and TFP growth. In
terms of invention, innovation or expanding production through economies of scale,
other settler economies such as Canada, Australia and Argentina seemed to lack the
dynamism that the large domestic markets of the United States provided. Even the
more established European industrialisers failed to match the success of the United
States in the early twentieth century. Hence, It is unrealistic that Canadian manu-
facturers could have kept pace with their American counterparts in terms of output,
productivity or technological change.
Figure 2.1 displays real GDP per capita for several countries relative to the United
States.5 In 1870 there was a great disparity in relative output per capita. Canada
progressed rapidly, virtually eliminating this gap by World War One. After World
War Two, Canada was able to overtake Australia in terms of aggregate real out-
put per capita, something that was not accomplished relative to the United States.
This comparison highlights the problem in focussing studies of Canada on the United
States. When compared with Australia there is little evidence suggestive of a pro-
ductivity shortfall attributable to Canadian manufacturers and entrepreneurs. The
first goal of this paper is to challenge the legitimacy of a ‘Canadian Failure Hypoth-
esis’ by drawing on the literature on settler economies and shifting comparison of
Canada towards Australia.
The second goal is to explain relative Canadian success by unifying various narra-
tives on Canadian growth in the existing literature. Typical explanations surround
3Key examples include Wylie (1986; 1989; 1990)[117][118][119], Keay (2000)[48][47], Inwood and
Keay (2005)[41], as well as various other publications by these authors.
4Broadberry et. al. (2012)[11] have noted that any cross-country comparison involving the United
States will be impacted by the ‘unusually dynamic performance of the United States economy’.
5See appendix figure A.1 for a comparison relative to Canada.
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the proximity to the United States, quality of institutions, openness to trade, adop-
tion of new technology and importance of staple exports. An attempt will be made
to quantify these potential explanations for Canadian success relative to Australia.
II Data and Methods
II.1 Canadian Time Series
Analysing productivity trends in the Canadian economy back to the nineteenth
century requires a time series on output and employment by sector. Obtaining this
is not a trivial task as there is no long run output series connecting the pre- and
post-war data. Moreover, sectoral data on real output prior to the Second World
War are only available after 1935 in Urquhart and Buckley (1965)[112]. Nominal
output data are available by sector from Urquhart (1986)[111] but must be deflated.
Hence, the first task was to extend the nominal output series from 1870 to 1935.
This was relatively straight forward using nominal GDP by sector from Urquhart
and Buckley (1965)[112] covering the period 1926 to 1976. The second, less straight
forward task, was to deflate output by sector.
Urquhart does not make any attempt to deflate his sectoral data. Instead, the fixed
capital component of his aggregate series has been deflated using a cost of capi-
tal index and the remaining component of the aggregate series was deflated using
the Consumer Price Index. These two real components are then combined to form
aggregate real output. Ideally, one could create a series of real output for each sec-
tor from 1870 to 1935 by deflating both the intermediate inputs and gross outputs
through a method of double deflation. Realistically, I have opted to follow Altman
(1992)[2] in deflating value added in each sector separately using the most appropri-
ate wholesale price index. The deflated real GDP series by sector are then combined
to get aggregate real output. Altman perceives this method as an improvement on
Urquhart (1986)[111] and uses it for the purpose of analysing patterns in aggregate
GDP. Unlike Altman I attach no significance to di↵erences in the aggregate series
and utilise this technique in the absence of an alternative, with the goal of analysing
the sectoral series. The aggregate series created from Altman’s deflated sectoral
data is a close enough approximation to Urquhart’s deflated aggregate series, pro-
viding support for the validity of Altman’s sectoral series.
Thus, the next step was to create various price series by sector that could be used
to generate a real GDP series up to 1935 where it could be linked with the real
GDP series found in Urquhart and Buckley (1965)[112]. Fortunately, many of the
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original sources used by Altman to construct the wholesale price series up to 1926
actually cover a longer period and can be used to extend many of the sectors beyond
1926.6 I will skip the detailed description of each series and how it was deflated as
this is explained in length in Altman (1992)[2]. Where it was impossible to extend
Altman’s data directly I have chosen the most appropriate wholesale price series
available.7
The final step was to bring the sectoral real GDP series up to the present period.
This was done using several editions of the Canadian Economic Observer. The data
on real GDP have been organised into a series for the aggregate economy and for
the three main sectors of agriculture, industry and services. The data are also avail-
able at a more disaggregated level but have been organised for ease of international
comparisons. Agriculture includes arable, pastoral, forestry and fisheries; Industry
includes mining, manufacturing and construction; Services acts as a residual in-
cluding all remaining categories, and includes house rents.8 The most contentious
aspect of this aggregation is the inclusion of mining in the industrial category. The
decision to proceed this way follows Broadberry and Irwin (2007)[12] and makes for
an easier comparison with existing long-run data that may be used in future studies.
For many reasons, such as capital intensity and minimum e cient scale, mining is
more akin to other secondary areas of production. When comparing Canada and
Australia, the inclusion of mining as an industrial pursuit will result in Australia
having a much larger share of output and employment in industry than if mining
were included as a primary activity. Mining in Australia was a positive contributor
to average labour productivity and will bias my results towards a more impressive
secondary sector in Australia, strengthening my conclusions on Canadian manufac-
turing.
Sectoral employment is available only for decennial census years in the pre-war
period. I have followed Urquhart (1986)[111] in using Firestone (1958)[28] and
Urquhart and Buckley (1965)[112] for employment by sector.9 The number of indi-
viduals gainfully occupied by sector is available annually after 1946 from Buckley et.
al. (1983)[110]. The output and employment data are used to calculate productivity
per worker by major sector.
6For example, see McInnis (1986)[59] for the series on an agriculture price deflator, Green
(1986)[33] for the series on transportation prices, etc...
7See Buckley et. al. (1983)[110] section K for various wholesale price series.
8Examples of services include distributive trades, communication, transportation, gas, water
and electricity, professional services, etc...
9There are large criticisms surrounding data found in Firestone (1958)[28] due to a lack of
supporting evidence. I have very limited use of Firestone (1958)[28] and have followed Urquhart
(1986)[111] in accepting this data as the best estimates available.
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II.2 Australian Time Series
Australian data on real GDP by sector are, somewhat, more conveniently provided
in the widely used series by Butlin (1962)[13]. Although no data on real output exist
from 1939 to 1949, post-war data on real output are available from the Common-
wealth Bureau of Census and Statistics (later the Australian Bureau of Statistics)
up to the present period.10 The di culty in creating a long-run series of real output
by sector for the Australian economy is primarily in linking pre- and post-war data.
Haig (2001)[35] provides a link but this raises questions over the use of Butlin’s data
rather than Haig’s data for the pre-war period. Given the lack of options I have
followed Broadberry and Irwin (2007)[12] by linking pre- and post-war data using
Haig’s alternative series.
Haig (2001)[35] provides two sets of data, one for the period up to 1911 and the
other for the period from 1911 to 1949. Broadberry and Irwin (2007)[12] suggest
Haig’s data prior to World War One does not demonstrate consistent correct-cross
country comparisons. As a result, I have utilised Butlin (1962)[13] for pre-1911 data
and spliced this to Haig’s second data set after 1911. Thus, my series relies on pat-
terns in Butlin’s data before World War One and those in Haig’s data from World
War One until World War Two. This approach produces a series that is extremely
consistent with successive versions of Maddison data based on backward projection
from a present benchmark.
Annual employment at the sectoral level after 1891 is available from Butlin and
Dowie (1969)[14] and before 1891 from Haig (1989)[34].11 Data on the total work-
force (gainfully occupied) are available only in decennial format after 1891. As a
result I have chosen to use average annual employment. This di↵ers from Cana-
dian employment data on the number of individuals gainfully occupied. Hence,
Australian data will understate employment relative to Canadian data. This is
acceptable as any bias appears small and will be in favour of Australian labour pro-
ductivity.
One issue that exists in both the Australian output and employment data is the shift
from calendar years up to 1900 to fiscal years starting in July from 1900/1901. Since
Canadian data are given either for calendar years or for fiscal years ending in March
(which provides a closer approximation to calendar years), I have averaged the con-
10See Australian National Accounts[76] for detailed national accounting data.
11I have used Broadberry and Irwin (2007)[12] which summarises the employment data from
these two sources.
10
necting fiscal year data for Australia to represent calendar years. For example, the
data for 1910/1911 and 1911/1912 are averaged together to represent calendar year
1911. Previous analysis has treated fiscal year 1910/1911 as though it was calen-
dar year 1911 for means of cross-country comparison.12 In Canadian-Australian
comparisons, this method produces more extreme swings in relative output and em-
ployment, notably surrounding the Great Depression. The approach I have taken
produces a greater consistency with data provided by Maddison (2010)[73].
II.3 Data Accuracy
In my data, evaluation is about confirming that methods of deflating, aggregating
and linking such a long-run series have not inappropriately altered the data. As
the method I have employed to get aggregate data is to combine deflated sectoral
data, rather than deflating an aggregated nominal series, the aggregate data on real
GDP per capita for Canada and Australia can be checked by comparing each se-
ries to those provided by Maddison (2010)[73]. Hence, to check the accuracy of my
sectoral data, each aggregate series has been converted to an index with the same
1990 base year as Maddison’s data. My relative Canadian/Australian output per
capita series has been benchmarked using Maddison’s Canadian/Australian 1990
PPP observation as well as the 1990 exchange rate. Figure 2.2 compares the rela-
tive Canadian/Australian aggregate real GDP per capita series generated from my
sectoral data and Maddison’s 1990 PPP (as well as the 1990 exchange rate) with the
original Maddison series.13 This is not an attempt to demonstrate the finer quality
of Maddison’s data but rather to establish the general validity of my sectoral series.
It should be apparent that although the aggregate real GDP series for Canada and
Australia have been created as sums of real sectoral data they are very close to Mad-
dison’s corresponding data. The only discrepancy of note occurs during the interwar
period, directly surrounding the Great Depression. This discrepancy is likely related
to the di↵erence in deflation methods previously discussed. While my sectoral series
are deflated using wholesale prices (producer prices), the aggregate real GDP series
provided by Urquhart (utilised by Maddison) relies on consumer prices to deflate
the majority of the series. Since producer prices lead consumer prices, and there is
a more dramatic fall in producer prices at the onset of the depression, this reduces
the initial collapse in real output in Canada. This results in a relative real GDP
12See Wray (1987)[113] as an example.
13ICP 1990 PPPs used to convert Canadian and Australian nominal GDP from KLEMS in 1990
into GK$s. The exchange rates are 1.15 CAN$/GK$ and 1.22 AUS$/GK$.
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series that does not produce as dramatic a collapse in Canadian/Australian real
GDP per capita. Overall the two relative real GDP per capita series are extremely
close providing me with confidence in the accuracy of my sectoral series.
III Relative Pattern of Economic Progress
Table 2.1 displays Canadian and Australian real output by sector relative to 1871.
Casual observations can be drawn from the data while keeping in mind that com-
parative output growth is not always a good predictor of relative success given that
growth often appears quickest in areas or sectors that are relatively behind. Firstly,
Australian agricultural output grew much more rapidly and consistently over sev-
eral periods. Even during the draught and depression of the 1890s, Australian real
output had increased significantly relative to its 1871 level. Canadian agricultural
growth in real output outpaced Australian growth during the wheat boom andWorld
War One but this proved to be a short lived phenomenon in the history of the two
countries. Shocks to agriculture in the interwar period were particularly hard felt
in Canada. Agricultural output relative to 1871 was substantial for Australia when
compared with Canada during the 1920-21 recession and the Great Depression. Af-
ter the 1930s, agricultural output in Canada recovered very slowly, in contrast to
Australia.
The situation was rather di↵erent in both industry and services. Both the Barings
Crisis of 1890-91, the 1893 Australian banking crisis and subsequent lack of invest-
ment had a persistent impact on Australian industrial output. Canada also su↵ered
some fluctuations over this period that may be unsurprising given the large share
of foreign investment in Canada coming from the United Kingdom14 and a similar
banking crisis in 1893 impacting the United States. However, an apparent break-
through occurred in Canadian industry with the onset of the wheat boom. It was
during the period after 1896 that Canada began to display rapid growth relative
to its 1871 level. Hence, it is probable that linkages into industry and investment
in infrastructure needed to support agriculture generated large real output gains in
other sectors. Following the wheat boom period, the 1920s also stand out as a period
of Canadian success in industry with strong relative growth in real output. During
the 1920s agricultural output growth looked unspectacular in Canada, hence the
success of Canadian industry was not dependant solely on linkages from agriculture.
14United Kingdom foreign investment in Canada was still 85% of total foreign investment by
1900.
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The most significant sector for Canada in terms of real output relative to 1871 was
the service sector. It was in services, both during the wheat boom and the 1920s,
where Canadian real output growth was exceptional. The timing of this result does
seem to have been related to linkages from other sectors (agriculture before World
War One and industry in the 1920s), changes in trade policy and Canada’s increas-
ing dependence on United States capital and technology. Interestingly, due to the
di culty in measurement, this is the sector least discussed in Canadian economic
history. If organised e ciently, this sector appears to be highly responsive to link-
ages, foreign investment opportunities and the benefits of an export oriented growth
strategy.
Real output shares by sector are displayed in table 2.2. The Canadian share of real
GDP in agriculture steadily declined throughout the period (From approx. 40% in
the 1870s to approx. 2% in 2007). Although the share of real output in agriculture
also declined in Australia, this decline was more rapid in Canada. By the 1920s
Canada had a smaller share of real output in agriculture than Australia despite
having double the share of real output in agriculture in 1871. The share of real
output going to the Canadian industrial sector remained fairly constant through-
out. The story looked very similar in the Australian industrial sector with only a
marginal di↵erence in the two countries after the 1930s.
Meanwhile the share of real output in Canadian services increased very rapidly (from
approx. 30% in the 1870s to approx. 70% by 2007). As early as the 1890s Canada
had overtaken Australia in the share of output going to services. In terms of real
output, the 1920s represented a clear break for the two countries with Canada be-
coming more industry and service based and less agricultural.
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 provide indexes and shares of Canadian employment by sector.
It is sometimes forgotten that Canada su↵ered from net emigration in the late nine-
teenth century as workers pursued opportunities in a rapidly industrialising United
States economy. As a result employment growth in Canada was unexceptional. How-
ever, with the expansion of the prairie wheat frontier in the early twentieth century,
disaggregated data show that all sectors of the Canadian economy exhibited strong
growth of employment. The service sector was the most striking in this respect.
Before World War One Canada had grown far more in service sector employment
than Australia had over the same period. Increased Canadian employment in ser-
vices outstripped Australia throughout the twentieth century. Growth in industrial
employment was also relatively strong for Canada after World War One.
Relative to Canada, Australian employment shares in agriculture and services were
more characteristic of a developed economy in the late nineteenth century. However,
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there were clear changes taking place with a growing relative share of Canadian em-
ployment in industry and services. By the 1930s Canada employed a comparable
share of its workforce in industry. From the 1950s onward Canada employed a larger
share of its workforce in services. Hence, from 1870 to World War One, Canada took
major steps in transitioning from a primarily agricultural economy.
Labour productivity indexes are displayed in table 2.1. Aside from the recession and
drought of the 1890s, Australia consistently maintained extremely high aggregate
labour productivity growth. Labour productivity growth in Canadian agriculture
looks less spectacular. The 1920/1921 recession (following the wheat boom and
World War One) had left Canadian agricultural labour productivity relatively un-
changed compared with its 1871 level. In contrast, Canadian labour productivity
growth in industry and services after 1871 was impressive. Industrial productivity
grew particularly rapidly in Canada, doubling in the last 30 years of the nineteenth
century. Australian growth after 1891 stagnated and grew little until the 1970s. As
a result, while Canadian productivity in industry had increased over nine times its
1871 level a century later, Australian productivity had only advanced three times
its 1871 level.
A similar pattern is revealed in terms of relative service sector productivity. Growth
in Canadian service sector labour productivity relative to 1871, unlike real output,
was significant. In contrast, by 1901 Australian labour productivity in services had
declined relative to 1871. Hence, while the wheat boom contributed a great deal
to agricultural output this was extensive growth, marked by increased capital flows
and immigration. The productivity e↵ects seem to have been felt more in the ser-
vice sector where linkages generated pure e ciency gains. These results seem to
indicate a very productive service sector in Canada, even during the later period of
the twentieth century when services came to dominate output shares and the size
of the service sector was extremely large in both countries.
In terms of consistent growth in labour productivity over the period, industry was
also a clear winner for Canada. With the exception of the period around World
War One, growth rates in Canadian industrial labour productivity growth rates
were exceptionally strong, placing doubt on the traditional argument that Cana-
dian industry was unresponsive, myopic or sluggish in adopting new capital and
technology. The industrial sector of Canada comes across as having impressive
growth rates in labour productivity, contributing an increasing share to aggregate
labour productivity throughout much of the twentieth century.
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IV A Benchmark for 1936/37
Comparison of Canadian and Australian sectoral indexes of real output and labour
productivity in levels requires both a comparative time series and comparative esti-
mates in a common currency for a benchmark year. To pin down the comparative
long run time series on real output I have constructed a benchmark for 1936/37
where sectoral output has been adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP). Broad-
berry and Irwin (2007)[12] have argued that this is necessary given the failings of the
exchange rate as a guide for price di↵erences between countries, especially at the sec-
toral level where PPPs will vary across sector according to comparative advantage.
The 1936/37 benchmark was chosen as this was the earliest date the Australian Bu-
reau of Statistics published a detailed account of primary and secondary industries
that covers quantities and values of manufactured goods produced.15
Tables 2.3 - 2.5 elaborate on the calculation of sectoral PPPs.16 For all sectors the
PPPs were based on relative unit values of goods and services derived from quanti-
ties and values of gross output. Data on Canadian unit values for 1936 are contained
in the Historical Statistics of Canada and the 1937 edition of the Canada Year Book.
Data on Australian unit values for 1936/37 are from the 1938 Australian Produc-
tion Bulletin, the 1938 Australian Year Book and Butlin (1962)[13]. Relative unit
values were combined into PPPs for disaggregated sectors using either gross output
weights or value added weights.17 For manufacturing relative unit values were first
formed into sub sectors based on the category of manufacturing using gross output
weights and then aggregated using value added weights. Value added weights in
agriculture, forestry and fisheries could only be meaningfully applied to Australian
data. Agricultural sub sectors have been combined based on gross output weights.
The geometric mean of these sub sectors has been taken to form an overall PPP for
agriculture in each country and another geometric mean was taken to arrive at an
aggregate PPP. The disaggregated sectors were then combined into the 3 aggregate
sectors (Agriculture, Industry and Services) using Australian and Canadian value
added weights. PPPs using Australian and Canadian value added weights for each
sector were averaged into one PPP per sector by taking the geometric mean. Finally
these were combined to form an aggregate PPP using value added weights.
15Gross and net values of output for manufacturing are available for much earlier years but
quantities are available only for a limited spread of manufactures.
16A more detailed set of tables is shown in the appendix. See appendix tables A.1 - A.5. Even
these detailed tables have been condensed for a more practical presentation in this thesis by combin-
ing sub-categories of manufacturing production and recalculating PPPs for combined sub-categories.
17Disaggregate sectors include: Agriculture, Fishing, Mining, Manufacturing, Construction, Per-
sonal and Professional Services, Transport, House Rents.
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Since the exchange rate in 1936 was $3.95 CAN / £1 AUS, the PPP for agricul-
ture, forestry and fisheries of 2.99 indicates a significant cost advantage in this area
for Canada. Agriculture, forestry and fisheries were disaggregated into sub sectors
for arable, fisheries and dairy, and pastoral and wool. As expected, Canada had
comparative advantages in arable, forestry, fisheries and dairy while Australia had a
comparative advantage in pastoral and wool. The most significant agricultural good
was wheat which makes up more than one third of both Australian and Canadian
gross agricultural output. Unsurprisingly, Canada had a comparative advantage in
wheat with a PPP of 3.5. Hay and clover were also significant agricultural products
for both Canada and Australia making up approximately one fifth of gross agri-
cultural output in each country. Canada had a comparative advantage in hay and
clover with a PPP of 2.16.
Fruit made up very little of gross agricultural output for either country. Canada
had a slight comparative advantage in fruit production. Fishing was of much greater
significance to Canada than to Australia, representing less than 1% of Australian
gross output in agriculture, forestry and fisheries and over 6% for Canada. Forestry
made up approximately 19% of gross output in agriculture, forestry and fisheries
in Canada but only 4% for Australia. Canada was significantly more competitive
in both forestry and fishing. Expectantly, Australia had a substantial comparative
advantage in meat and wool. Wool was the most significant good in Australia mak-
ing up approximately 40% of gross output but was insignificant in Canada. All the
PPPs fit with the history of each country and their expected relative comparative
advantage in staple goods for export.
The PPP of 4.30 for manufacturing indicates that Australian goods were cheaper
than Canadian goods in 1936. I believe the explanation for this is related to a shift in
Canadian industry towards more valuable secondary manufacturing. Fully manufac-
tured Canadian goods such as iron and steel products, agricultural implements and
chemicals were competing in world export markets by 1936. Generally, the share of
manufactured goods in total exports rose significantly after World War One. In this
case Canada was likely manufacturing much higher quality goods with higher costs
of production. This could be explored by deflating both the intermediate inputs
and the gross outputs from manufacturing by sub-sector. A complete study would
require both input and output prices and allow for a comparison of value added in
each sub-sector. Here it is adequate to note that the PPP calculations are fit for
the purpose of comparison undertaken in this study.
Another explanation for this might be related to the importance of staple linkages
in supporting a manufacturing sector aimed both at the domestic market and one
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that might produce goods for the export market. A deeper look into the manufac-
turing sector PPP indicates the importance of linkages. Based on PPPs Australia
had a comparative advantage in animal related products, textiles and textile prod-
ucts, non-metallic minerals, iron products and rubber products. For Australia, only
its advantage in iron products seems consistent with advances outside staples led
development and on closer inspection its advantage in iron was principally from pig
iron and direct castings while Canada had an advantage in automobiles, automobile
components and agricultural implements. Canada had a comparative advantage in
chemical products, non-ferrous metals, wood and paper products and some miscella-
neous industries. Of these industries wood and paper products seem to speak most
heavily to Canada’s natural resource advantages. If both Canada and Australia had
been equally successful in developing manufacturing linkages that stretched beyond
the processing of staples then there should have been a less resource-oriented pat-
tern in Australian manufacturing. It appears here that Canada was able to develop
its secondary manufacturing a greater diversity than Australia. My theory is that
Canada’s success lay partly in its ability to transition its staples export sector to-
wards a more advanced industrial (and service) led-growth than in other resource
based economies like Australia. This implied manufactured goods were produced for
the domestic market and for exporting abroad. In a sense, Australia was not fully
exploiting linkages from staple resources because it was not developing a diverse
manufacturing sector that could sustain long-run growth. The results here provide
some evidence of this.
The service sector PPP of 3.45 indicates a comparative advantage for Canadian
services. Data are very limited in services and these results are based on cost
advantages in Canadian railroad transportation and in personal, professional and
domestic services. Canada transitioned much later out of agriculture and into ser-
vices but already had a comparative advantage in services, driven mainly by relative
wage costs and low transport rates, as early as 1936. Again these results seem to
indicate the success of Canada in converting its early staples led growth of the late
nineteenth century into transportation infrastructure and final demand linkages in
the service sector.
IV.1 1997 Benchmark Crosscheck
As a final check on the validity of the 1936/37 benchmark I have followed Broadberry
and Burhop (2007)[10] with the use of additional benchmarks to provide cross-checks
on my time series projections. The 1997 benchmark has been created using data
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for both value added and sectoral PPPs from the World KLEMS database. Table
2.5 gives the summary of the 1997 PPPs. For the aggregate economy, Canadian
real GDP per capita was 118% of Australian real GDP per capita in 1997 using the
1936/37 benchmark compared with 117% using the 1997 cross check. According to
Maddison’s data, Canadian real GDP per capita was 104% of Australian GDP in
1997, hence my data provide estimates very close to both the Maddison data and
the KLEMS data. In either case there is a very small discrepancy between my data
based on the 1936/37 benchmark and alternative data at the 1997 benchmark (or
Maddison’s data).
The 1936/37 benchmark is also satisfactory at the sectoral level. In industry, Cana-
dian real GDP per capita was 128% of Australian real GDP in 1997 using the
1936/37 benchmark. According to KLEMS data, Canadian real GDP per capita
in industry was 146% of Australian real GDP. This is a discrepancy of approxi-
mately 15%, which seems acceptable given the greater inaccuracy of sectoral data.
For services, Canadian real GDP per capita was 119% of Australian real GDP in
1997 using the 1936/37 benchmark. Canadian real GDP per capita in services was
117% of Australian real GDP per capita according to KLEMS data. This implies a
discrepancy of about 2% between the two figures. Lastly, real agricultural output
per capita for Canada in 1997 was 53% of Australian real output per capita using
the 1936/37 benchmark. KLEMS data indicates Canadian agricultural output was
65% of Australian output in 1997. This represents a discrepancy of approximately
20%. It is likely given the discrepancy in manufacturing and agriculture, forestry
and fisheries that either the 1936 PPP overestimates the cost advantages for Cana-
dian manufacturing and underestimates the cost advantages for Canadian primary
production or that the 1997 PPP does the reverse. This makes my results using
the 1936 benchmark an upper bound on Australian agricultural productivity and
an upper bound on Canadian industrial productivity. The results using the 1997
benchmark are a lower bound for Australian agricultural productivity and a lower
bound for Canadian industrial productivity.
V PPP Adjusted Real Output Per Capita and Labour
Productivity Comparisons
Figures 2.3 to 2.6 display the relative PPP adjusted Canadian/Australian real GDP
per capita series based on the 1936/37 benchmark (The 1997 boundary based on
the KLEMS PPP has also been included to set out the confidence interval suggested
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in the previous section). Canadian aggregate real GDP per capita was significantly
lower than that of Australia in 1871. Throughout most of the 1870s real output per
capita in Canada fell relative to Australia, reaching a low of approximately 40%.
The period directly following the Canadian National Policy (1879) saw Canada be-
gin to catch-up on Australia in real GDP per capita. Some combination of economic
events and policy responses in the 1890s initiated a period of even more rapid Cana-
dian catch-up in relative GDP per capita. Impressively, Canada was able to improve
its output per person from less than half of the Australian level to parity by World
War One.
Following the war, real output per capita in Canada collapsed relative to Australia,
reaching a trough in 1921. The post 1920/21 recession saw a revitalised Canadian
economy, with Canada making further ground on Australia until the Great Depres-
sion where relative output per capita in Canada had risen well above the Australian
level. The 1930s depression hit Canada much harder than Australia and relative
real output fell back to pre-World War One levels. World War Two sparked a rel-
ative revival in Canada in terms of real GDP per capita. From the 1950s onwards
there was a gradual slowdown of relative Canadian output growth but a persistent
dominance over the Australian level. Australian catch-up of output per capita did
not begin to occur until the 1980s, likely due to changes in Australian trade policy
and greater openness initiated in the 1970s.
The agricultural sector was a consistently productive sector for Australia in the
long-run. The 1890s depression and/or Canadian wheat boom were significant in
boosting Canadian real agricultural output per capita to between 1.5 to 2.5 times
the Australian level. The increased volatility in agricultural output of economies
dominated by wheat production is evident from the early twentieth century. The
e↵ect of the Great Depression on Canadian agricultural output was also substantial,
pushing Canadian real agricultural output per capita from its peak to well below
that of Australia in only a few years. However, this event looks like a rapid return
to the trend of relative decline in Canadian agriculture that began in the nineteenth
century and was interrupted by the wheat boom years.
Canadian real industry output per capita was approximately half of the Australian
level in 1871. The 1870s saw Canadian industry output per capita fall well below
half of the Australian level. From the 1880s Canada started its upward climb in
terms of relative industrial output. Although Canada took a large dip in relative
industrial output per capita both around World War One and the Great Depres-
sion, it maintained a significant advantage over Australia throughout most of the
twentieth century. Real industrial output per capita in Canada fluctuated around
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40-50% above Australia in the post-war period.
Before the 1880s, real output per capita in Canadian services was only one third of
the Australian level. By the end of World War Two Canadian service sector output
per capita was close to one and a half times Australian output per capita. Over-
all there was a clear upward trend in relative service sector output per capita for
Canada starting in the 1880s, with an interruption around World War One and the
Great Depression, levelling o↵ in the post-war period. The significant pattern in the
sectoral data appears to have been the success of Canadian industry and services
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, reaching peak output levels
by World War Two.
Although both countries are often argued to have lived and died by their agricultural
success, this could not have occurred literally through relative gains in agricultural
output but rather through the gains translated via linkages to the manufacturing
and service sectors. Hence, Canadian staple resources, more so than Australian sta-
ples, must have been underwriting future gains in manufacturing and services and
not just a high, but transitory, standard of living. Australian catch-up in aggregate
output per capita did not begin until the 1990s when production shifted away from
the traditional resource base.18
There are several important features of the PPP adjusted relative labour produc-
tivity series that stand out. Firstly, Canadian aggregate labour productivity from
1871 to 1891 was very low and did not increase at all relative to Australia. Sec-
toral analysis reveals that relative Canadian labour productivity was constant in
industry and rising marginally in services but falling in agriculture. One possibility
could have been due to the relative protectionist stance of the 1880s and its e↵ect
on productivity. Dismantling of the National Policy Tari↵s and increased union
with the United States under the Liberals in the 1890s likely increased competition
in manufacturing. Services also benefitted from the spillover e↵ects of the growing
domestic manufacturing sector and its agglomeration forming in Ontario and Que-
bec. Another potential explanation could be related to foreign technology transfer
through growing capital and labour flows.
Secondly, the 1890s also provided several dramatic economic shocks. Australian
productivity su↵ered from the depression and subsequent lack of investment, as well
as a serious drought while Canada entered a period of booming agricultural expan-
sion. Between 1891 and 1901 Canadian aggregate labour productivity had risen
18Relative Canadian labour force participation was increasing from the 1970s to 1990s. This was
the reason for the delay in Australian catch-up of aggregate relative real output per capita until
the 1990s. Hence, this result fits with the theory that a push towards Australian openness to trade
in the 1970s was a key event.
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from 60% to 100% of the Australian level. It is hard to ignore the relationship be-
tween timing of this observation and the expansion of the Western Frontier and the
rising importance of prairie wheat in the global market. However, my theory is that
Canadian productivity benefitted substantially because of an emphasis on establish-
ing long-run growth potential in the industrial and service sectors. As a result, all
sectors of Canadian production saw large relative gains in labour productivity over
this period. For whatever reason, the 1890s reflected a structural break in terms of
labour productivity for Canada relative to Australia, supporting literature in both
countries which suggests a permanent and opposite shock from trend growth during
this period.
The period from 1901 to World War One saw Canadian aggregate labour productiv-
ity growth slowdown relative to Australia. Both the agricultural and service sectors
had bounced back for Australia. Only Canadian industry had continued its relative
productivity growth over the period and was at a local maximum just before World
War One. This is further evidence that Canadian industry before World War One
could not have been as ine cient as has been suggested by some authors. In fact,
the Canadian industrial sector after 1891 was always a positive contributor to rela-
tive aggregate labour productivity when compared with Australia.
During the period after World War Two until the 1970s Canadian labour produc-
tivity remained well above the Australian level. After the 1970s relative aggregate
labour productivity declined but remained in Canada’s favour. Sectoral analysis
reveals that relative labour productivity had peaked in services directly following
World War Two and had been on the decline throughout this period. It was indus-
try that had sustained the large Canadian advantage over Australia in aggregate
productivity from World War Two until the 1970s. Relative labour productivity
in industry began to decline in the 1970s and with it the aggregate series followed.
Hence, Canadian productivity after World War Two was maintained by the impres-
sive growth in Canadian industry relative to Australia during this period.
VI Explaining Divergent Outcomes
VI.1 Determinants of Growth
Since 1776 there has been some understanding of the deep determinants of long-
run growth. Adam Smith recognised the role of good institutions, and beneficial
geography. In other words, extensive growth resulting from capital accumulation,
immigration or the acquisition of new land could not fully explain di↵ering growth
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outcomes in the long-run. Endogenous growth theory developed by authors like
Romer (1986)[98] and Lucas (1988)[52] have refined this understanding. Modern
development economics is now awash with studies proposing to have discovered the
next big thing in explaining long-run growth. In a sense, macroeconomic studies
have reached a critical mass of correlates explaining the rate of growth in per capita
income across countries and over time. Examples include measures of property
rights, rule of law, democracy, language, religion, corruption, colonial heritage, ac-
cess to the sea, trade openness, climate, and many others. There is no consensus on
which of these sources of growth might be most significant or even if these explana-
tory variables have any real explanatory power.19
Fortunately, attempting to isolate causes of relative growth amongst settler economies
is aided by the nature of their commonalities. Canada and Australia share many
similarities that rule out most measures of growth as being able to explain dif-
fering performance. Considering first the ‘proximate’ sources of growth (physical
and human capital accumulation, exploitation of scale economies, other productiv-
ity improvements), both Canada and Australia share broadly similar experiences.
Both countries enjoyed periods of rapid capital accumulation during the late nine-
teenth century. In both cases these substantial capital inflows came from the same
source, Britain. According to Magee and Thompson (2010)[56] Canada received
£43,446,000 of investment from Britain between 1870 and 1909 while Australia re-
ceived £56,911,000. Of course this flow of investment followed di↵erent patterns
with each receiving similar amounts of investment in 1870, Australia receiving more
from 1880 to 1900 and Canada receiving substantially more investment after 1900.
Both the interwar period and postwar period were marked by an overall reduction
in international capital flows as a result of the depression and the Bretton Woods
agreement.
Labour flows were not drastically di↵erent either. Canada received 1,379,200 im-
migrants from Britain over the period from 1870 to 1910, while Australia and New
Zealand received 893,900.20 Immigration from the United States to Canada was
also substantial in the late nineteenth century but net migration in that direction
was typically negative. As a result, it should be assumed that the larger British
immigration figures to Canada, when compared with Australia, were overstated by
migrants moving on to the United States. As with investment, Australia received
significantly more migrants from Britain before 1890 and Canada received more from
1890 to World War One. Comparative studies of human capital accumulation have
19Much of this summary of growth theory was discussed in McLean (2004)[60].
20Magee and Thompson (2010)[56], pg. 69.
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shown that high school participation rates were much slower to rise in Australia than
in the United States.21 The consensus, however, is that other advanced economies
like Canada similarly lagged the United States in educational attainments, leaving
little explanatory power for human capital di↵erences amongst settler economies.
Scale economies may have influenced relative performance in manufacturing but it
seems unlikely that the scale of agricultural production di↵ered markedly between
the two countries. The settlement of land and the distribution of land grants was
not dissimilar enough to warrant the belief that large scale commercial agriculture
took root more deeply in one country, in contrast to the Argentinian Pampas where
property rights for tenant farmers implied significant di↵erences in the scale of agri-
cultural production.22
Other di↵erences that generated productivity gaps in the two countries cannot be
ruled out. The most likely proximate source of growth to play a significant role in
di↵ering growth performance was technological change. McLean (2004)[60] high-
lighted the view that Australia remained dependent on factor accumulation with
low levels of TFP growth well into the twentieth century. Although this observation
on Australia may have been in marked contrast with the United States it fits into
the common framework of growth amongst settler economies. Certainly it seems un-
likely that TFP in Canadian agriculture was significantly higher than in Australia
before World War One. More likely is the argument that Canadian manufacturing
and services benefitted from spill-over investment in agriculture during the wheat
boom and this generated relatively high levels of productivity growth.
Another set of potential determinants of growth are the so called deep determinants
of growth, namely formal institutions, informal institutions and geographic features.
Measures of institutional quality such as property rights, rule of law, democracy,
language, religion, corruption and colonial heritage were too similar in Canada and
Australia to adequately explain di↵ering growth experiences. By contrast the other
major deep determinant of growth, geography, requires its own detailed and ded-
icated study reserved for later work. Here I will simply note that the e↵ect of
geography on growth is unclear in the context of settler economies. One might pre-
dict that location and access to markets gave Canada a significant advantage over
Australia but there were other geographical factors at play. Australia had better
access to the sea with almost no economic activity being conducted deep in the
interior of the country. Australia’s population was farther removed from markets
resulting in a greater degree of urbanisation and potential for gains from increased
21See MacKinnon (1989)[53] for a detailed discussion.
22See Solberg (1987)[103] for a detailed comparison of land tenure in settler economies.
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economic density and agglomeration economies. Australia’s climate was also quite
di↵erent from Canada’s but both managed to produce a similar set of staple prod-
ucts for export such as grain, timber and meat.
The final source of growth is policy. Within the limitations of this paper there are
two reasons to focus on policy as the primary source of di↵erences in growth perfor-
mance. Firstly, as discussed above, both the proximate and deep determinants of
growth emphasised in most comparative studies will not have serious explanatory
power in the context of settler economies. This was especially true as significant
di↵erences in growth performance occurred during the long nineteenth century (par-
ticularly in a comparison of Canada and Australia). Secondly, the benefits of under-
standing the role of policy on growth in the context of settler economies is arguably
more important because it provides a laboratory for developing countries and can
o↵er suggestions for decision makers. Although generally considered short-run de-
terminants of growth, policy can be either growth-enhancing or growth-inhibiting
and in some cases the impacts of policy decisions can have consequences for long-
run growth. These ‘deep policy’ sources of growth for settler economies relate to
the long term stance on tari↵ policy (general openness to trade), the direction of
trade (dependency relationships and taste), policy on resource extraction (link to
proximate sources of growth through scale economies), and policy on the adoption
of foreign technology (openness to technology transfer directly or indirectly). The
following sections set out the process of creating measures of these ‘deep-policy’
sources of growth and applying them to regression analysis in order to determine
their relative significance.
VI.2 Creation of Explanatory Variables
A significant contribution of this paper is to quantitatively approach the question
of why Canada caught up and overtook Australia in output per capita. This re-
quired creation of several relevant explanatory variables. The literature on settler
economies has suggested that proximity to the United States may have been a key
factor in Canadian success amongst it settler peers. The advantage of proximity to
the United States is argued to have been in access to its markets through trade.
According to the conventional wisdom on settler economies, variables measuring
the degree of openness, the development of a secondary manufacturing sector, the
quality of labour markets and the performance of staple exports should all hold ex-
planatory power. Although not a common suggestion in the literature, I believe the
willingness and ability to adapt foreign technology may have been an important de-
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terminant of growth performance amongst settler economies as well. As mentioned
in the previous section, I have decided to focus on the ‘deep-policy’ determinants of
growth that are most likely to show variation between settler economies with reason-
ably similar characteristics such as inherited European institutions. The variables
chosen relate broadly to changes in the size, direction, and nature of trade, the
transfer and adoption of foreign technology, the share of the export sector devoted
to manufacturing and the price fluctuations in low value added staple exports. Ide-
ally, I would also like to address the potential variance in policy related to labour
markets that created di↵erences in labour market rigidity, however this has proven
more di cult empirically.
Canadian trade and customs data has been collected and organised from the Tables
of Trade and Navigation of the Dominion of Canada and from the Annual Report of
the Department of Trade and Commerce. The trade and navigation volumes sepa-
rate exports and imports into categories for the produce of: mines, fishing, forestry,
animal products, arable, miscellaneous, and manufactures. Annual reports provide
the data in categories for products of: vegetable, animal, textile, wood and paper,
iron, metals, chemicals and miscellaneous. Linking the categories is time consuming
and impractical over long periods. However, I have focused only on the rising im-
portance of manufactured goods as a share of exports. Manufacturing remains fairly
consistent, Annual Reports provide the share of fully and partially manufactured
goods in exports. The produce of manufactures from the trade and navigation vol-
umes is equivalent to fully manufactured goods from the Annual Reports providing
a link. Trade data are available showing the destination country, allowing creation
of a series for exports to the United States and the United Kingdom by degree of
manufacture. In order to calculate the real value of staple exports I have observed
quantities and values of the most significant low-value added staple resources ex-
ported from Canada and Australia. This allowed the conversion of nominal export
values into real values for each staple export without relying on a broad deflator.
Exports of the staples chosen represent between 50% to 90% of the share of total
exports for either country in most years. A weighted staples export price series
for Canada and Australia has been created to highlight the relative e↵ect of price
shocks. The index for Canada is based on the weighted price series for wheat, lum-
ber and dairy exports. The Australian index is based on the weighted price series
for wheat, wool and dairy.
Australian trade and customs data is slightly more complicated due to idiosyn-
crasies in the individual colonies before federation. Detailed data from 1899 onward
are available for the entire Australian Commonwealth from Australian Bureau of
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Statistics publications on the Annual Statement of the Commonwealth of Australia.
Moreover, colonies were treated as foreign countries for purposes of data collection
before federation. Hence, summary statistics on foreign trade make an inappropri-
ate comparison with Canadian data unless adjusted for inter-colonial trade. For
data before 1899 I have had to rely on data from the Statistical Register for New
South Wales and Statistical Register for Victoria in each individual year in order
to make the appropriate adjustment for inter-colonial trade. Data for New South
Wales and Victoria have been spliced in 1899 with the data from the Australian
Bureau of Statistics so that the data before 1899 reflects the entire Australian Com-
monwealth. This gives me limited concern since New South Wales and Victoria were
the largest and most important of the colonies, representing the dominant share of
Commonwealth trade.
Other important data collected relate to patenting in Canada and Australia. Cana-
dian patent data indicating the country of inventor are available for limited years in
copies of the Canada Year Book. These data are based on Annual Patent Reports
published by the Canadian Intellectual Property O ce (CIPO). Unfortunately the
annual reports are di cult to obtain for the nineteenth century. I have filled gaps in
the patent data using the online Canadian Patent Database provided by the CIPO.
Unfortunately the database does not contain strings allowing inventors country to
be isolated when searching through data before the late twentieth century. Hence,
I have painstakingly recorded detailed information on each patent for the missing
years between 1871 and 1891. Australian patent data di↵erentiated by country of
inventor is only available for New South Wales and Victoria before federation. As
with trade data, I have used data for New South Wales and Victoria as representa-
tive of patterns in the entire Australian Commonwealth. In the case of patenting, it
was necessary for an inventor to apply for a patent in each colony separately before
the patent act of 1904. As suggested in Magee (1999)[55], this implies that it might
be appropriate to focus on patenting in either Victoria or New South Wales but not
both. I have spliced patent data for Victoria with post-federation data for the entire
Australian Commonwealth to form one continuous series.
As mentioned, data on labour market quality were di cult to collect in a meaningful
series. Several measures of labour disputes are available from Mitchell (2013)[64].
Appendix figure A.2 shows the number of workers involved in strikes and lockouts in
Canada relative to Australia. Unfortunately data on strikes and lockouts for Canada
are available only after 1900 and for Australia only after 1913. Lastly one might
consider policy on immigration or foreign investment by source country. This may
have been a significant factor for Canada given its proximity to the United States.
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Appendix figures A.3 and A.4 display the relative importance of the United States
to the United Kingdom as a source of labour and capital for Canada. As with data
on the incidence of strikes, data on immigration and foreign investment do not cover
the entire period of this study and have been excluded from the analysis in the next
section.
VI.3 Trade Flows
The most common debate on the importance of proximity to the United States
surrounds growing Canada-United States trade. Much emphasis has been placed
on the significant opportunities a↵orded Canada by its access to American mar-
kets. While Canada sought a re-orientation in trade from Britain to the United
States, Australia focused on British trade well into the twentieth century. Pomfret
(2000)[89] has suggested Canada’s most important locational advantages over Aus-
tralia were exploited when partially or fully manufactured goods such as newsprint
and consumer durables (especially automobiles) were being exported to the United
States. Figures 2.11 and 2.12 provide information on the direction of Canadian
trade with the United States and the United Kingdom. It is clear that the share
of total exports to the United States did not come to dominate those going to the
United Kingdom until the post-World War Two period, well after Canada’s initial
catch-up in GDP per capita with Australia (and others). However, evidence does
seem to suggest some importance in the timing of a shift in manufactured exports
to the United States. Raw material exports show no real re-orientation towards the
United States until World War Two and even then the process was more gradual
than in manufactured goods. The re-orientation of manufactured exports to the
United States does appear to correlate with earlier periods of exceptional Canadian
performance relative to Australia.
Interestingly, the share of total imports from the United States began to dominate
those from the UK as early as the 1880s. After the 1880s, Canadian trade policy
placed more emphasis on bringing in low cost intermediate goods and raw materials
from the United States and blocking the import of fully manufactured goods. As a
result, Canadian entrepreneurs were successful in obtaining imports from the United
States during the critical period of the ‘second industrial revolution’. Imports from
the United States may have represented not only cheap access to intermediate goods
and raw materials needed in manufacturing but may have also transferred embodied
technology.
‘Gradualist’ literature in Canadian economic history has placed significant weight
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on the early development of a strong domestic manufacturing sector in Canada to
explain previously unappreciated periods of growth. Figure 2.13 shows the break-
down of total exports by degree of manufacture. Although there was a gradual
rise in the export of manufactured goods in the late nineteenth century, this rise
was unspectacular until World War One. However, it is interesting to note that
the share of manufactured goods was rising gradually even during the Canadian
Wheat Boom. In other words, despite the presumption that wheat came to typify
the staples story for many authors, the share of non-manufactured exports was on
the decline from the 1880s onward. One should be careful drawing conclusions here
since this does not imply that staple exports played a diminishing role as there are
important indirect linkages into other sectors of production such as manufacturing.
VI.4 Tari↵ Policy
In the late nineteenth century Canada moved decidedly towards a more protectionist
trade regime based on tari↵s in manufacturing designed to promote industrialisa-
tion. The Cayley-Galt Tari↵ of 1858, the failure to renegotiate reciprocity with the
United States after 1866 and the National Policy Tari↵s of 1879 typify the nineteenth
century period of Canadian protectionism. The first movement towards openness
occurred when the Liberals took power in the 1890s with their eyes on dismantling
the National Policy Tari↵s. After World War One Canada again looked towards a
low tari↵ policy regime, most notably with relatively low barriers to U.S. imports.
The Great Depression interrupted this process. However, beginning in the early
1930s with Imperial Preference (1932) and United States Reciprocity (1934) tari↵
barriers began to fall and declined below the prevailing National Policy period.
Before the 1890s Australian tari↵ policy was diverse across its colonies but compar-
atively open, with the free traders of New South Wales and moderate Victorians
representing the bulk of Australiasian imports. The downturn of the 1890s led to
a strong protectionist backlash and a large increase in duty on imports across all
of the colonies. This protectionism persisted after federation and did not really
begin to decline until the 1970s. Figure 2.14 displays relative Canadian/Australian
average e↵ective tari↵s (measured as customs collected over imports). From the
implementation of National Policy Tari↵s (1879) in Canada until the 1890s depres-
sion in Australia, Canada did have comparatively high tari↵s. Average duties were
generally lower in Canada from the 1890s until the 1920s but not drastically. From
the 1920s onward there was a significant decline in relative duties in Canada until
World War Two. Broadberry and Irwin (2007)[12] have identified that, after 1920,
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the abrupt relative decline of Australian labour productivity in manufacturing cor-
relates with Australia’s sharp rise in import tari↵s. My data confirm this, however
in the Canadian comparison the 1920s indicate an abrupt relative decline in Aus-
tralian labour productivity in services rather than manufacturing, which faced a
more continuous relative decline beginning in the 1890s.
VI.5 Technological Openness
Economic historians have long appreciated that growth is heavily influenced by the
adoption of new technologies. Many authors have debated, with no clear answer,
the validity in using patents as a measure of innovation or technological change
across countries and over time.23 Setting this debate aside, I pursue an approach
similar to Magee (1999)[55] by suggesting that patent data can reveal some infor-
mation on the di↵usion and/or adoption of foreign technology. Figure 2.15 displays
the total Canadian patents issued to foreigners relative to Canadians.24 The first
patent issued in Canada to a foreign resident was not until 1872. After 1872 the
share of patents taken out in Canada by Americans increased dramatically. From
the 1880s to World War One approximately 70% of patents issued in Canada went
to Americans. By contrast, the share of American inventors taking out patents in
New South Wales was approximately 10% over this period.
It is unlikely that American inventors would have applied for patent protection in
Canada or Australia without expecting a return on their investment in intellectual
property rights. Moreover, Magee (1999)[55] has noted that the Australian colonies
had relatively strong patent rights in the late nineteenth century, which provided a
good return on investment due to the long period of protection for a comparatively
low cost in the context of other developed countries. Hence, we should assume that
much of the increasing influence of foreign patenting was indicative of actual tech-
nology transfer.
Previous research on technological adaptation in Canadian manufacturing has as-
sumed that technology transfer from the United States was significant but that the
technology needed to be altered to make it cost e↵ective in Canada.25 Analysis on
comparative adaptation of United States technology is reserved for further study.
It may be significant enough to note here that the United States was pushing the
technology frontier and Canada was clearly impacted by this process. Even casual
23Good examples are various publications by Jacob Schmookler, Ken Sokolo↵, Zorina Khan,
Naomi Lamoreaux, Petra Moser and Josh Lerner.
24For a more detailed breakdown in Canada see appendix figure A.5.
25The classic example is Wylie (1989)[118].
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observation of the patent data makes a convincing case for technology transfer from
the United States playing a substantial role in Canadian growth.
VI.6 Staple Resources
The ‘Staples Thesis’ as originally espoused by Harold Innis and extended by Watkins
(1963;2007)[114][115], Mackintosh (1964)[54], Caves (1965)[17] and others, is well
known amongst many economic historians and I will overlook the elaboration it
deserves. Debate in this literature has been over the importance of staples in the
growth of settler economies. Staple resources are argued to have been key either
directly as resources entering the production function or indirectly through linkages
into manufacturing and services, influencing the proximate measures of growth. It
is instructive to put the significance of staples growth in perspective by compar-
ing two staple exporting economies. The issue of resource advantages as the pri-
mary contributor to output growth and productivity has been looked at in the case
of Australia by McCarty (1964)[57], Schedvin (1990)[100], McLean (2004)[60] and
Broadberry and Irwin (2007)[12]. One key observation in this area of research is
that Australia’s early success in the nineteenth century was due to large deposits of
resources which were unable to sustain exceptionally high rates of long-run growth.
The question of why resources contributed to sustainable long-run growth in Canada
but not Australia or how Canada was able to transition away from extensive growth
to intensive growth in resource extraction has not fully been answered. The most
common assessment assumes that each staple is inherently di↵erent in the degree
that it demands capital and labour, thus promoting linkages.26 If a particular staple
can be extracted and exported without economies of scale or without advancements
in technology then there may be limited spill-over e↵ects that generate increased
productivity.
Figures 2.16 and 2.17 display the real value of principal staple exports in each coun-
try. Two significant patterns are evident. Firstly, Canada had a much greater
diversity in staple exports before World War One than Australia, which was almost
singularly focussed on wool. As pointed out in Caves (1965)[17], the central limit
theorem suggests that variance in output will decrease as the number of staples
exported increases. This is an interesting observation since the significance of com-
parative diversity in staples production has not been explored in empirical work. It
26Fogarty has suggested that Canadian wheat was a ‘super-staple’ that demanded much more in-
vestment and promoted greater forward and backward linkages than Australian wool or Argentinian
beef.
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may be that a diversity of staples is needed to sustain long-run growth. Secondly,
after World War One staples extraction and export in both Canada and Australia
became polarised in a limited number of staples. Wheat and lumber were extremely
dominant staples in Canada after World War One while wool and wheat were domi-
nant in Australia (butter and cheese or meat were occasionally a close third for each
country). The implications of these observations are still to be explored.
Figure 2.18 gives the staples significance index. The staples significance index mea-
sures the weighted relative real value of the principal staples for Canada and Aus-
tralia with a base year of 1871. Increases in the index imply the real value of exports
in Canadian over Australian staples is increasing relative to its position in 1871. The
index highlights the fact that in 1871 the Canadian over Australian real value of
staples was very high and not reached again until World War One. Analysis here
must be conditioned on the fact that the relative value of staples in 1871 could
have favoured either Canada or Australia dramatically or only slightly and the in-
dex says nothing about this. Still the general story is one of declining significance
of staple exports for Canada relative to Australia from a historically high level in
the nineteenth century. This conforms well with the fact that Canadian literature
has been much less confident regarding the importance of staple exports relative to
manufactured exports than the Australian literature.
VI.7 Results
Establishing the significance of various explanations for the relative success of set-
tler economies is di cult. Correlations between variables measuring the competing
explanations for relative performance are shown in table 2.6.27 The strongest corre-
lation with Canadian/Australian relative GDP per capita comes from the share of
Canadian patents issued to foreigners. The share of exports in manufacturing and
the share of Canadian imports from the United States are also highly correlated
with relative GDP per capita. The share of Canadian exports going to the United
States is moderately correlated with relative GDP performance. The two variables
measuring the significance of staple exports are weakly correlated with relative GDP.
An increased relative price in the staples index has a positive relationship with rela-
tive GDP. An increase in the relative real export value of staples also has a positive
connection with relative GDP. Finally the measure of relative tari↵s is moderately
27GDP data are for 1875-1970 due to missing observations in some of the variables during the
early 1870s and di culty in gathering trade data by degree of manufacture for Canada after the
1970s.
31
negatively correlated with relative GDP.
These correlations imply that manufacturing exports rather than raw material or
staples exports are connected with relative GDP performance. They also imply
that proximity to the United States had a stronger connection with growth through
increased imports than exports. Manufacturing activity was also highly correlated
with the share of Canadian imports coming from the United States. This fits the
story that United States imports were used as intermediate goods in a developing
manufacturing sector. The degree of foreign patenting in Canada also looks to have
had an important impact on Canadian performance. Foreign patenting was highly
correlated with imports from the United States, as one might expect since both
serve as channels for technology transfer. Foreign patenting was also highly posi-
tively correlated with manufacturing indicating that American patenting in Canada
was expanding with the domestic manufacturing sector.
In all of this analysis it is important not to assume causation. A simple example is
illustrative. While it may be tempting to assume that an increased focus on manu-
facturing impacts growth positively, it could also be that increased growth promotes
a structural change and the development of a stronger manufacturing sector capa-
ble of exporting goods abroad. In order to comment on causation it is necessary
to apply more complex methods. The approach taken to solve this issue was to
run a series of Vector Autoregression (VAR) models and test for Granger Causality.
Table 2.7 shows the results of these tests where the null hypothesis in each case was
that the ‘excluded’ variable does not granger cause the ‘equation’ variable.28 The
results indicate that in three of the cases (tests on the share of exports to the United
States, relative tari↵s and the relative price of staples exports) it is not possible to
reject the null hypothesis that the excluded variable does not granger cause relative
GDP per capita. In all of these three cases it is uncertain whether relative GDP per
capita granger causes these variables. The most conceivable explanation based on
empirical and theoretical grounds is that an increase in Canadian GDP per capita
led to a Canadian policy response to lower tari↵s. It seems unlikely that relatively
strong GDP per capita in Canada resulted in an increase in Canadian exports going
to the United States as a share of total exports. It also seems unlikely that better
relative output performance in Canada should have influenced the relative price of
staple exports.
The share of Canadian imports coming from the United States does granger cause
relative GDP as the test rejects the null hypothesis at the 15% level of significance.
It does not appear that relative GDP performance granger causes an increased share
28One VAR model was run with 2 lags of each variable included in the model.
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of imports from the United States at any reasonable level of significance. This is sug-
gestive evidence that United States imports to Canada influenced relative Canadian
success. Similarly manufacturing granger causes relative GDP at the 15% level of
significance while relative GDP does not granger cause changes in the share of man-
ufactured exports at standard significance levels. Since the correlation is positive
this implies that an increased focus on producing manufactured exports in Canada
relative to Australia resulted in an improved relative performance for Canada.
The relative real value of staple exports and foreign patenting are slightly unclear.
Both the relative real value of staple exports and the share of Canadian patents is-
sued to foreigners granger cause relative GDP but relative GDP also granger causes
these variables. In other words, it is uncertain whether the dominant channel is from
the relative real value of staple exports and foreign patenting to GDP performance
or visa versa. It is entirely possible that a feedback loop exists in either case. For
example, an increased real value of staple exports could influence relative output
performance and relative output performance could then impact development of the
staple export sector. In the case of patenting, an increase in relative output could
encourage foreign inventors who then transfer technology and increase output per-
formance further.
The final goal was to determine the relative importance of each explanatory vari-
able in combination. As with all broad macroeconomic studies issues of endogeneity
and other complications in modelling a statistical relationship exist. I have delib-
erately made no attempt to account for all of these issues. This was based on the
assumption that when looking at comparative growth over such a long period, any
attempt to add complexity to the modelling process would likely do more harm than
good in confounding the results. Relative GDP per capita has been regressed on
all potentially relevant variables discussed above. The regression is improved on by
removing all of the variables that are statistically insignificant or highly correlated
with another explanatory variable. Independent variables that are highly correlated
with other more relevant variables are removed. The final regression discards the
lag dependent variable in order to prove the results are not dependent on the annual
fluctuations not specifically identified in the theory. Table 2.8 gives the results of
these regressions.
Several observations can be drawn from the results. Only the price of staple exports
are completely insignificant in the first regression which includes all explanatory
variables. The share of imports coming from the United States, the share of ex-
ports going to the United States, the relative tari↵ rate, the share of manufactured
exports, and the share of foreign patents issued are all statistically significant at
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the 1% level of significance. The relative real value of staple exports is statistically
significant only at the 15% level. All of the coe cients are what might be expected
a priori except for the measure of manufactured exports which has a negative sign.
Given the strong positive correlation between the share of exports in manufactur-
ing, the share of imports from the United States and the share of patents issued
to foreigners this was an expected problem. Dropping the United States imports
measure, the relative tari↵ measure, and the relative staples price measure produces
the correct sign in the manufacturing share coe cient. The third regression assumes
that the explanatory variables have an e↵ect on relative GDP per capita only after
a lag. Both theoretically and statistically this specification is more relevant and
I prefer this to the other specifications. This is confirmed by the p-values given
from RESET tests for correct specification of the model which do not reject the null
hypothesis of no omitted variable bias in the third regression.
The preferred regression highlights the fact that an increased share of imports from
the United States had a statistically significant impact on Canadian growth. Al-
though the share of exports going to the United States was also statistically sig-
nificant and positive the coe cient was almost one third as large.29 The share of
patents issued to foreign residents in Canada was both positive and statistically
significant at the 1% level. The coe cient on the foreign patent share measure
was double the size of the coe cient on imports from the United States. Both are
measured in terms of percentages indicating that relative output growth was more
heavily influenced by a one percentage increase in foreign patents as a share of total
than by imports from the United States as a share of total. This result may also
be unsurprising since foreign patents represent a direct technology transfer that are
expected to hold productive potential whilst imports transfer technology indirectly
and may be impossible to reproduce through domestic production. The prospect
that technological transfer was the most significant factor in Canadian proximity
to the United States has received little attention. More work here is needed and a
detailed look at Canadian patenting appears worthwhile.
Relative tari↵s were included in the original regression with the assumption they
might capture a measure of competitiveness in markets that is not picked up by the
trade variables. The threat of entry is impacted by the level of protection and this
might have been measured by relative tari↵s. Relative tari↵s can also represent a
policy push towards openness that has a long-run e↵ect on growth. The relative
tari↵ variable was excluded from later regressions as it was insignificant once issues
29Since both the share of imports from the United States and the share of exports to the United
States are measured in percentage terms it is possible to compare these directly.
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of multicolinearity were reduced. Finally, it should be noted that because there are
no institutional variables or geography variables there is no way to discern if the
deep determinants of growth played a larger or smaller role relative to policy in
comparative long-run growth.
Although there is no theoretical reason why the relative GDP per capita between
the two countries would trend in either direction in the long-run, an augmented
dickey-fuller regression does not result in a rejection of the null hypothesis of non-
stationarity. Caves (1965)[17] has suggested that growth in settler economies is
made up of a stable neoclassical component and a cyclical export-oriented compo-
nent that fluctuates with expansion and contraction of resource exploitation. This
view of the growth process implies the appropriateness of di↵erence stationarity,
rather than trend stationarity, representations of the Canadian and Australian real
GDP time series. In order to support the results, I have created a series of rel-
ative GDP per capita growth rates to act as the dependent variable in alternate
specifications. Converting the dependent variable into a growth rate allows the in-
clusion of the lag of relative GDP per capita to measure catch-up growth. In other
words, this specification controls for the standard neoclassical catch-up growth that
occurs when countries have matched some growth supporting conditions related to
the proximate and deep determinants of growth.
The alternative set of growth regressions have been included in table 2.8. As antic-
ipated, the high R2 has fallen as growth rates are more di cult to predict. Forcing
the dependent variable and all independent variables to be stationary has altered
the statistical significance of all the explanatory variables except the share of patents
issued to foreign residents, which remains statistically significant. The lag of the
relative GDP per capita variable has the correct negative sign and is statistically
significant, indicating that catch-up growth does explain some of the rapid Canadian
growth from the 1870s to World War One relative to Australia. Conclusions on the
importance of technology transfer is clearly robust. However, the interesting story
is really in explaining the trend of a non-stationary variable that should be station-
ary in theory. Over the period from 1875 to 1970 we would expect Canadian GDP
per capita relative to Australian GDP per capita to be stationary. Persistence of
Canadian growth relative to Australian growth over such a long period is perplexing.
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VII Conclusion
When compared with Australia, instead of the United States, Canadian industry
and services appear to have performed extremely well in statistics on real output
and labour productivity. Growing in size and importance these two sectors were
relatively e cient in Canada. In contrast, growth in the agricultural sector seems
to have been less significant in the Canadian success story when compared with
other resource rich countries like Australia, at least directly. Indirectly, agriculture
likely provided a boom in the early twentieth century that generated e ciency gains
and spill-over e↵ects for the development of industry and services. Manufacturing
did grow in importance and there was an eventual boom in manufactured exports,
especially those going to the United States. This can be seen in the change in the
composition of exports towards higher value intermediate and final goods. Much of
this shift was related to the proximity and role of the United States since it was
during this period that the United States overtook the United Kingdom as the prin-
cipal export market for Canada.
Arguably proximity to the United States played a bigger role through the increased
share of imports made available to Canada. This work has shown that the share
of imports from the United States was strongly positively correlated with relative
Canadian performance and with both the increase in manufactured exports and tech-
nology transfer from abroad. The causality appears to run from increased United
States imports to increased relative growth. Increased imports coming from the
United States may have influenced growth in Canada by making cheap intermediate
goods available for manufacturing or by transferring embodied United States tech-
nology to Canada.
The results also show that staples remained a factor in Canadian export-led growth,
but this should not be over exaggerated. While regression analysis supports the
significance of, and casual link between increasing staple exports and growth there
is a weak correlation describing their relationship. However, exports of the staple
resource may show up not only in the sector where they are produced but also in
other sectors through linkages. The e↵ect of staples may show up in fully manufac-
tured goods through their conversion as intermediate inputs. In this case, Australia
could be argued not to have maximised its comparative advantage or was not as
successful in generating comparable productivity gains in industry and services by
exploiting linkages. Although Australia focused its trade policy on the protection
of domestic manufacturing there is little statistical evidence to argue that relative
tari↵s had a marked impact on performance amongst settler economies.
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The most significant finding in this research appears to be that the strongest can-
didate in explaining relative Canadian success was the measure foreign technology
transfer. Canada issued a significantly higher level of patents to foreigners (mainly
Americans). This should not be viewed as a lack of innovativeness on the part of
Canadians as Canada was not on the technology frontier. It made sense to maximise
the use of cost-e cient foreign technology, pushing Canadian firms closer to the ef-
ficiency frontier. It is likely that large levels of R&D spending in the United States
during this period generated high levels of innovation that had spillover benefits for
Canada. Even if technology adopted was not originally designed to suit Canadian
factor prices, it must have been cost-e↵ective to use this technology and/or adapt
it in Canada given the substantial investment of American inventors on Canadian
patent rights. In economic theory, technological change is the one of most important
factors in explaining sustained long-run growth and its significance in di↵erentiat-
ing Canadian success from other settler economies is supported empirically in my
results.
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Table 2.1: Real GDP, Employment & Labour Productivity (1871=100)
Real GDP
Canada Australia
Year Agriculture Industry Services Total Agriculture Industry Services Total
1871 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
1881 156 144 156 153 211 186 160 178
1891 152 217 243 198 305 277 237 263
1901 217 285 401 294 226 255 278 260
1911 299 585 827 542 447 371 413 405
1921 215 529 982 542 437 415 514 465
1931 304 920 1775 935 579 376 544 492
1941/38 303 1633 2633 1391 634 674 756 705
1950 330 2272 3487 1839 948 1001 1026 1003
1960 398 3717 5463 2870 692 1729 1824 1581
1970 486 6435 9276 4822 901 2953 3185 2680
1980 535 8864 15010 7309 1144 3762 4866 3791
1990 679 10842 19709 9387 1475 4849 6845 5154
2000 728 13770 25762 12102 2014 6356 9760 7139
2007 733 14867 31970 14390 1780 7867 12351 8829
Employment
Canada Australia
Year Agriculture Industry Services Total Agriculture Industry Services Total
1871 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
1881 116 112 139 119 – – – –
1891 129 119 203 138 168 158 232 185
1901 126 143 258 152 200 174 297 222
1911 168 217 475 232 246 236 365 282
1921 186 227 623 269 266 251 436 317
1931 204 288 826 329 288 212 465 317
1941/38 204 438 838 372 299 347 541 398
1950 176 554 1144 439 270 511 746 523
1960 122 607 1723 517 252 595 947 618
1970 92 720 2573 671 229 792 1375 831
1980 89 836 3644 876 223 737 1802 951
1990 92 866 4668 1053 228 703 2437 1150
2000 79 923 5448 1190 233 703 2928 1315
2007 83 959 6411 1359 192 819 3502 1541
Labour Productivity
Canada Australia
Year Agriculture Industry Services Total Agriculture Industry Services Total
1871 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
1881 134 129 112 129 – – – –
1891 118 182 120 143 182 175 102 142
1901 172 200 155 193 113 146 94 117
1911 178 269 174 234 181 157 113 144
1921 116 233 158 202 165 165 118 147
1931 149 319 215 284 201 177 117 155
1941/38 148 373 314 374 212 194 140 177
1950 187 410 305 419 351 196 138 192
1960 326 612 317 555 275 291 193 256
1970 525 894 361 719 393 373 232 322
1980 599 1060 412 834 513 510 270 399
1990 740 1252 422 891 648 690 281 448
2000 916 1492 473 1017 864 904 333 543
2007 884 1551 499 1059 927 960 353 573
Canadian Sources: Altman (1992)[2], Urquhart & Buckley (1965)[112], Urquhart (1986)[111],
Buckley et al. (1983)[110], CEO (Various)[15], COC (Various)[83], Firestone (1958)[28],
KLEMS (2008)[74], CANSIM (Various)[26]
Australian Sources: Butlin (1962)[13], Haig (2001)[35], CBCS/ABS (Various)[76], AYB (Various)[75],
Broadberry (2005)[9], Butlin & Dowie (1969)[14]
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Table 2.2: Real GDP & Employment Shares (% of Total)
Real GDP
Canada Australia
Year Agriculture Industry Services Agriculture Industry Services
1871 43 25 32 19 35 47
1881 43 24 33 22 36 42
1891 33 27 40 22 37 42
1901 31 24 44 16 34 50
1911 24 27 49 20 32 48
1921 17 24 59 17 31 52
1931 14 25 62 22 27 52
1941/38 9 29 61 17 33 50
1950 8 31 61 18 35 48
1960 6 32 62 8 38 54
1970 4 33 62 6 38 55
1980 3 30 67 6 34 60
1990 3 29 68 5 33 62
2000 3 28 69 5 31 64
2007 2 26 72 4 31 65
Employment
Canada Australia
Year Agriculture Industry Services Agriculture Industry Services
1871 56 28 16 28 39 33
1881 55 26 19 – – –
1891 52 24 24 25 33 42
1901 47 26 28 25 31 45
1911 41 26 34 24 33 43
1921 39 23 38 23 31 46
1931 35 24 41 25 26 49
1941/38 31 32 37 21 34 45
1950 23 35 43 14 38 48
1960 13 32 54 11 38 51
1970 8 30 63 8 37 55
1980 6 26 68 6 30 63
1990 5 23 72 5 24 71
2000 4 21 75 5 21 74
2007 3 19 77 3 21 76
Canadian Sources: Altman (1992)[2], Urquhart & Buckley (1965)[112], Urquhart (1986)[111],
COC (Various)[83],Firestone (1958)[28], Buckley et al. (1983)[110],
KLEMS (2008)[74], CANSIM (Various)[26]
Australian Sources: Butlin (1962)[13], Haig (2001)[35], CBCS/ABS (Various)[76],
AYB (Various),[75], Broadberry (2005)[9], Butlin & Dowie (1969)[14]
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Table 2.3: 1936/37 PPP Manufacturing
Australia
Sector PPP Value Added (%)
Food, Drink & Tobacco 4.60 24
Rubber Products 5.08 1
Skins & Leather 2.96 2
Textile & Textile Goods 6.02 6
Clothing 4.81 9
Woodworking, Furniture & Other 3.61 8
Industrial Metals, Implements & Other 4.31 34
Precious Metals, Jewellery & Plate 3.67 1
Non-metalliferous Mine Products 4.10 6
Chemicals, Paint, & Oils 3.46 7
Miscellaneous Products 3.32 1
AUS Manufacturing PPP 4.37
Canada
Sector PPP Value Added (%)
Vegetable Products 5.13 19
Animal Products 5.33 9
Textiles & Textile Products 5.23 14
Wood & Paper Products 2.50 21
Iron & Its Products 4.38 15
Non-Ferrous Metals 3.67 9
Non-Metallic Mineral Products 4.58 6
Chemicals & Chemical Products 3.53 6
Miscellaneous Industries 4.37 2
CAN Manufacturing PPP 4.23
Manufacturing PPP 4.30
Sources: See section IV
Notes: Manufacturing PPP is a geometric mean of AUS & CAN PPPs
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Table 2.4: 1936/37 PPP Agriculture, Industry & Services
Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing
Australia Canada
Sector PPP Value Added (%) PPP Value Added (%)
Arable 3.51 32 3.38 –
Dairying, Forestry & Fishing 1.88 19 1.41 –
Pastoral 4.47 49 5.04 –
AUS Agriculture PPP 3.09
CAN Agriculture PPP 2.89
Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing PPP 2.99
Industry
Australia Canada
Sector PPP Value Added (%) PPP Value Added (%)
Mining 4.93 12 4.93 20
Manufacturing 4.30 65 4.30 72
Construction 4.21 23 4.21 9
AUS Industry PPP 4.35
CAN Industry PPP 4.42
Industry PPP 4.39
Services
Australia Canada
Sector PPP Value Added (%) PPP Value Added (%)
Transport & Communications 2.05 11 2.05 36
Property & Finance 6.48 18 6.48 29
Personal, Professional & Domestic 2.71 71 2.71 34
AUS Services PPP 3.31
CAN Services PPP 3.58
Services PPP 3.45
Sources: See section IV
Notes: AUS & CAN PPPs for Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing are based on the geometric mean of sub
categories. Sectoral PPPs are a geometric mean of AUS & CAN Sectoral PPPs. Categories have
been organised to match data in Butlin (1962)[13].
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Table 2.5: Aggregate PPPs
1936/37 PPP
Australia Canada
Sector PPP Value Added (%) Value Added (%)
Agriculture 2.99 24 12
Industry 4.39 25 33
Services 3.45 51 55
AUS Aggregate PPP 3.57
CAN Aggregate PPP 3.71
Aggregate PPP 3.64
1997 PPP
Australia Canada
Sector PPP Value Added (%) Value Added (%)
Agriculture 1.06 3 2
Industry 0.84 25 28
Services 0.82 72 70
AUS Aggregate PPP 0.83
CAN Aggregate PPP 0.83
Aggregate PPP 0.83
Sources: See table 2.4 & KLEMS (2008)[74]
Notes: Aggregate PPPs are a geometric mean of AUS & CAN Aggregate PPPs
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Table 2.6: Correlation Coe cients
REL-
GDP
EXP-
US
IMP-
US MNFG
REL-
TAR
FOR-
PAT
STA-P
STA-
O
REL-GDP 1.00 – – – – – – –
EXP-US 0.40 1.00 – – – – – –
IMP-US 0.87 0.25 1.00 – – – – –
MNFG 0.75 0.39 0.81 1.00 – – – –
REL-TAR -0.34 0.11 -0.27 -0.48 1.00 – – –
FOR-PAT 0.88 0.37 0.76 0.77 -0.43 1.00 – –
STA-P 0.07 0.34 0.01 0.14 0.05 0.16 1.00 –
STA-O 0.20 -0.20 0.37 0.23 0.06 0.01 -0.33 1.00
Notes: REL-GDP is relative Canadian over Australian GDP per Capita, EXP-US is the share of
Canadian exports going to the United States, IMP-US is the share of Canadian imports
coming from the United States, MNFG is the manufactured share of Canadian exports,
REL-TAR is the e↵ective tari↵ rate in Canada relative to Australia, FOR-PAT is the share
of Canadian patents issued to foreign residents, STA-P is the relative price index of staple
exports in Canada with Australia, STA-O is the relative real output index of Canada with
Australia. Complete data are for 1875-1970.
Table 2.7: Granger Causality Wald Tests
Equation Excluded Chi2 DF P Value
REL-GDP EXP-US 2.703 2 0.259
EXP-US REL-GDP 1.7457 2 0.418
REL-GDP IMP-US 4.2442 2 0.120
IMP-US REL-GDP 1.6769 2 0.432
REL-GDP MNFG 4.497 2 0.106
MNFG REL-GDP 0.39092 2 0.822
REL-GDP REL-TAR 0.98176 2 0.612
REL-TAR REL-GDP 4.0464 2 0.132
REL-GDP FOR-PAT 11.67 2 0.003
FOR-PAT REL-GDP 15.391 2 0.000
REL-GDP STA-P 1.3819 2 0.501
STA-P REL-GDP 3.9476 2 0.139
REL-GDP STA-O 7.0557 2 0.029
STA-O REL-GDP 5.6711 2 0.059
Sources: See section III.1
Notes: Variables as defined in table 2.6. Complete data are for 1875-1970.
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Table 2.8: Regression Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES REL-GDP REL-GDP REL-GDP GRO-GDP GRO-GDP GRO-GDP
EXP-US 0.431*** 0.261** 0.106 0.0716
(0.0681) (0.101) (0.0922) (0.0771)
IMP-US 1.121*** 0.116
(0.141) (0.204)
MNFG -0.300*** 0.0399 -0.102 -0.0505
(0.0630) (0.0730) (0.0890) (0.0574)
REL-TAR -0.115*** -0.0338
(0.0408) (0.0497)
FOR-PAT 1.203*** 1.851*** 0.403* 0.416**
(0.163) (0.169) (0.207) (0.201)
STA-P -2.440 3.441
(4.401) (4.115)
STA-O 0.0245* 0.0605*** 0.0163 0.0140
(0.0130) (0.0145) (0.0137) (0.0111)
EXP-US 1 0.259*** 0.0548
(0.0653) (0.0698)
IMP-US 1 0.652*** -0.0447
(0.156) (0.173)
FOR-PAT 1 1.261*** 0.337*
(0.155) (0.203)
STA-O 1 0.0333** 0.0128
(0.0142) (0.0120)
REL-GDP 1 -0.240** -0.207** -0.196*
(0.107) (0.0792) (0.109)
Constant -94.17*** -99.42*** -83.31*** -23.83 -21.66 -13.51
(11.39) (14.15) (8.246) (15.89) (14.23) (12.95)
RESET 0.001 0.0094 0.1672 0.0013 0.0295 0.0286
Observations 96 96 96 96 96 96
R2 0.901 0.823 0.869 0.114 0.101 0.085
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Sources: See section III.1 for a description of variables.
Notes: Most variables as defined in table 2.6 GRO-GDP is the growth rate of GDP in Canada
minus Australia (or the growth rate of Canadian over Australian GDP). Variables with a  1
subscript have been lagged by one year. Complete data are for 1875-1970.
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Figure 2.3: CAN/AUS PPP Adjusted Aggregate Real GDP Per Capita
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Figure 2.4: CAN/AUS PPP Adjusted Real GDP Per Capita in Agriculture
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Figure 2.5: CAN/AUS PPP Adjusted Real GDP Per Capita in Industry
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Figure 2.6: CAN/AUS PPP Adjusted Real GDP Per Capita in Services
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Figure 2.7: CAN/AUS PPP Adjusted Aggregate Labour Productivity
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Figure 2.8: CAN/AUS PPP Adjusted Labour Productivity in Agriculture
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Figure 2.9: CAN/AUS PPP Adjusted Labour Productivity in Industry
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Figure 2.10: CAN/AUS PPP Adjusted Labour Productivity in Services
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Figure 2.11: Share of CAN Imports from and Exports to the USA and GBR
!"
#!"
$!"
%!"
&!"
'!"
(!"
)!"
*!"
+!"
#!!"
#*
)#
"
#*
)'
"
#*
)+
"
#*
*%
"
#*
*)
"
#*
+#
"
#*
+'
"
#*
++
"
#+
!%
"
#+
!)
"
#+
##
"
#+
#'
"
#+
#+
"
#+
$%
"
#+
$)
"
#+
%#
"
#+
%'
"
#+
%+
"
#+
&%
"
#+
&)
"
#+
'#
"
#+
''
"
#+
'+
"
#+
(%
"
#+
()
"
#+
)#
"
#+
)'
"
#+
)+
"
#+
*%
"
#+
*)
"
#+
+#
"
#+
+'
"
#+
++
"
$!
!%
"
$!
!)
"
!"
#$
%&
'(
&)
'*
#+
&,-
.&
,-./012"1/"3454"
67./012"80/7"3454"
,-./012"1/"3494"
67./012"80/7"3494"
Sources: CYB (Various)[18], Buckley et. al. (1983)[110]
Figure 2.12: Relative USA and GBR Shares of Canadian Manufactured Exports
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Figure 2.13: Manufactured Share of Total Canadian Exports
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Figure 2.14: Canadian & Australian Relative Duties on Imports
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Figure 2.15: Share of Canadian Patents Issued to Foreign Residents
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Figure 2.16: Real Value of Principal Canadian Staple Exports (1911 Prices)
Sources: TTNC (1869-1908)[71], ARTC (1909-1982)[81]
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Figure 2.17: Real Value of Principal Australian Staple Exports (1911 Prices)
Sources: SRNSW (1871-1899)[78], ASTA (1899-1976)[80]
Figure 2.18: Real Value of CAN/AUS Staple Exports in a Base Year (1871=100)
Sources: TTNC (1869-1908)[71], ARTC (1909-1982)[81], SRNSW (1871-1899)[78], SRVIC (1871-
1899)[87], ASTA (1899-1976)[80]
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Chapter 3
Manufacturing Success in the
Nineteenth Century: An
Application of Data
Envelopment Analysis
I Introduction to Chapter 3
On the 4th of May 1886 the Indian and Colonial Exhibition was opened in South
Kensington. The Canadian display at this exhibit had been much more impor-
tant than at the 1876 Centennial Exhibit, both in the quantity and quality of its
contributions. According to contemporary British accounts,
this progress (since 1876) does not confine itself to machinery, agricul-
ture and forestry but is especially noticeable in manufactures of all kinds,
showing, not only an increase of intelligence and industry, but also of
population and wealth. In point of fact, in many ways Canada now com-
pares well with the United States, and even with this country (Britain),
for the bulk of the manufactured goods shown, if they lack artistic finish
of design, are certainly equal to anything we can produce in quality.1
Canada received the largest exhibit space of any Dominion, 73,830 square
feet. The London Times remarked how Canada was spread ‘almost all over the
building, from the gateways of British Guiana and the West Indies on the one side
1The Morning Post, June 2nd 1886.
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to the frontiers of Natal and the Cape on the other.’2 While the Australasian and
South African colonies chose to focus on the more ‘un-English’ artefacts and raw
materials of their lands, Canada presented a homely and familiar court where En-
glish industries appeared to have been duplicated and made identical to those in
Britain.3 This is not to suggest that no showing was made of Canadian resources
or agriculture (there was a large display on salmon breeding, examples of arable
marvels, an authentic fur trader and a large display on Canadian forestry, to name
a few). However, the most striking aspect of the Canadian exhibit was the advance-
ment of its industrial abilities since the 1870s. A full account of the machinery in
the Canadian exhibit would require significant digression and so the discussion here
must be limited. Of particular importance were advances in iron and steel that per-
mitted the manufacture of numerous agricultural implements; self-binders, reapers,
mowers, horse-rakes, seeders, harrows, ploughs, scrapers, rollers, cultivators, fanning
mills, threshing machines, and general harvesting machinery. These were exhibited
by Canadian industrialists who could rival many in the United States and Britain;
Masey Manufacturing Company of Toronto, the Watson Manufacturing Company
of Ayr, the Cockshutt Plough Company and Elliott and Sons of Ontario. Many
other categories of Canadian manufacturing were particularly surprising to British
and Colonial visitors to the exhibition such as textiles, furniture and musical instru-
ments.
Given these contemporary accounts from the 1880s it seems odd to approach the
study of Canadian manufacturing with condemnation. Yet the traditional argument
claims that Canadian manufacturing su↵ered from relatively low labour productivity
and income per capita. As Keay puts it, ‘in much of this work (traditional literature
on Canadian manufacturing) the Canadians’ performance has been found to be lack-
ing relative to some international, usually American, standard.’4 Should we accept
the traditional United States centric view that Canada was an industrial laggard
with a poorly developed manufacturing sector before 1900? If not then how can
we reconcile the two opposing views on Canadian manufacturing? Was the fanfare
at the Colonial and Indian Exhibit justified or were the toasts of rival Dominions
cheap talk? This paper seeks to address the question of Canadian success by plac-
ing Canadian manufacturing into the context of other ‘settler economies’. Focus
is on a comparison of Ontario and Quebec with Victoria, New South Wales, New
2The London Times, 6th of August.
3Tellingly the Cape Colony chose not exhibit any manufactured implements at the 1886 exhibit
and there is no record of agricultural implement factories in the Cape Colony in the 1891, 1904 or
1911 censuses.
4Keay (1999)[46], pg. 5.
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Zealand and the Cape Colony, rather than country wide comparisons. This regional
approach seems more appropriate as it isolates the study to the most advanced cen-
tres of manufacturing in each country.5 Data on several aspects of manufacturing
are used to shed light on the relative development and e ciency of manufacturing
in settler economies. In response to recent studies that suggest partial factor pro-
ductivity is insu cient to gauge the comparative success of manufacturing I employ
two theoretical approaches, Growth Accounting and Data Envelopment Analysis
(DEA). These approaches are utilised to obtain overall measures of e ciency that
combine all available information on manufacturing inputs and outputs.
II Overview on Manufacturing
Since World War Two there has been significant debate on the development of Cana-
dian manufacturing following confederation. Traditionally, Canadian manufacturing
is argued to have been sluggish in the period before 1900 with relatively low output
growth in manufacturing corresponding with a collapse in the export of established
staples such as fish, furs and timber. Traditionalists argue that manufacturing out-
put grew rapidly after 1900 with the onset of booms in both wheat and minerals.
Traditionalists also typically contend that manufacturing was encouraged by various
trade and tari↵ policies intended to support import substitution. Authors such as
Gordon Bertram challenged a traditional view of rapid manufacturing growth after
1900, claiming a more gradual process occurred from 1870 onward.6 According to
the gradualist view secondary manufacturing developed relatively independently of
the traditional staples to satisfy growing domestic (and later international) demand.
More recent work by Mac Urquhart and Morris Altman has criticised the gradual-
ist view and supported the traditionalists, arguing that manufacturing growth was
extremely rapid after 1900 and fairly dismal before 1900.7 Consensus has yet to be
reached, however most agree that manufacturing growth was strong in the period
from 1900 to 1910 and weak in the recession period of the early 1890s before the
onset of the wheat boom.
Shifting away from the overall growth story there were some interesting develop-
ments from 1870 to 1910 in terms of the structure of manufacturing in Canada. Ac-
cording to Norrie and Owram, the distribution of gross domestic product revealed
5In much of the analysis the mention of Canada will imply Ontario and Quebec more precisely.
6See Bertram (1964)[7] for the original source or Norrie and Owram (1991)[66] for a summary.
7See Urquhart, M.C. (1986)[111] and Altman, M. (1987) for the original source or Norrie and
Owram (1991)[66] for a summary.
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a clear hierarchy of manufacturing activity in 1870. Wood products (principally
planks and boards) were at the top of the hierarchy; iron and steel products (in-
cluding agricultural implements, foundry and machine shop products, boilers and
engines, cutting and edging tools, pumps and windmills, sewing machines and wire),
leather products and food and beverage products were second in importance; trans-
portation and clothing came third; textiles (excluding clothing), nonmetallic miner-
als and printing and publishing were the least significant categories. This hierarchy
had broken down by 1900 with wood products giving way to food and beverages and
iron and steel products. The rest of the hierarchy had dissolved into a continuous
step pattern of importance.8
Substantial growth in manufacturing from 1870 to 1900 occurred either in fields
related to new resource products (Nonferrous metals, paper, chemicals, hydro-
electricity and electrical apparatus and nonmetallic minerals) or to import com-
peting industries selling finished goods to the domestic market (Rubber, textiles,
printing and publishing, tobacco, clothing, miscellaneous industries and food and
beverages). Growth in manufacturing from 1900 to 1910 was influenced heavily by
the opening of the prairies and westward expansion. The classic example is the iron
and steel industry which was spurred to rapid growth by increased demand and
technological change promoting lower input costs in production.
Table 3.1 compares the share of value added in manufacturing for Canada, Victoria
and New Zealand in 1890, 1900 and 1910 based on census data. Manufacturing in
Canada appears to have been more diverse than in New Zealand and possibly even
more so than in Victoria. Metal works, food and beverages and clothing and textiles
made up the lions share of value added in Victoria’s manufacturing from 1890 to
1910. Wood products were highly significant in both Victoria and New Zealand. In
Victoria they had diminished in importance by 1900 but they were still significant
relative to most other categories. In New Zealand wood products were a very im-
portant manufacturing category before World War One.
All of the settler economies were heavily orientated towards the manufacture of
food and beverage products before World War One. For Victoria food and bever-
ages made up 24.9%, slightly more than metal products at 19.5%. For New Zealand
food and beverage products held the largest share by some margin making up 42.2%
of value added. Both Victoria and New Zealand’s share of value added in food and
beverage products peaked in 1900 at 36.5% and 48.3% respectively. In Canada, food
and beverage manufacturing made up a slightly smaller figure between 16-18% of
value added. Food and beverage manufacturing was of course related to agriculture
8Norrie and Owram (1991)[66].
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since many agricultural materials such as milk were used as inputs in production.
It stands to reason that Canada’s smaller share of value added in food and bever-
ages indicates it had further developed its secondary manufacturing sector. This is
evident given the significant share of value added in iron, steel and other metals.
Since year book data organised agricultural implements and other machinery into
the miscellaneous category the figures actually understate the level of secondary
manufacturing in Canada relative to other settler economies. If issues of data or-
ganisation were taken into account then Canada would have a comparable share of
manufacturing in metal products and machinery.
Unlike Canada and Victoria, metal manufacturing was not an important category
for New Zealand making up between 6 to 10% of total value added. Clothing and
textiles were also less important in New Zealand than in Canada where they made
up approximately 15% of value added. Printing and bookbinding were significant in
both Victoria and Canada in 1890 but did not become relatively important in New
Zealand until much later. Clearly manufacturing in Victoria and Canada was based
more on the production of metal products, machinery and textiles (likely for the do-
mestic market) while New Zealand was heavily dependent on converting its arable,
pastoral and forest products into goods that could be exported. The next section
describes the availability of data and its comparability over time. Later sections deal
with the issues inherent in cross country comparisons using manufacturing data and
present a compromise categorisation of data on consistent basis.
III Data: Characteristics and Limitations
III.1 Raw Manufacturing Data
Manufacturing data on the number of establishments, hands employed, wages paid,
capital owned, materials used and gross output generated are available at a fairly
desegregated level for the Canadian provinces, Victoria, New South Wales, New
Zealand and the Cape Colony. Canadian factories were enumerated in census years
and published in the Canadian Year Book in 15 categories including food products,
textiles, iron and steel products, timber and lumber manufactures, leather products,
paper and printing, liquors and beverages, chemicals and allied products, clay and
glass products, metal products (other than iron and steel), tobacco manufactures,
vehicles for land, vehicles for water, miscellaneous industries and hand trades. This
organisation of the data was based on the 1901 census where these categories first
appeared. Although earlier censuses organised data on manufactories into several
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alternative categories, the year books reorganised previously categorised data in or-
der to analyse changes over time.
Unfortunately, only the data for Canada as a whole, rather than the individual
provinces, was published in the Year Books and no record was left on how the sub-
categories of manufactories were organised into major categories. This implies that
one must make an educated guess on how industrial subcategories should be organ-
ised and adjust this organisation until the correct totals for major categories are
obtained. The 1871 census enumerated 140 distinct factory subcategories while the
1881 census enumerated 176 subcategories. After carefully applying this approach I
have successfully determined the correct organisation of industry types into the year
book categories by province for 1870 and 1880. In 1890 there were several subcat-
egories that could not be perfectly matched since the year books have inexplicably
excluded some of the manufactories from the original census.9 The 330 distinct
industry subcategories have been organised into the most appropriate major cate-
gories with very little discrepancy relative to the Year Book totals. Another issue
in organising manufactories according to the Year Books was the inconsistency over
time for which the Year Books were responsible. For example, carpentry and joinery
were included as hand trades in 1871 but were moved to the miscellaneous category
in 1891.
Furthermore, it is impossible to organise the manufactories from the 1901 and 1911
censuses into the corresponding Year Book categories at the provincial level since
they were not reported adequately. Both the 1901 and the 1911 censuses do not
provide the same level of detail on minor categories of manufactories at the provin-
cial level, as at the federal level, rendering the same organisation of data impossible.
Appendix tables B.1 and B.2 display manufactories for Ontario and Quebec in 1870
and 1880 using the Year Book categories. The Year Book data for 1890, 1900 and
1910 are presented in appendix table B.3.
Manufacturing activity in Victoria was being enumerated yearly by 1870. Data on
the number of establishments, hands employed, the value of land, building and ma-
chinery and the horsepower used in each factory type are contained in the annual
volumes of the Statistical Registers for the Colony of Victoria. However, the value
of materials used and output generated in each factory were only enumerated in
census years and are available in Victorian Year Books.10 The first census where
9Most categories have been perfectly determined in 1891, any categories that could not be
perfectly determined had only a very minor discrepancy with the year book totals.
10Paradoxically the data enumerated during census years for Victoria and New South Wales were
not published with other census data, as in Canada, New Zealand and the Cape Colony, but were
made available in government Gazette’s and Year Books.
60
materials used and output generated were enumerated was in 1880. Victoria’s facto-
ries were organised into approximately 19 major categories, depending on the census
year, that were then subdivided into minor classes. Major categories in the 1911
census for Victoria were: treating raw materials, oils and fats, processes relating to
stone, clay and glass, working in wood, metal works and machinery, food and drink,
clothing, textiles, and fibrous materials, books, paper, printing and engraving, mu-
sical instruments, arms and explosives, vehicles and fittings (including saddlery and
harness), shipbuilding, furniture and bedding, drugs, chemicals and by-products,
surgical and scientific appliances, timepieces, jewellery and platedware, heat, light
and energy, leatherware and miscellaneous. I have organised the 125 (105) subcate-
gories of manufacturing in 1890 (1900) into the major categories set out in the 1911
census. The results are displayed in appendix table B.4.
Data on manufacturing for New South Wales was organised under the same cate-
gorisation as Victoria after 1896 and published in fragments amongst the Statistical
Registers and Year Books. However, data availability for New South Wales before
1896 was less robust than for Victoria. For completeness I have included New South
Wales data for 1890 despite the inability to organise sub categories of manufactories.
The data for 1890, 1900 and 1910 are provided in appendix table B.5.
Excellent manufacturing data exist for New Zealand beginning in 1886. Although
factories were enumerated in New Zealand back to the 1871 census there was no at-
tempt to estimate the value of materials used or output generated for each category
of manufacturing before 1886. The 1911 census organised 97 subcategories of fac-
tory type into 27 major categories. These categories were: animal food, vegetable
food, drinks, narcotics and stimulants, animal matters, working in wood, fodder,
paper, gasworks, electric light and supply, electric tramways, stone, clay and glass,
metals (other than gold and silver), publications, musical instruments, ornaments
and other small wares, equipment for sports and games, designs, medals, type and
dies, ammunition, machines, tools and implements, carriages and vehicles, harness
and saddlery, ships and boats, furniture, chemicals and allied, textile fabrics, dress
and fibrous materials. I have taken the 86 (110) subcategories from the 1891 (1901)
census and organised these into the major categories from the 1911 census. Ap-
pendix table B.6 displays the results.
Cape Colony manufactories were enumerated in the censuses of 1891, 1904 and
1911. The 1904 census organised the specific classes of manufactories into 24 broad
categories: animal foods, vegetable foods, drinks, narcotics and stimulants, animal
matters (not otherwise classed), vegetable matters (not otherwise classed), wood
products, houses and buildings, furniture, carriages and vehicles, harness and sad-
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dlery, ships and boats, printers and bookbinders, designs and type, lighting, dress,
textile fabrics, dye and cleaning works, fibrous materials, metals (other than gold
and silver), processes relating to stone, clay and glass, chemicals, production of salt,
arms and explosives, gold, silver and precious stones, small wares (not otherwise
classed). The 1911 census continued to organise manufacturing around the 1904
categories. For comparison over time I have organised data on manufactories in the
1891 census in terms of the 1904 census.11 Table B.7 displays Cape Colony manu-
facturing according to the 1904 categories.
No equivalent to the SIC in manufacturing existed in censuses before World War
One. Cross-country comparisons by category of manufacturing require some re-
organisation in order to standardise the various divisions. It would be inappropriate
to use raw data on manufacturing organised into each country’s census or year book
categories for cross-country comparisons. One must understand both the limita-
tions of this data for comparison and undertake the task of organising the data into
consistent cross-country categories.
III.2 Technicalities of Enumerations
Of course one problem that exists in cross-country comparisons of manufacturing is
the incompatibility of estimates based on di↵erences in data collection. In Australia
each colony imposed its own definition of factories and persons employed.12 Before
1896, establishments in New South Wales were enumerated if they were engaged
in manufacturing activity using machinery or where no machinery was used if at
least five or more hands were employed. The definition of a factory before 1896 was
more complex in Victoria. Enumerators were instructed to return all manufacturing
establishments where steam, gas or water-power was used but not to return retail
clothing establishments employing less than ten, nor retail boot factories employ-
ing less than five hands, and to exclude all persons connected with the commercial
branch of a business. In 1896, Victoria and New South Wales agreed to adopt a
common system of the term factory. According to the 1896 agreement a factory was
any, ‘factory, workshop, or mill where four or more persons are employed or power
is used’. This change implied that for both New South Wales and Victoria four em-
11In a few cases it was impossible to separate data on some classes of manufacturing to conform
to the exact categories from 1904. As a result I have combined data on carriage and vehicle
manufactories with harness and saddlery, printers and bookbinders have been combined with design
and type works and textiles, fabrics, dye and cleaning works have been combined with chemicals
and salt production.
12Australian statisticians have suggested this was due to the relatively minor place that manu-
facturing held in relation to total economic activity.
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ployees were necessary for enumeration after 1896. Enumerators were instructed to
record all manufacturing with less four hands only if steam, gas, electric, water, wind
or horse power was employed. However, a final stipulation allowed for the inclu-
sion of all industries of ‘unusual or interesting character’. The remaining Australian
States accepted the Victorian definition at the Conference of State Statisticians in
1902.
New Zealand adopted the same enumeration definitions as Victoria and New South
Wales after 1896. The 1896 census provides an adjustment for the 1891 and 1886 cen-
sus’ of industries to bring their summary data in line with the 1896 definition. An-
other issue was the inclusion of tailoring, dressmaking and millinery (shirt-making),
stone-quarrying, monumental masonry, tramways, engineering, wire working, as-
phalting, jewellery manufacture and fencing-standard making in the 1901 census
but not in earlier enumerations. The 1901 and 1911 censuses include an adjusted
series that removes these industries in order to keep the sample consistent over
time. I have chosen to remove stone-quarrying but keep all remaining data in or-
der to maintain consistency with data for other colonies. A further issue with New
Zealand data was the number of industries that were recorded both within their
appropriate subcategory in terms of hands employed and horse power used but in
an undisclosed category in terms of materials used and the value of output. Since
it would be impossible to disaggregate the undisclosed data, I have considered all
data from these partially undisclosed firms as being undisclosed.
Censuses enumerated for the Cape Colony included all establishments with an an-
nual amount of goods produced in excess of £100. One of the biggest issues in
using data on the Cape Colony to make comparisons is in the treatment of mines
and quarries. Diamond mining became a major industry of the Cape Colony after
diamonds were discovered in the 1860s. Estimates of capital intensity are heavily
influenced by the inclusion of diamond mining in summary statistics for industry
but much of this is due to the perceived value of land rather than plant and ma-
chinery. The most straight forward way to deal with this issue is exclude quarrying
and mining from data on industries. Another approach is to drop any data from
Kimberley out of the sample. Since quarrying has been removed from the industry
data in the other colonies I have chosen this approach.
The 1901 Canadian census defined a factory as
any premises, building, room or place where steam, water or other power
is used to move or work machinery employed in preparing, manufacturing
or finishing any article, substance, material, fabric or compound, or to
aid the manufacturing process carried on there, or any premises, build-
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ing, room or place wherein the employer of the persons working there
has the right of access and control, and in which any manual labour is
exercised by way of trade or for purposes of gain, in making, altering,
repairing, ornamenting or finishing any article or part of article to adapt
it for sale.13
Essentially the Canadian enumerators were concerned with distinguishing between
domestic or hand labour and factory labour. The Factory Act in Ontario only
applied if more than five persons were employed in any appropriately defined estab-
lishment. None of the five could be children unless steam, water or other motive
power was used in the aid of manufacturing. This was the basis for the enumerators
of the Canadian census who took the term ‘manufacturing establishment or factory’
to imply ‘no manufacturing establishment or factory will be so recognised for census
purposes which does not employ at least five persons, either in the establishment
itself or as piece-workers employed out of it.’14 As in the case of Victoria certain
concessions were made for ‘special industries’. Butter and cheese factories and brick
and tile works were enumerated even if they contained fewer than five employees
since they were often large scale capital intensive operations that required few hands.
This became true of many industries as capital intensity increased. The 1906 and
1911 censuses extended this exemption on the number of employees to flour mills,
gristing mills and electric light plants. The 1911 census also exempted saw mills,
shingle mills, fish curing plants and lime kilns.
Prior to 1901, Canadian censuses attempted to enumerate all factories regardless
of the number of hands employed. This basis for enumeration generates the most
serious issues for cross-country comparisons and comparisons over time. The change
in definition had a significant impact on the number of factories enumerated. The
1901 census estimates that the number of factories enumerated in 1891 under the
1901 definitions would have been 14,065 rather than 75,964. This implies there
were 61,899 factories with less than five hands. Wages and salaries paid would have
fallen from $100,415,350 to $79,234,311. The value of output produced would have
declined from $469,907,886 to $368,696723. Although it is important to remember
that the enumerators in 1891 may have included some of these smaller factories even
under the 1901 definitions given the ‘special character’ or power employed.15
Practically, all of these cross-country di↵erences imply that small factories were ig-
nored when there were tighter definitions of what constitutes a ‘factory’ or where a
13Census of Canada (1901)[83], Section III Manufactures, pg. vi.
14Census of Canada (1901)[83], Section III Manufactures, pg. vi.
15Census of Canada (1901)[83], Section III Manufactures, pg. lxv.
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larger number of employees were required for enumeration. Presumably this would
tend to remove the less e cient small scale factories and increase estimates of capital
per worker and output per worker. For some industries it is impossible to predict
how cross-country comparisons would be biased since enumerators included all es-
tablishments for some industries based on the use of motive power or based on the
high capital intensity of firms in that industry.
However, some perspective is necessary in order to understand the magnitude of
the problem. Consider the adjustment needed in 1896 to bring the definition of a
factory for Victoria and New South Wales together. The adjustment required Vic-
toria to add 51 dressmaking and millinery factories, 68 tailoring factories, 4 boot
factories and 8 railway workshops to the its original 1896 enumeration. It also had
to subtract 210 factories, in which the hands fell below four, that would have been
included before the 1896 definition. The overall result of this was an increase of 2742
hands employed, £40,020 of machinery and plant, £66,700 of land and £86,970 of
buildings. These adjustments represent about 1% of the capital stock and 3% of
labour employed.16 It seems highly unlikely that this bias would be so great as to
influence cross-state or cross-country comparisons to the point where broad gener-
alisations would be considered inaccurate.
Consider a second example for Canada. Exceptions for special industries with fewer
than five hands added to the 1906 and 1911 censuses resulted in an increase of
$8,886,303 to the value of capital in 1905 and $14,658,010 in 1910, $8,901,486 to
the value of products in 1905 and $17,753,848 in 1910. These changes represented
approximately 1% of the value of capital in 1905 and 1910, 1.25% of the value
of products in 1905 and 1.5% in 1910. Similar figures could be furnished for the
adjustments in the enumeration for New Zealand or the Cape Colony.
III.3 A Time Consistent Cross-Country Organisation
In order to accurately compare the characteristics of manufacturing over time and
across countries it is necessary to match disaggregated data into consistent interna-
tional subcategories of manufacturing. To this end, I have created a set of universal
categories for manufacturing activity by observing the limitations of cross-country
data and reorganising appropriately. The universal subcategories are then aggre-
gated into broad but consistent major categories. There are 16 major categories of
well matched data. The universal major categories are as follows: food products
which contains the subcategories dairy produce (principally butter and cheese), meat
and fish (slaughtering, preserving and packing), bread, biscuits and confectionary
16Adjustments calculated from information in the 1895 Year Book for Victoria.
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(including sugars), flouring and grist mills, fruit and vegetable preserving and can-
ning, co↵ee, chicory, cocoa, and spices, salt works and starches, ice and cold stor-
age, baking powder and flavouring; textiles which contains the subcategories wollen
goods, hats, caps and furs, awnings, tents and sails (including oilskin and water-
proof materials), men’s clothing (tailoring), women’s clothing (dressmaking and
millinery), cordage, rope and twine, dressed flax and seeds, hosiery and knits; iron
and steel which contains the subcategories wire working, engineering and foundaries,
cutlery, edge tools, nails, lead, and machinery; timber and lumber which contains
the subcategories saw milling, moulding and joinery, furniture, upholstered goods
and billiard tables, basket making, picture frames, woodcarving and turnery, cooper-
age, boxes and cases; leather products which contains the subcategories boots and
shoes, tanneries, fellmongeries and wool-washing, harness and saddlery (including
whips); paper and printing which contains the subcategories paper boxes, ink, print-
ing, bookbinding, publishing, engraving, stereotyping and electrotyping, stationary
goods, account-books, paper, cardboard and strawboard, rubber stamps (including
other rubber goods); liquors and drinks which contains the subcategories liquor,
malt, wine, distilleries and breweries, aerated and mineral waters; chemicals and
drugs (including allied products) which contains the subcategories chemicals, drugs
and medicines, paints, varnishes, fertilizers and tallow (including bone milling and
boiling down); clay, glass and stone which contains the subcategories cement, lime
and plaster, brick, tile, pottery and glass, stone and marble sawing, monumental
stone; metal manufactures which contains the subcategories smelting, goldsmithing,
jewellery and electroplating, plumbing and tinsmithing (including sheet iron and
japanning); tobacco has no standard subcategories but contains all manufactur-
ing related to smoking, chewing and snu↵, cigars and cigarettes; vehicles for land
contains the subcategories carriages, waggons, railway coaches, cars and bicycles,
vehicles for water contains no standard subcategories but includes all manufacturing
of boats and ships (including building and repairs), docks, and patent slips; miscel-
laneous which contains the subcategories umbrellas, brooms and brushes, blacking
and washing compounds, soap and candles, agricultural implements, musical, sci-
entific and surgical instruments, mattress and spring beds; power and light which
contains the subcategories gasworks, electric light and power, other light and power
(including electric apparatus, matches, lamps, charcoal dust and hydraulic power);
hand trades which contains the subcategories dyeing, cleaning and scouring, black-
smithing.
All of the remaining types of factories listed for each country have been organised
into an unmatched and undisclosed category. If the type of factory fit the description
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of one of the major categories but was missing from all other countries then it was
included in the unmatched category. For the purpose of cross country comparison I
have chosen to combine the data for Ontario and Quebec. Although it was impossi-
ble to disaggregate the provincial data according to Canada Year Book categories,
it was possible to disaggregate provincial data according to my universal categories.
This was due to the fact that the most important subcategories of manufacturing
were available and could be matched while all others were placed in an unmatched
category.
IV Cross-Country Comparisons of Manufacturing
IV.1 Relative Value Added
Although Canadian firms have often been shown to have been less productive than
American firms in the long nineteenth century, very little work has been done to
determine if this relationship holds relative to other countries. The primary goal of
this paper is to determine Canadian performance relative to other settler economies.
Table 3.5 shows net output per establishment and net output per worker for Victoria,
New South Wales, New Zealand and the Cape Colony relative to Canada (Ontario
and Quebec). Before 1890 Canadian firms were at a disadvantage in terms of net
output generated. The Australasian colonies had approximately four times the net
output per establishment and higher levels of net output per worker. In 1890 the
Cape Colony was ahead in terms of net output per establishment but had slightly
less net output per worker. By 1900 the situation had changed dramatically. Cana-
dian manufacturers generated a higher net output per establishment than all other
settler economies. Although New Zealand and New South Wales still had higher
levels of net output per worker, Canada had overtaken Victoria. By 1910 Canada
dominated all other settler economies in terms of net output in manufacturing both
on a per firm or per worker basis. For example, Victoria and the Cape Colony were
generating only half of Canadian net output per worker in 1910.
This was a dramatic turn of events, Canada moved from having the lowest value
added in its manufacturing sector, on either a per establishment or per worker basis,
to having the highest in under thirty years. Even at an early stage Canadian iron
and steel manufactures performed well, as did chemical products, metal manufac-
tures and the production of some miscellaneous goods. Food products remained an
area of relatively low net output per establishment and per worker. Hence cross-
country data on net output seems to support the view that Canadian manufacturing
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generated low levels of labour productivity before 1890 and that something changed
before, rather than after the turn of the century. It is apparent that manufacturing
in Canada did advance rapidly after 1900 to the point where it was a compara-
tively productive sector by 1910. The connection between Canada’s economic boom
around 1900 with increased manufacturing activity is clear. This is highly sug-
gestive evidence that manufacturing played a key part in Canada catching-up on
other settler economies before World War One. The following several sections of
this paper attempt to address the role of extensive and intensive growth in relative
manufacturing success.
IV.2 Capital Intensity
Why did Canada have relatively low net output before 1890 and high net output af-
terwards? Previous studies have suggested that most nineteenth century Canadian
manufacturers operated at a smaller scale of production with relatively low capital
intensity relative to American manufacturers. Accordingly, levels of manufacturing
e ciency in Canada failed to match the United States. This argument is convinc-
ing given the size and particularly impressive endowments of land and coal in the
United States. However, A more interesting and unanswered question remains, was
Canadian manufacturing in the long nineteenth century operating at a smaller scale
with less capital intensity when compared with other settler economies? Table 3.2
displays the machinery, plant and implements per establishment and per worker for
Victoria, New South Wales, New Zealand and the Cape Colony relative to Ontario
and Quebec.
In the 1880s, Canada clearly had a lower capital intensity both on a per establish-
ment basis and a per worker basis in all areas of manufacturing when compared
with other settler economies. The story was more mixed in 1890. Overall Canada
was still less capital intensive than the other settler economies, including the Cape
Colony. Victoria remained the most capital intensive of the colonies by a significant
margin.17 However, Canada was more capital intensive than New Zealand and the
Cape Colony in several important categories of manufacturing including iron and
steel, metal manufacturing and paper and printing. By 1900 Canada was at least as
capital intensive as any of the other settler economies aside from New South Wales
(New South Wales had a slight advantage in capital per establishment and capital
per worker). In some categories such as iron and steel, Canada was noticeably more
17No data could be presented on New South Wales in 1890 which was likely very similar to
Victoria given its high capital intensity in 1900.
68
capital intensive by 1900. Over the next decade Canada moved well ahead of the
other colonies in terms of capital per establishment and capital per worker. By
1910, both overall and in virtually every category of manufacturing, save food and
tobacco products, Canada had become the most capital intensive country.
In summary, it seems that Canada was guilty of a low level of capital intensity rela-
tive to other settler economies up to the 1890s. From the 1890s Canadian manufac-
turing began catching-up in terms of capital intensity, a process that was complete
before World War One. This epoch of capital accumulation in Canadian manufac-
turing from the 1890s to World War One coincides directly with the onset of the
Canadian Wheat Boom and Canada’s overall process of catching-up on world lead-
ers in terms of GDP per worker and GDP per capita. Hence, the aggregate picture
is consistent with manufacturing success driven by capital accumulation in the late
nineteenth century.
IV.3 Horse Power of Engines
The introduction of steam, gas, oil and electricity as a source of power in nine-
teenth century manufacturing heralded major advances in production.18 If Canadian
manufacturers operated at a smaller scale than their counterparts in other settler
economies then one would expect a much lower usage of these advanced forms of
power that require a greater capital investment. No data is available on the horse
power of engines used in Canadian manufacturing before the 1901 census. A com-
parison of engine horse power by category of manufacturing for 1900 and 1910 are
shown in table 3.3. In both 1900 and 1910 Canadian manufacturers were using sig-
nificantly higher amounts of engine power in production. The Australasian colonies
were using between one third and one half the horse power generated from engines
while the Cape Colony was using only one tenth. Canada was using particularly
high levels of engine power in the production of iron and steel products, leather
products and land vehicles. The only categories of manufacturing where Canada
exhibited a relatively low usage of engine power were clay, stone and glass prod-
ucts and tobacco products. Again these results imply a larger scale of production
and a higher capital intensity in Canadian manufacturing relative to other settler
economies from at least 1900 and possibly earlier. It is likely given the evidence pre-
sented above that capital intensity coupled with the use of engine power were higher
in Canadian manufacturing around 1890. This suggests that capital accumulation
during the 1880s and 1890s played a key role in Canada’s ability to overtake its ri-
18I have excluded water, wind and horse power from measures of motive power.
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val settler economies in net output per establishment around the turn of the century.
IV.4 Resource Intensity
Arguments on the success of American manufacturing have often focused on the
liberal use of resources in production. American manufacturing firms in the long
nineteenth century had high levels of output per worker due partially to a more
capital intensive process of production and partially to a more resource intensive
one. Assuming similar levels of labour force participation, high levels of output per
worker meant high levels of output per capita. Hence resource use was a key element
in the United States becoming the world leader in per capita incomes. No attempt
has been made in the literature to determine if Canadian manufacturing, had a com-
paratively high or low resource intensity in the context of other settler economies.
Table 3.4 indicates the amount of relative resources used per establishment and per
worker.19
Canadian manufacturing does appear to have been relatively resource intensive in
the long nineteenth century. This was particularly the case in 1900 when Cana-
dian manufacturing establishments were using approximately twice the materials
during production as compared with New Zealand or the Cape Colony. On a per
worker basis, Canada was also more resource intensive than Victoria as early as
1900. Looking more closely at specific categories reveals iron and steel products,
paper and printing products and chemicals to have been relatively resource inten-
sive industries for Canada from the 1880s. By 1900, textiles had also emerged as
one of the most relatively resource intensive areas of Canadian manufacturing. By
contrast, the manufacture of food products was always less resource intensive in
Canada over the long nineteenth century.
As with capital, Canadian manufacturers were generally using relatively low levels
of resources in production during the 1880s. This observation was changing in many
categories of manufacturing by 1890 and had turned on its head in 1900. All of these
facts point to a larger scale of production in Canadian manufacturing around the
turn of the twentieth century that was both capital intensive and resource intensive
in relation to other settler economies. The areas of Canadian manufacturing that
exhibited the highest relative capital and resource intensity were significant indus-
tries of the second industrial revolution: iron and steel, paper and chemicals.
19Resources include raw, crude and intermediate materials used.
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V Growth Accounting
Several recent studies have claimed that Canadian failure relative to the United
States in the nineteenth century was simply the product of a reliance on labour
productivity as a tool for cross country comparisons of e ciency. Keay (2000)[47]
argued that estimates of TFP showed no evidence of technical ine ciency on be-
half of Canadian manufacturers (relative to American manufacturers). TFP was
calculated for Canadian and American industries using a Tornqvist index, assum-
ing underlying translog cost and production functions, Constant Returns to Scale
(CRS) in production and Hicks-neutral multiplicatively separable productivity pa-
rameters.20 His results indicated that from the mid-1920s Canadian firms were at
least as technically e cient as American firms and in some industries they were more
e cient. Other studies, such as Baldwin and Gorecki (1986)[6] have also found a
high relative TFP in Canadian manufacturing for the interwar period. Hence an
important consideration in this paper is to provide a comprehensive comparison of
Canadian manufacturing in the context of settler economies by adopting methods
that measure TFP.
One method used to explain the combined sources of output growth is growth ac-
counting. Growth accounting is conducted in order to decompose changes in net
output into various components. If we begin with a Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion with Constant Returns to Scale (CRS) and Hicks neutral technological change:
Yt = AtK
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(1 ↵)
t (3.1)
where Yt is net output in period t, At is the residual or TFP in period t, Kt is a
measure of capital in period t and Lt is a measure of labour in period t.
Using continuous time, taking logarithms and the derivative with respect to
time yields the following:
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the growth rate in the capital stock and L˙L is the growth rate in labour employed.
Note that ↵ and 1 ↵ reflect the payments to capital and labour and ↵ is generally
assumed to be between 0.4 and 0.5.
Applying growth accounting to data on the number of hands employed, cap-
ital owned and value added in manufacturing during census years allows the esti-
mation of overall e ciency or TFP. Table 3.6 displays the annual estimated growth
rates of capital, labour, productivity and net output over several decades.21 Cana-
dian output growth lagged Victoria but was still relatively strong during the 1880s.
This was largely the result of capital accumulation with almost no growth in TFP.
Canada did poorly in the 1890s relative to other periods but managed to avoid
the sort of serious downturn that Australia experienced during this period. The
first decade of the twentieth century was a boom period for Canada with an ex-
tremely strong annual output growth rate of 9.9% in manufacturing. This boom
was driven by exceptional growth in both capital and TFP. Canadian manufacturing
performed exceptionally well during this period relative to other settler economies.
While growth accounting and observations on manufacturing are valuable, a more
comprehensive approach is required. Growth rates say nothing about the relative
level of e ciency which can only be estimated using a more intensive method. The
next section outlines how such a method can be undertaken.
VI Data Envelopment Analysis
VI.1 Theoretical Approach
As was discussed in the introduction, there has been a recent push to consider Cana-
dian manufacturing performance on the basis of total rather than partial e ciency
measures. The advantage in moving from partial to TFP is in the combination of
all inputs into a single ratio which avoids the loss of information. Traditional esti-
mation of relative TFP in the method described above implies TFP is a weighted
average of relative partial productivities. Hence, this measure still relies on partial
factor productivity estimates for each input as well as the choice of weights and the
assumptions of CRS production and Hicks-neutral multiplicatively separable pro-
21Keeping in mind that no accurate price series exists for manufacturing categories and there is
little data available on quantities I have simply presented growth rates based on original series in
current rather than constant prices. As the framework is meant to be comparative across countries
rather than over time I believe this is an acceptable approach.
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duction or Hicks-neutral technological change. Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)
permits the estimation of a combined measure of partial factor productivity for each
input that is not dependent on any limiting assumptions. By solving a series of Lin-
ear Programming (LP) problems DEA estimation provides an aggregate measure of
e ciency with the most optimal weights assigned to each input. DEA is conducted
as follows,
If we are interested in calculating relative e ciency in Canadian manufactur-
ing industries then partial factor productivity for a given input in a given industry
is calculated as:
✓ix =
Output
Input
=
Qi
xi
(3.3)
where Q represents output in industry i and x represents one of the factors of pro-
duction in industry i.
If we wanted to determine TFP in a given industry using the traditional
limiting assumptions it could be calculated as:
✓ix,y,z =
WeightedOutput
WeightedInput
=
✓
Qi
xi
◆↵✓
Qi
yi
◆  ✓
Qi
zi
◆1 ↵  
(3.4)
where Q represents output in industry i and x,y,z represent the three factors of
production in industry i.
To determine relative e ciency we can then compare TFP for Canadian
manufacturers in industry i against TFP for manufacturers in other countries in
industry i. This would require guesses for ↵ and   in addition to the other limiting
assumptions. Alternatively, we could use DEA in order to determine relative e -
ciency.22 If we utilised DEA, e ciency in a given industry for each country would
be calculated as:
✓ic =
V irtualOutput
V irtualInput
=
Qic
v1xic + v2y
i
c + v3z
i
c
(3.5)
where Q represents output in industry i and country c, x,y,z represent the three
22For a good description of the general theories of DEA see Cooper, Seiford and Tone (2006)[23].
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factors of production in industry i and vj(j = 1, 2, 3) represent the three weights on
inputs when the optimal solution to the LP problem is obtained.
For industry i in Canada the Fractional Problem assuming CRS can be solved
as:
✓i
⇤
CAN = max
vij
QiCAN
vi1x
i
CAN + v
i
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i
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i
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The same LP problem is solved simultaneously for each country in industry i. The
constraints imply that the ratio of ‘virtual outputs’ over ‘virtual inputs’ should not
exceed 1 for every country (a value of 1 implies the country is on the frontier and
fully e cient in industry i).23
The model above assumes Constant Returns to Scale (CRS) production and solves
for input oriented e ciency.24 Output oriented e ciency can easily be calculated
in addition to input oriented e ciency, I leave the models from this analysis. The
assumption of Constant Returns to Scale can also be replaced with one of Variable
Returns to Scale (Increasing or Decreasing Returns to Scale). Variable Returns to
Scale (VRS) requires an additional constraint be added to the LP problem that
forces the e ciency frontier to be a convex hull around the production possibility
set.25
Solving the CRS model and the VRS model provide two e ciency values for each
country in a given industry. These specifications of the e ciency measure allow
e ciency to be decomposed into pure technical e ciency and scale e ciency. The
relationship is given by:
Technical E ciency (✓CRS) = Pure Technical E ciency (✓V RS) x Scale E ciency (
✓CRS
✓V RS
)
23While this method is theoretically valid it is simpler to replace this problem with the Linear
Programming problem which is equivalent. See the appendix for a complete description of the
methods used.
24Input e ciency is when output is held fixed and inputs can be reduced to improve e ciency.
25The constraint would be  CAN +  V IC + ...+  CPE = 1 if added to the DLP problem.
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Another issue is in the calculation of technical e ciency rather than alloca-
tive e ciency. Technical e ciency is useful in cases where input costs are unknown
and some measure of e ciency is required. The problem in using technical e ciency
is that it measures only advantages in technology and ignores advantages in input
costs. If significant cost advantages exist then the seemingly excessive use of some
inputs may still be cost minimising and manufacturers may be achieving allocative
e ciency but not technical e ciency. Fortunately, another advantage of DEA is
that it can be used to discern relative allocative e ciency. Allocative e ciency is
given by the relationship:
Overall E ciency (Cost Minimisation) = Allocative E ciency x Technical E ciency
Technical e ciency can be calculated by solving the LP problem given above.
Allocative e ciency is a residual e ciency after solving for technical e ciency and
overall e ciency. Overall e ciency can be calculated by solving an LP problem that
minimises input costs as follows:
✓i
⇤
px = min
xi, i
pixi (3.7)
subject to
xi  Xi i
Qic  Qi i
 i   0
where pi = (pi1, p
i
2, p
i
3) is the input-price or unit-cost vector for each country
in industry i. Xi is an (3x5) matrix of inputs for each country in industry i. Qi is a
(1x5) vector of outputs for each country in industry i.  i = ( iCAN , 
i
V IC , ..., 
i
CPE)
is a non-negative vector of variables in industry i. Qic represents a minimum output
level of country c that is maintained whilst reducing inputs radially. This approach
is only appropriate when common input costs exit, which is not the case in a cross-
country analysis on production. Hence, this model will fail to recognise the exis-
tence of other cheaper input mixes. A slight adjustment to both the LP problem
for technical e ciency and overall e ciency yields the correct results. This new
approach discovered by Tone (2002)[109] recognises e ciency di↵erences between
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decision making units (countries in this case) that would be indistinguishable if the
standard model of cost minimisation were applied.26
VI.2 Empirical Analysis
Results from solving the various LP problems are displayed for each census year in
tables 3.7 - 3.9. A value of 1 indicates full e ciency given the sample group. In this
case full e ciency implies that a country is on the ‘settler e ciency frontier’ in a
particular area of manufacturing. Inputs in the LP problem are the value of wages,
value of fixed capital (land, buildings and equipment) and the value of materials
used. Output is gross output rather than net output (it is appropriate to use gross
output since materials used in production are included in the model as an input).
Unit-input-costs and the number of unit-inputs are irrelevant since the model re-
quires unit-values (cost x units) and a vector of ones to solve the LP problem. The
value of wages paid for each industry were available for all countries in 1910 but
were unavailable for Victoria and the Cape Colony in 1900 and 1890. Where miss-
ing, wages were estimated using the number of hands employed in missing years and
the relationship between wages and numbers employed in 1910 for each manufac-
turing category.27 Value of fixed capital has been used rather than machinery alone
as there was little di↵erence in the results and greater data available on combined
fixed capital. Some general observations on the results follow.
The average of all categories indicates that manufacturers in Ontario and Quebec
had the highest level of overall e ciency in 1890, 1900 and 1910. The gap between
Canada and the other settler economies in overall e ciency was actually most pro-
nounced in 1890. This was at least partially the result of New South Wales being
excluded from the 1890 LP problem. Although no comparison with New South
Wales was possible for 1890 there are clear signs that it was the closest rival to
Canada in manufacturing. In 1900 New South Wales had 95% of the Canadian level
of average overall e ciency.28 This figure had risen to virtual parity by 1910 (av-
erage overall e ciency for New South Wales was 99% of the Canadian level). New
Zealand was also a relatively e cient manufacturer compared with the other settler
26See the appendix for the new cost and new technology formulations under di↵erent unit-costs
using the Tone(2002)[109] approach.
27Alternative methods for estimating wages taking into account the number of hands employed
were also attempted, for example the relative relationship between Canadian wages paid per worker
and Australian wages per worker were fixed in 1910 and applied to previous years. Almost no change
in the solution to LP models resulted from alternative methods and so they have been excluded
from the results.
28Calculated as 0.856/0.902 = 0.95.
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economies with 75% of Canada’s average overall e ciency in 1890.29 This figure
was 85% in 1900 and 81% in 1910. Victoria and the Cape Colony had caught-up
significantly by 1910 but an e ciency gap with Canada remained.
Breaking overall e ciency down into allocative e ciency and technical e ciency ex-
plains the gap. In 1890 there was a much smaller gap between Canada and the other
settler economies in terms of average technical e ciency than in terms of average
allocative e ciency. New Zealand was on par with Canada in terms of average tech-
nical e ciency while Victoria had 95% of Canadian average technical e ciency.30
In 1900 virtually all of the settler economies were on par in terms of average tech-
nical e ciency aside from the Cape Colony which had progressed little since 1890.
Only Victoria had backtracked, presumably a result of the precarious conditions it
faced in the 1890s. By 1910 Victoria had rebounded in terms of average technical
e ciency and had reached 97% of the Canadian level. The Cape Colony had made
marginal progress sitting at 89% of the Canadian level.
The gap in technical e ciency can be further divided into scale e ciency and pure
technical e ciency. Scale e ciency was similar amongst settler economies in 1890,
implying that technical e ciency gaps were almost entirely the result of pure techni-
cal ine ciencies. In 1900 substantial gaps in scale e ciency arose between countries.
Victoria and the Cape Colony each had 10% lower levels of average scale e ciency
than Canada. Similar scale ine ciencies existed in the Cape Colony in 1910 but
had largely disappeared in Victoria. Overall we can conclude that issues in tech-
nical e ciency were essentially issues of pure technical ine ciency (distance to the
frontier of production) rather than issues in scale ine ciency (distance between the
Constant Returns to Scale frontier and the Variable Returns to Scale frontier).
In terms of average allocative e ciency Canada did have a substantial advantage in
the nineteenth century. In 1890, Victoria, New Zealand and the Cape Colony all had
approximately 70% of the Canadian level of average allocative e ciency. By 1900
Victoria and New Zealand had 83% and 87% of Canada’s e ciency respectively, an
improvement but a substantial gap still persisted. Meanwhile the Cape Colony had
fallen behind with only 64% of the Canadian level of average allocative e ciency.
As Cape Colony data are from 1903 rather than 1900 there could have been sub-
stantial price shocks around the Boar War or the recession of the early 1900s that
limited allocative e ciency. In 1910 the Cape Colony had rebounded and caught
up to New Zealand in terms of average allocative e ciency at around 86% of the
Canadian level. New South Wales was on par with Canada while Victoria was about
29Calculated as 0.725/0.968 = 0.75.
30New Zealand calculated as (0.978/0.992 = 0.99), Victoria calculated as (0.941/0.992 = 95%).
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10% under the Canadian level of e ciency.
Analysis by industry reveals that Canada was on the manufacturing frontier in terms
of overall e ciency in thirteen of the seventeen categories in 1890 and seven of the
seventeen categories in 1900 and 1910. Canada was fully e cient throughout the
long nineteenth century in only three categories: clay, glass and stone products,
tobacco and its manufactures, and vehicles for land. Other notable categories where
Canada never fell below an overall e ciency value of 90% were iron and steel prod-
ucts, timber and lumber products and chemical and allied products. These results
may surprise some readers since they do not suggest a manufacturing sector that
was highly dependent on staple linkages. Of the several new and advanced areas of
manufacturing in the second industrial revolution Canada seems the most success-
ful. The only other settler economy to compare favourably in overall e ciency in
this respect was New South Wales, which also had 100% overall e ciency scores in
seven of the seventeen categories in 1900 and 1910. The most advanced categories
included metal and its manufactures and power and light in both years.
Undoubtably Canada would have been behind the frontier in other categories in
1890, and had a lower average overall e ciency score, if New South Wales were
included in that year. New Zealand was the only other colony on the frontier in
any of the matched categories. New Zealand was on the frontier in four categories
in 1890, three categories in 1900 and one category in 1910. Victoria and the Cape
Colony were on the frontier in only one category in 1910 and these were the mis-
cellaneous and unmatched categories. Clearly, Canada and New South Wales were
significantly more advanced than the other colonies in terms of e ciency in areas of
modern manufacturing before World War One. New Zealand was somewhere in the
middle with Victoria and the Cape Colony operating at much lower levels of TFP
in several advanced industries.
Analysis of allocative e ciency and technical e ciency indicates that any issues
were largely due to allocative and not technical ine ciency. Ontario and Quebec
had full technical e ciency in sixteen out of seventeen categories of manufacturing
in 1890 and 1900, and fourteen out of seventeen categories in 1910. In other words,
in several categories Canada was on the technological frontier but was less than
fully e cient overall because of relative input costs (wage rates, resource prices and
the rental rate of capital). By contrast other settler economies faced issues of both
allocative and technical ine ciency. For example, the Cape Colony was on the tech-
nology frontier in only five of the seventeen categories. These results conform well
with recent studies that have found nineteenth century Canadian manufacturers to
have been relatively strong in measures of TFP despite operating at a smaller scale
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than their American counterparts and having lower levels of labour productivity.
Manufacturing in Ontario and Quebec faced some cost disadvantages when com-
pared with other settler economies but they were technically e cient and in many
cases were operating on the technology frontier for settler economies.
VII A Case Study: Agricultural Implements
Theories of directed technical change suggest that settler economies sought to de-
velop labour saving technology due to their relative abundance of land and relative
scarcity of labour. In many settler economies this process was manifested in the
rapid advancement of agricultural machinery. As highlighted in the introduction,
Canadian manufacturers of agricultural implements received great fanfare at home
and abroad. For some time after Confederation the sector remained small scale with
numerous operations producing implements for domestic consumption. The Massey
Company and the Harris Company made trips to the United States and were in-
fluenced by American techniques. According to Norrie and Owram (1991)[66] the
industry began to change in the 1880s when a protective tari↵ on agricultural im-
plements was raised from 17% to 35%. Output increased significantly in the 1890s
until World War One and the industry became more concentrated. The Canadian
market became dominated by several large scale producers. The Massey and Harris
company combined and absorbed the Patterson-Wisner company making it a major
player in the industry. A plant was opened in the United States in 1910 giving it
multinational status. The slightly smaller Cockshutt company and a branch plant of
the American company International Harvester were also important manufacturers.
In total, 221 firms produced $7.5 million of output in 1890, 114 firms produced $9.6
million of output in 1900 and 88 firms produced $20.7 million of output in 1910.31
Employment almost doubled over the same period and the value of capital had risen
by a factor of five.
Near the end of the nineteenth century Canadian agricultural implement makers
began to export their products abroad. Figure B.1 displays the increasing share of
agricultural implement exports out of total exports. In the early 1890s agricultural
implement exports made up less than half a percent of total exports for Canada.
This figure increased rapidly after 1896, in line with the growing agricultural boom
in Canada and its spill-over e↵ects on manufacturing production. By World War
One agricultural implements made up approximately 2% of total Canadian exports.
31Norrie and Owram (1991)[66] based on census data.
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This was a period of rapid export growth, hence we can conclude that agricultural
implements were being exported on a significantly larger scale in 1910 than in 1890.
Figure B.2 indicates that much of this increase in the export of agricultural imple-
ments was the result of growing demand in other settler economies. There was little
change in the share of agricultural implement exports going to the United States
and a falling share going to Britain. Other settler economies had rapidly growing
agricultural sectors that required an influx of new implements. It is interesting that
linkages did not develop this area of manufacturing in other settler economies as in
Canada. Perhaps the influence of American technology and skills were essential in
developing this type of secondary manufacturing. For whatever reason, virtually no
agricultural implements were imported into Canada from other settler economies.
Demand was satisfied by domestic production and imports from the United States,
which made up close to 99% of the share of agricultural implement imports into
Canada before World War One.
Table B.8 displays various cross-country characteristics of agricultural implement
manufacturers. Production of agricultural implements in Ontario and Quebec were
more labour intensive than in Victoria or New Zealand in 1890. Each worker had
significantly less capital in Canada and this led to a lower level of labour produc-
tivity. In 1900 the scale of production had increased dramatically in Ontario and
Quebec. Canadian implement manufacturers had a much higher level of capital per
worker, more resources were used in production and yet the number of employees
per establishment remained much higher than in other settler economies. As a re-
sult Canada was generating significantly more value added per establishment and
per worker in this sector. The process of capital accumulation continued through
the 1900s and by 1910 capital per establishment was extremely high in Ontario and
Quebec. Firms had reduced the number of workers per establishment but they had
replaced these workers with a substantial investment in fixed capital. Value added
per establishment and labour productivity were very high in Canada relative to
other settler economies.
Turning again to DEA allows the estimation of overall e ciency in agricultural
implement manufacturing. Table B.9 displays the results after solving the various
LP problems. In terms of overall e ciency, implement manufacturers in Canada
were slightly less e cient than their counterparts in Australia in 1890. Technical
e ciency was an issue, however this was the result of pure technical ine ciency
rather than scale ine ciency. In 1900 Canada was on the frontier in implement
manufacturing. Victoria had issues of pure technical ine ciency while New South
Wales and New Zealand had issues of allocative ine ciency. By 1910 Canada was
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no longer on the frontier in terms of overall e ciency. This was likely the result of
the large investment in fixed capital during the boom period of the early 1900s. The
issue appears to have been allocative ine ciency rather than issues of pure technical
ine ciency or scale ine ciency. Although Canada was producing more value added
per establishment there were issues in the degree of inputs used given relative factor
prices. In summary, the results seem to conform well to the observations made by
other authors and contemporary accounts. Agricultural implement manufacturers
in Canada were growing in scale from the 1890s and were increasing their levels of
output and e ciency dramatically. The sector looks to have been highly e cient
at the turn of the century relative to other settler economies and was able not only
to satisfy domestic demand but to export implements to other settler economies.
Combined with previous analysis there is ample reason to believe that agricultural
implement production was generally representative of Canadian manufacturing in
several new and important second industrial revolution categories such as iron and
steel, chemicals and automobiles.
VIII Conclusion
After six months and over 5 million visitors the Indian and Colonial Exhibit closed
on the 10th November 1886. Few could argue that Canada, particularly due to its
manufactured products, hadn’t captured the Empire’s attention. The New South
Wales Herald described the Canadian exhibit as ‘beautifully designed’ with ‘manu-
factures shown very extensively’. The Auckland Weekly News declared that Canada
confronts the old world by pointing to ‘her labour-saving machinery, her fisheries,
her wool, her furniture, her sewing machines, to her pianos, organs, tweeds and
woollen goods.’ At the close of the exhibit guests remarked that Canada was ‘one
of the brightest jewels in the British Crown and certain to make enormous advances
in the immediate future.’32
This paper has shown that optimism proved to be rightly founded, even if it may
have been as yet unrealised in 1886. Canada was still a laggard in terms of the capital
intensity and scale of manufacturing in the 1880s but this was a period of transition.
Sometime in the 1890s things changed. Canadian manufacturing increased its capi-
tal intensity, resource intensity and labour productivity dramatically. Other settler
economies had fallen behind Canada by the turn of the century in all of the key
32Comments on the exhibit from various newspapers were summarised in The Standard, November
1886.
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statistics. DEA reveals that Canadian firms were already ahead in measures of to-
tal rather than partial factor productivity by 1890. In several important categories
of manufacturing Canada was well ahead in allocative and technical e ciency. All
of this lends weight to the argument that Canadian manufacturing had advanced
substantially from the late 1880s on the back of policy changes and westward ex-
pansion. This paper confirms that Canadian manufacturing was performing well as
early as 1890 when placed in the context of other settler economies rather than the
United States.
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Table 3.3: Horse Power Used
Horse Power Per Establishment (Ontario & Quebec = 100)
1900 1910
Category VIC NSW NZL CPE VIC NSW NZL CPE
Food Products 351 492 372 151 214 335 303 132
Textiles 50 17 52 0 24 23 41 0
Iron & Steel 18 19 20 17 9 21 15 8
Timber & Lumber 20 20 29 6 20 33 39 17
Leather Products 14 19 11 10 17 32 17 15
Paper & Printing 40 22 26 16 18 24 29 13
Liquors & Drinks 20 16 11 25 26 17 15 23
Chemicals & Drugs 21 19 26 5 47 52 26 35
Clay, Glass, & Stone 166 134 130 175 29 65 60 8
Metal Manufactures 10 351 2 1 4 134 3 2
Tobacco Products 122 151 – 113 291 749 16 87
Vehicles for Land 20 30 6 9 6 30 6 5
Vehicles for Water 65 114 33 40 153 113 14 –
Miscellaneous 20 26 20 52 16 22 13 12
Power & Light 20 10 15 51 38 90 50 41
Hand Trades 133 4 6 96 44 13 7 54
Unmatched 11 4 23 3 6 9 35 6
TOTAL 39 44 38 20 25 74 40 21
Sources: See appendix tables B.3-B.7 for list of sources. See section III.1 for a description of data.
Notes: Horse Power is for steam, gas, oil & electric engines only (excludes water wheels).
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Table 3.7: 1890 DEA Results
Technical E ciency Scale E ciency
Category CAN VIC NSW NZL CPE CAN VIC NSW NZL CPE
Food 1.000 1.000 – 1.000 0.812 1.000 1.000 – 1.000 0.963
Textiles 1.000 1.000 – 1.000 0.800 1.000 1.000 – 1.000 1.000
Iron & Steel – 0.956 – 0.910 1.000 – 0.956 – 0.993 1.000
Lumber 1.000 1.000 – 1.000 1.000 1.000 – – 1.000 –
Leathers 0.868 0.791 – 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 – 1.000 1.000
Printing 1.000 1.000 – 0.918 1.000 1.000 1.000 – 1.000 1.000
Drinks 1.000 0.874 – 1.000 0.917 1.000 0.874 – 1.000 1.000
Chemicals 1.000 1.000 – 0.813 1.000 1.000 1.000 – 1.000 1.000
Clay, &c 1.000 0.957 – 1.000 0.974 1.000 0.957 – 1.000 0.995
Metals 1.000 1.000 – 1.000 0.946 1.000 1.000 – 1.000 1.000
Tobacco 1.000 0.959 – – 0.740 1.000 0.959 – – 1.000
Carriages 1.000 0.751 – 1.000 0.842 1.000 0.751 – 1.000 1.000
Ships 1.000 0.769 – 1.000 0.578 1.000 1.000 – 1.000 0.578
Misc. 1.000 1.000 – 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 – 1.000 1.000
Power 1.000 0.948 – 1.000 0.687 1.000 0.948 – 1.000 1.000
Trades 1.000 1.000 – 1.000 0.599 1.000 1.000 – 1.000 0.647
Other 1.000 0.984 – 1.000 – 1.000 0.984 – 1.000 –
AVERAGE 0.992 0.941 – 0.978 0.869 1.000 0.964 – 1.000 0.946
Overall E ciency Allocative E ciency
Category CAN VIC NSW NZL CPE CAN VIC NSW NZL CPE
Food 0.777 0.648 – 1.000 0.681 0.777 0.648 – 1.000 0.839
Textiles 1.000 0.762 – 0.656 0.539 1.000 0.762 – 0.656 0.673
Iron & Steel 1.000 0.868 – 0.817 0.653 – 0.908 – 0.898 0.653
Lumber 0.999 0.954 – 1.000 0.964 0.999 0.954 – 1.000 0.964
Leathers 0.838 0.689 – 1.000 0.726 0.965 0.871 – 1.000 0.726
Printing 1.000 0.854 – 0.725 0.879 1.000 0.854 – 0.790 0.879
Drinks 1.000 0.588 – 0.867 0.721 1.000 0.673 – 0.867 0.786
Chemicals 1.000 0.737 – 0.640 0.326 1.000 0.737 – 0.787 0.326
Clay &c 1.000 0.526 – 0.444 0.824 1.000 0.549 – 0.444 0.846
Metals 1.000 0.603 – 0.616 0.212 1.000 0.603 – 0.616 0.224
Tobacco 1.000 0.668 – – 0.599 1.000 0.696 – – 0.809
Carriages 1.000 0.549 – 0.725 0.819 1.000 0.731 – 0.725 0.972
Ships 1.000 0.029 – 0.143 0.192 1.000 0.038 – 0.143 0.332
Misc. 1.000 0.853 – 0.800 0.718 1.000 0.853 – 0.800 0.718
Power 1.000 0.573 – 0.437 0.446 1.000 0.604 – 0.437 0.649
Trades 1.000 0.422 – 0.726 0.442 1.000 0.422 – 0.726 0.738
Other 0.833 0.372 – 1.000 – 0.833 0.378 – 1.000 –
AVERAGE 0.968 0.629 – 0.725 0.609 0.973 0.664 – 0.743 0.696
Sources: See appendix tables B.3-B.7 for list of sources. See section III.1 for a description of data.
Notes: Canadian $s converted to £s at 4s 2d per $. Inputs include Wages, Value of Fixed K (Land,
Buildings & Machinery), and Value of Materials. Output is Value of Gross Output. Lumber
includes timber, printing includes paper, drinks includes liquors, chemicals includes drugs,
clay includes glass and stone, carriages includes all vehicles for land, ships includes all
vehicles for water, power includes light, trades includes all hand trades, other includes all
unmatched and undisclosed subcategories
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Table 3.8: 1900 DEA Results
Technical E ciency Scale E ciency
Category CAN VIC NSW NZL CPE CAN VIC NSW NZL CPE
Food 1.000 0.765 0.795 1.000 0.805 1.000 0.765 0.795 1.000 0.958
Textiles 1.000 0.862 1.000 0.919 0.955 1.000 0.960 1.000 0.919 0.955
Iron & Steel 1.000 0.882 1.000 1.000 0.977 1.000 0.882 1.000 1.000 0.977
Lumber 1.000 0.684 1.000 1.000 0.753 1.000 0.953 1.000 1.000 0.753
Leathers 1.000 0.890 0.999 1.000 0.864 1.000 0.988 0.999 1.000 0.864
Printing 1.000 0.682 1.000 0.915 1.000 1.000 0.940 1.000 0.915 1.000
Drinks 1.000 0.708 1.000 1.000 0.887 1.000 0.872 1.000 1.000 0.887
Chemicals 1.000 0.875 0.793 1.000 0.749 1.000 0.875 0.882 1.000 0.749
Clay &c 1.000 0.665 0.919 0.882 0.956 1.000 0.665 0.919 0.882 0.956
Metals 1.000 0.897 1.000 1.000 0.978 1.000 0.994 1.000 1.000 0.978
Tobacco 1.000 0.522 1.000 – 0.775 1.000 0.758 1.000 – 1.000
Carriages 1.000 0.797 1.000 1.000 0.878 1.000 0.969 1.000 1.000 0.947
Ships 1.000 0.957 0.920 1.000 0.966 1.000 0.973 0.920 1.000 0.966
Misc. 1.000 0.817 1.000 0.896 1.000 1.000 0.936 1.000 0.896 1.000
Power 0.884 0.745 1.000 0.900 0.467 0.884 0.925 1.000 0.984 0.467
Trades 1.000 0.807 1.000 1.000 0.458 1.000 0.807 1.000 1.000 0.814
Other 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.897 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.993
AVERAGE 0.993 0.797 0.966 0.969 0.845 0.993 0.898 0.971 0.975 0.898
Overall E ciency Allocative E ciency
Category CAN VIC NSW NZL CPE CAN VIC NSW NZL CPE
Food 0.705 0.643 0.594 1.000 0.518 0.705 0.840 0.747 1.000 0.643
Textiles 0.879 0.682 1.000 0.675 0.413 0.879 0.791 1.000 0.734 0.433
Iron & Steel 0.995 0.826 1.000 0.962 0.742 0.995 0.937 1.000 0.962 0.759
Lumber 0.953 0.667 0.961 1.000 0.494 0.953 0.975 0.961 1.000 0.656
Leathers 1.000 0.837 0.866 0.953 0.619 1.000 0.940 0.867 0.953 0.716
Printing 0.799 0.547 1.000 0.761 0.700 0.799 0.803 1.000 0.832 0.700
Drinks 0.787 0.680 0.970 1.000 0.596 0.787 0.961 0.970 1.000 0.671
Chemicals 1.000 0.596 0.754 0.751 0.200 1.000 0.682 0.950 0.751 0.267
Clay &c 1.000 0.445 0.615 0.501 0.315 1.000 0.668 0.670 0.568 0.330
Metals 0.918 0.623 1.000 0.736 0.273 0.918 0.694 1.000 0.736 0.279
Tobacco 1.000 0.402 0.537 – 0.433 1.000 0.772 0.537 – 0.558
Carriages 1.000 0.606 0.778 0.749 0.736 1.000 0.760 0.778 0.749 0.838
Ships 1.000 0.060 0.705 0.248 0.119 1.000 0.063 0.766 0.248 0.123
Misc. 1.000 0.711 0.780 0.842 0.880 1.000 0.870 0.780 0.940 0.880
Power 0.715 0.530 1.000 0.500 0.453 0.810 0.712 1.000 0.556 0.970
Trades 0.833 0.503 1.000 0.795 0.123 0.833 0.623 1.000 0.795 0.268
Other 0.747 0.756 1.000 0.788 0.711 0.747 0.756 1.000 0.788 0.792
AVERAGE 0.902 0.595 0.856 0.766 0.490 0.907 0.756 0.884 0.788 0.581
Sources: See appendix tables B.3-B.7 for list of sources. See section III.1 for a description of data.
Notes: Canadian $s converted to £s at 4s 2d per $. Inputs include Wages, Value of Fixed K (Land,
Buildings & Machinery), and Value of Materials. Output is Value of Gross Output. Lumber
includes timber, printing includes paper, drinks includes liquors, chemicals includes drugs,
clay includes glass and stone, carriages includes all vehicles for land, ships includes all
vehicles for water, power includes light, trades includes all hand trades, other includes all
unmatched and undisclosed subcategories
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Table 3.9: 1910 DEA Results
Technical E ciency Scale E ciency
Category CAN VIC NSW NZL CPE CAN VIC NSW NZL CPE
Food 1.000 – 1.000 0.896 0.971 1.000 – 1.000 0.928 0.971
Textiles 1.000 0.889 1.000 0.882 1.000 1.000 0.889 1.000 0.966 1.000
Iron & Steel 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.601 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.601
Lumber 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Leathers 1.000 0.965 1.000 0.955 0.878 1.000 0.965 1.000 0.955 0.878
Printing 1.000 0.960 1.000 1.000 0.916 1.000 0.991 1.000 1.000 0.946
Drinks 1.000 0.785 1.000 0.737 0.743 1.000 0.922 1.000 0.737 0.947
Chemicals 1.000 0.938 1.000 0.737 1.000 1.000 0.973 1.000 0.737 1.000
Clay &c 1.000 1.000 0.943 0.742 0.678 1.000 1.000 0.991 0.914 0.678
Metals 0.983 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.983 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Tobacco 1.000 0.899 1.000 1.000 0.788 1.000 0.899 1.000 1.000 1.000
Carriages 1.000 0.995 1.000 1.000 0.822 1.000 0.995 1.000 1.000 0.822
Ships 1.000 1.000 0.879 1.000 – 1.000 1.000 0.879 1.000 –
Misc. 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.889 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.889 1.000
Power 0.919 0.993 1.000 0.976 0.813 0.919 0.993 1.000 0.986 0.969
Trades 0.993 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.993 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Other 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.912 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.976
AVERAGE 0.994 0.964 0.990 0.930 0.883 0.994 0.977 0.992 0.948 0.924
Overall E ciency Allocative E ciency
Category CAN VIC NSW NZL CPE CAN VIC NSW NZL CPE
Food 1.000 0.867 0.869 0.838 0.749 1.000 – 0.869 0.936 0.771
Textiles 0.980 0.786 1.000 0.649 0.847 0.980 0.884 1.000 0.736 0.847
Iron & Steel 0.935 0.943 1.000 0.850 0.430 0.935 0.943 1.000 0.850 0.717
Lumber 0.917 0.934 1.000 0.792 0.583 0.917 0.934 1.000 0.792 0.583
Leathers 1.000 0.876 0.911 0.848 0.820 1.000 0.908 0.911 0.887 0.934
Printing 1.000 0.937 0.978 0.824 0.659 1.000 0.976 0.978 0.824 0.720
Drinks 1.000 0.706 0.900 0.668 0.658 1.000 0.899 0.900 0.906 0.886
Chemicals 0.923 0.869 1.000 0.686 0.807 0.923 0.926 1.000 0.932 0.807
Clay &c 1.000 0.976 0.929 0.707 0.616 1.000 0.976 0.986 0.953 0.908
Metals 0.821 0.816 1.000 0.722 0.670 0.835 0.816 1.000 0.722 0.670
Tobacco 1.000 0.794 0.816 0.540 0.671 1.000 0.882 0.816 0.540 0.852
Carriages 1.000 0.786 0.716 0.437 0.704 1.000 0.790 0.716 0.437 0.856
Ships 0.842 0.087 0.488 1.000 – 0.842 0.087 0.555 1.000 –
Misc. 0.873 0.874 0.842 0.758 1.000 0.873 0.874 0.842 0.853 1.000
Power 0.532 0.658 1.000 0.829 0.437 0.579 0.662 1.000 0.849 0.537
Trades 0.824 0.845 1.000 0.637 0.640 0.830 0.845 1.000 0.637 0.640
Other 0.979 1.000 0.973 0.843 0.898 0.979 1.000 0.973 0.843 0.985
AVERAGE 0.919 0.809 0.907 0.743 0.699 0.923 0.838 0.915 0.806 0.795
Sources: See appendix tables B.3-B.7 for list of sources. See section III.1 for a description of data.
Notes: Canadian $s converted to £s at 4s 2d per $. Inputs include Wages, Value of Fixed K (Land,
Buildings & Machinery), and Value of Materials. Output is Value of Gross Output. Lumber
includes timber, printing includes paper, drinks includes liquors, chemicals includes drugs,
clay includes glass and stone, carriages includes all vehicles for land, ships includes all
vehicles for water, power includes light, trades includes all hand trades, other includes all
unmatched and undisclosed subcategories
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Chapter 4
Death by Distance: Market
Potential of Australian States
before World War One
I Introduction to Chapter 4
Comparisons of GDP per capita from 1870 to World War One indicate some settler
economies such as Canada and Argentina were advancing while others like Australia
and New Zealand were in decline. One central argument for this decline has been
the suggestion that geography played a key role. Australia was fairly unique, being
a wealthy export-oriented economy but also extremely remote. For the Australian
colonies trade was heavily orientated towards Britain well into the twentieth cen-
tury despite the vast distances involved in maintaining this trade relationship. This
issue motivated one of the most influential works of Australian economic history by
Geo↵rey Blainey.1 In his 1966 book Bainey popularised the phrase ‘tyranny of dis-
tance’ in describing Australia’s plight. Since the 1960s there has been only modest
attempts to quantify the ‘peripherality’ of Australia. Especially little attention has
been paid to the period before World War One when Australia lost its lead in GDP
per capita to rival settler colonies around the world. This study attempts to bring
a quantitative approach to Blainey’s Australian historiography. This work is also
the first attempt to measure the ‘tyranny of distance’ across Australian colonies in
a unified framework.
How ‘tyrannical’ was distance in the nineteenth century and how ‘distant’ was Aus-
tralia? One geographical advantage Australia had was access to the sea. The lit-
1See Blainey (2001)[8] for an updated version of the 1966 book.
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erature on economic geography stresses the importance of access to the sea before
World War One as rail freight rates were higher over moderate to long distances.
The obvious disadvantage was the substantial sea journey needed to reach Euro-
pean markets. Figure 4.1 shows the most significant trade partners for New South
Wales with major trade routes and significant ports.2 Vast distances resulted in
high freight rates relative to most other primary product exporters. Figure 4.2
compares freight rates on bringing grain to market in Britain from several points
of origin. Sydney faced more severe freight rates than the principal ports of other
wheat exporters. Canadian and American ports were ideally located for Atlantic
trade with Britain. Bahia Blanca and Buenos Aires faced less severe freight rates
than Sydney but were still at a disadvantage when compared with Montreal, Boston
or New York.
Another story evident in figure 4.2 was the falling cost of rail relative to sea transport
in settler economies just before World War One. Changes in transport technology
were dramatic in the late nineteenth century, interacted with location this may have
impacted Australian growth. At the time the Canadian Pacific Railway was com-
pleted, in the 1880s, there was a high total cost in transporting grain to Britain
from the Canadian interior. By the turn of the century it had become similarly
cost e↵ective to transport grain from Regina to Britain as from Sydney to Britain.
Australia’s disadvantage in bringing grain to European markets meant the demand
for foodstu↵s could be satisfied by others more e ciently. Despite this disadvantage
a large share of Australian agricultural exports shifted from wool to wheat before
World War One.
Although very little trade was carried on steamers to/from Australia before 1871
there were significant changes taking place in the nineteenth century. The first reg-
ular inter-state steamship service began in 1852 with a service between Melbourne
and Hobart. A regular steamship service between New South Wales and Victoria
began in 1862 connecting Melbourne, Sydney and Newcastle. In 1875 a regular
service began to connect Adelaide and Melbourne. By the 1890s there were several
large international shipping lines using some combination of steamers and clippers
to carry passengers and freight between Australia, Asia and Europe. Notable ex-
amples include The Orient Line, The Penninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation
Company, The White Star Line and The British India Steam Navigation Company.
Steam had come to dominate the tonnage entering Australia by World War One.
2These trade partners have been chosen based on them having a recorded share of Australian
trade before Federation. Only a very small share of trade was conducted with any countries outside
this sample aside from islands in the South Pacific. Key ports were chosen based on their inclusion
as such in contemporary statistical registers.
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Similarly, the Australian merchant fleet had more tonnage in steamers than sailing
vessels by the turn of the century. Dramatic changes in shipping technology be-
tween 1871 and World War One had significant economic e↵ects on the far flung
Australian colonies. The ‘tyranny of distance’ was less pronounced but undoubtably
still present.
At the same time, rail technology was increasing in e ciency and railroads were
spreading across all the regions of recent settlement. Australian railways seem to
have been slower to develop than in other colonies. In 1883 a railway bridge over the
River Murray was built at Wodonga to link Melbourne and Sydney. In 1887 the last
section of the Victorian line to the South Australian border was completed. New
South Wales was linked to Queensland in 1888 with the completion of the junction at
Wallangarra (The four capitals of Brisbane, Sydney, Melbourne and Adelaide would
not be fully linked until 1889 when the Hawksbury River bridge was completed).
The Trans-Australian railway from Port Augusta to Kalgoorlie was completed in
1917 connecting all five capitals of the mainland with a journey time from Brisbane
to Perth of six days and forty-seven minutes.
By comparison the first Canadian railway boom was underway in the 1850s. Major
completions included The St. Lawrence and Atlantic connecting Montreal and Port-
land (Maine) in 1853; The Great Western railway connecting Niagara to Detroit via
Hamilton and London in 1855; The Ontario, Simcoe and Lake Huron connecting
Toronto to Collingwood in 1855. The most ambitious was the Grand Trunk railway
which linked Sarnia (Ontario) with Quebec City (Quebec) by 1859 and extended
over 2600 miles with branch lines forming a network between the Great Lakes. The
1850s boom was followed by a boom in the 1880s that saw the completion of the
Canadian Pacific Railway spanning the entire country and providing a rail link from
the Pacific coast to the St. Lawrence River (eventually onward to the Atlantic
coast). The first through train to the Rocky Mountains left Montreal at the end of
November 1885 with the introduction of regular service from Quebec to the Rocky
Mountains. Through trains began running from the Atlantic to the Pacific in June
1886. The Canadian Pacific Railway network was the most extensive in the British
Empire with upwards of 1100 miles of branch lines radiating from Montreal, Ottawa
(to Toronto and other towns), Winnipeg, and Port Arthur. Although relatively
similar in area, the two Dominions were miles apart in railway construction.
Figure 4.3 indicates the increasing length of rail miles in operation in several coun-
tries relative to their size. Immense distances between major cities overland, com-
bined with direct access to the sea, meant rail provided less advantage to the Aus-
tralian colonies. Although inland waterways were relatively scarce in Australia they
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could be utilised year round, reducing the need for all-weather alternatives; in con-
trast to Canada where waterways were made useless for three or four months per
year due to freezing conditions. Contemporaries also blamed the depreciation of
Australian securities in London, the ‘sparseness of the population’, and the ranges
of mountains near the coast requiring large capital expenditures, for the lack of
railway coverage.3 According to Blainey (2001, pg. 293)[8],
While railways were like a web in the south east corner of the (Aus-
tralian) continent, elsewhere were vast gaps where no rails would ever
be laid. Many places on the coast and innumerable points in the interior
were hundreds of miles from the nearest railway. Many adult Australians
had never seen a railway. In 1900 one could travel along half the coast-
line of the continent, from Geraldton (WAU) to Cooktown (QLD) and
find only two short railway lines in the intervening country.
The division of interests (geographical, political and economic) amongst the Aus-
tralian colonies presented further problems which led to the development of separate
railway systems. Queensland and Western Australia adopted a 1067 mm gauge for
most lines while New South Wales adopted a 1435 mm gauge and Victoria a 1600
mm gauge. South Australia split its lines between the 1067 mm and 1600 mm
gauges.4 The non-conformity of gauge meant passengers and freight often needed
to be transferred at stations like Wallangarra on the NSW-QLD border with no di-
rect service to Sydney available until the Brisbane-Kyogle line was opened in 1930.
Figure 4.4 shows a breakdown of Australian railway expansion by state. Victoria
stands out as having a very dense railway network for its size before World War
One. Western Australia relied the most heavily on sea transport given the extreme
distances it faced in inter-state journeys (A railway linking Perth to Adelaide was
not complete until after World War One).
Australian hinterlands were much closer to urban centres with all arable and pas-
toral land nearer the coast than in most settler economies. Even in the 21st century,
measures of remoteness show how little the Australian interior has been penetrated
by any form of productive activity.5 Geography placed the Australian colonies in a
unique position relative to other settler economies. Had rail technology stagnated
globally and tramp shipping continued to gain e ciency at the end of the nine-
teenth century then the Australian story may have been drastically di↵erent in a
3See Australian Year Books for contemporary accounts.
4In 1911 approximately 13 of SAU line was the 1600 mm gauge and
2
3 was the 1067 mm gauge.
5For more details see the Accessibility/Remoteness Index of Australia which can be accessed
from the Queensland government website at http://www.oesr.qld.gov.au/index.php.
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comparative context. As it turned out, rapidly improving rail technology did less to
solve Australia’s isolation than might have been thought given the relatively slow
adoption of rail technology in the mirror of other settler economies.
Asymmetric tari↵ policy and output growth across countries also influenced the
‘tyranny of distance’ between Australia and the rest of the world. Bairoch (1993)[5]
divided the period of globalisation before World War One into three epochs: The Eu-
ropean free trade interlude (1860-1879), the gradual return to protectionism (1879-
1892), and the period of Continental protectionism vs. British liberalism. The first
epoch was characterised by trade liberalisation across Europe and initiated with an
Anglo-French treaty in 1860. This treaty was followed by several treaties between
France and a number of other countries that led to tari↵ ‘disarmament’ in Conti-
nental Europe.6 The second epoch was a gradual return to protection kicked o↵
with a new German tari↵ in 1879 as part of Bismark’s Realpolitik. Contributing fac-
tors were the coalition between farmers and manufacturers in Continental Europe,
coupled with the shift from ad valorem tari↵s to specific duties during a period of
deflation. However, the period before 1892 was not uniformly protectionist, some
European countries did not raise tari↵s and many liberal policies were yet to expire.
The final epoch was one of fairly uniform protectionism across Europe. Germany
signed several free trade agreements in the 1890s but shifted towards protection
again in 1902. France increased tari↵ protection throughout the period. Only the
Netherlands maintained a truly liberal trade policy from 1870 to World War One.
Outside Europe the Industrial Revolution and European expansion created two
spheres of countries with very di↵erent trade policies. The European o↵shoots
rapidly became part of the developed world and pursued highly protectionist trade
policies. Most notable was the United States (referred to by Paul Bairoch as the
‘bastion of modern protectionism’) with an e↵ective tari↵ rate close to 50% for dura-
tions of the nineteenth century. The second sphere of developing countries (mostly
in Asia and Africa) were forced to adopt extremely liberal trade policies prior to
World War One. Hence, the period from 1870 to World War One presented the
Australian exporter with asymmetric changes in trade policy over both time and
space. In other words, there was no decisive movement towards free trade in Europe
and Asia during the long nineteenth century that might have reduced Australia’s
‘peripherality’.
The final element in Australia’s perception of distance was its relationship with
foreign markets. The changing relative importance of regional markets had a pos-
itive impact on Australia in the twentieth century with the rise of Asia, however
6Bairoch (1993)[5] also stresses the importance of the most-favoured-nation clause in this period.
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the nineteenth century e↵ect is debatable. Table 4.1 shows the levels of GDP per
capita in 1990 international dollars for regions relative to Western Europe. From
1870 to 1913 markets in Asia and Africa became less significant relative to Western
Europe while in North and South America they became more significant. Australia
and New Zealand increased their share of world GDP over this period but they
still represented a tiny share of output compared with other regions. From Aus-
tralia’s perspective, markets that mattered were shifting to more distant regions in
the nineteenth century, while the nearer markets of Asia and Africa were becoming
less important.
The next section lays out a model of market potential intended to incorporate all of
the ‘distance’ factors discussed and quantify the e↵ect of these on growth. Crafts
(2005)[24] has drawn on this approach to calculate regional economic potential for
the various disaggregated regions of Britain before and after World War One. I fol-
low Crafts (2005)[24] by applying a model of market potential to measure regional
economic potential for each of the Australian states from 1870 to World War One.
The appropriateness of the model is that it can combine these various aspects of
‘distance’ in a unifying framework to measure relative ‘peripherality’. Market po-
tential in each Australian state is then assessed over time and across states.
II A Model for Market Potential
As noted by Keeble (1982)[49], regional economic potential can be measured in an
analogous way to electrical potential in physics.7 The goal of this type of model is
to predict the potential economic activity a region can engage in once the barriers
to trade have been accounted for.
In this context economic potential is given by:
Pi =
nX
j=1
Mj
Dij
(4.1)
where:
n = the number of significant markets
Pi = the potential of region ‘i’
Mj = a measure of the mass of in region ‘j’
7This method was originally proposed by Stewart (1947)[108] in a study on population distri-
bution and was adapted by Harris (1954)[36], Clark (1966)[20] and Rich (1975)[95] to measure
industrial potential.
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Dij = a measure of the distance or cost of transport between ‘i’ and ‘j’
A region must also have some self-potential. Self-potential represents a
weighted contribution of a regions own mass. Keeble (1982)[49] suggests this can
be calculated by the following equation:8
Dii =
1
3
r
area of regioni
⇡
(4.2)
It is important to note that there is no agreement on how to precisely mea-
sure internal distance in determining self-potential. Rich (1975)[95] utilised a value
of 0.5 rather than 0.333. Head and Mayor have suggested a value of 0.667.9 A value
of 0.333 implies more clustering of economic activity around metropolitan centres
in order to maximise self-potential. Rich (1980)[96] argued that the clustering of
chief European centres (London and the South East, Paris and Ile de France) sup-
port the use of the smaller radius value as a better approximation to reality. I
have adopted the radius value consistent with Keeble (1982)[49], Rich (1980)[96]
and Crafts (2005)[24].
A practical specification of the model is given by:
Pi =
nX
j=1
GDPjd
 
ij (4.3)
such that:
Dij = d
 ( )
ij (4.4)
Mj = GDPj (4.5)
where:
n = the number of significant markets
Pi = the economic market potential of region ‘i’
8Previous authors have suggested alternative methods for calculating self-potential; Ray
(1965)[94] adopted an arbitrary five mile distance areal unit, Clark, Wilson and Bradley (1969)[21]
defined a fixed minimum transport cost for each region, Rich (1975)[95] designed the approach
taken by Keeble (1982)[49].
9A value of 0.667 was noted in Keeble (1982)[49].
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GDPj = a measure of output in region ‘j’
dij = a measure of the total costs associated with transport between ‘i’ and ‘j’
  = a distance exponent based on previous studies
III Empirical Approach
III.1 Sample Selection
The decision on what countries must be included in order to calculate economic
potential for each Australian state is made by observing actual trade flows. The
final year where trade data on the direction of trade was recorded in the separate
statistical abstracts for all the states on an independent basis was 1903. From 1903
trade returns were compiled by the Commonwealth Government for ‘Australia as a
whole’ with places outside the Commonwealth and not as in former years. Shares
of Australian trade by state for 1875 and 1903 are given in table 4.2.10
Table 4.2 indicates that New South Wales and Victoria were trading with a larger
number of countries than other states. As has been observed in numerous studies,
there was a clear British bias in Australian trade; a large share of trade from each
state was conducted with Britain. The state least dependent on this relationship
with the United Kingdom was Queensland. However, Queensland had a much less
diverse interstate trade than others and was heavily reliant on trade with New South
Wales.11 A meagre amount of Australian trade was conducted with the rest of Eu-
rope before World War One, while a more substantial share of state trade was in
Asian markets by 1875.
Many of the trade patterns are largely consistent with a gravity interpretation.
Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Malaysia presumably occupied significant places in Aus-
tralian trade due to their close proximity. China and India were important given
both their distance and size. Markets in the United States and Germany had become
significant by 1903. Presumably they were doubly important since they occupied
a substantial share in world manufactured exports by World War One. Idiosyn-
crasies in inter-state trade further support the gravity interpretation. New South
Wales traded substantially more with Queensland as a share of total trade than
other states. Western Australia traded heavily with South Australia, and Tasmania
traded with Victoria. These results seem to indicate the importance of distance,
10See appendix tables C.2 - C.3 on the direction of state trade in 5 year intervals.
11Trade shares include transhipments, which explains some of the inter-state di↵erences. Remov-
ing transhipments does not resolve this issue fully.
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size and colonial connections, in favour of Neoclassical arguments for trade based
on comparative advantage and relative factor prices.
III.2 Determining Mass
Choosing a measure for mass presents two key decisions. Firstly, a decision must be
made on whether to use nominal GDP or real GDP. Surprisingly little debate in the
literature on gravity models has arisen over the decision to use real or nominal GDP
when making cross sectional comparisons. Although the use of panel data would
suggest real GDP should be preferred there may be empirical justification for the
use of nominal GDP if the deflation process introduces significant error. Previous
gravity studies in the long nineteenth century have utilised real GDP rather than
nominal GDP.12 The real PPP adjusted GDP data are more readily available from
various backwards projections by Maddison and are often employed ‘as is’ in con-
junction with either nominal trade data or real trade data (nominal trade data in
US$ deflated with the US GDP deflator). If nominal PPP adjusted GDP is desired
then this can be obtained by applying the US GDP deflator to Maddison’s real PPP
adjusted GDP data.13
Secondly, the researcher must decide whether to use PPP adjusted GDP or exchange
rate adjusted GDP. Previous gravity studies have been more divided on this deci-
sion. Jacks et. al. (2010;2011)[43][44] use the PPP adjusted data from Maddison
(2003)[3] while Estevadeordal et. al. (2002)[27] use exchange rate adjusted GDP.
Whether this decision has been made with careful consideration in most gravity
studies, and whether this has a large e↵ect on the results is a question that should
be posed to trade economists working in economic history. In fact discussion on this
issue has arisen in the trade literature dating back to the 1970s.14 I have chosen
to follow Crafts (2005)[24] where exchange rate adjusted nominal GDP was used to
measure market potential. This seems to be preferable as market potential should
be thought of as the opportunity available at a point in time, determined by sur-
rounding markets. This would be reflected by the actual exchange rate adjusted
12See Jacks et. al. (2010; 2011)[43][44], Estevadeordal et. al. (2003)[27].
13The source chosen for the US GDP deflator should make little di↵erence in theory. I have
analysed the deflator supplied by the FRED database (http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/), the
Measuring Worth project (http://www.measuringworth.com/) and an implicit deflator based on
Maddison’s real and nominal GDP series for the US. Comparing these deflators to the implicit
deflator calculated from the Penn World Tables reveals little di↵erence for the period 1950-2008.
All calculations in this work that use the US GDP deflator are done with the Measuring Worth
deflator (full citation given in bibliography under Williamson (2013)[116]).
14See David (1972)[25], Kravis, Heston and Summers (1978)[50].
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output other countries can o↵er in trade.
Attempting to attain nominal exchange rate adjusted GDP is no easy task for the
period before World War One. Given limited resources the only approach feasible for
several countries is to utilise the ‘short cut’ method described in Prados (2000)[90].
This method estimates nominal GDP by exploiting a stable relationship between
exchange rate and PPP adjusted GDP across time and space. Two options are
available to the researcher, either prices (purchasing power parities over exchange
rates) can be regressed on nominal PPP adjusted GDP per capita and various ex-
planatory variables to back out nominal PPP adjusted GDP or nominal exchange
rate adjusted GDP per capita can be regressed directly on nominal PPP adjusted
GDP per capita and various explanatory variables. A recent working paper by
Klasing and Milionis (2012)[61] has taken the second approach using a model that
incorporates geographic characteristics both directly and indirectly through their
e↵ect on trade as independent variables.15 In order to generate my own nominal
exchange rate adjusted GDP estimates I have supplemented the latest addition of
the Penn World Tables with several exogenous geography variables.16 I have then
applied the approach laid out in Prados (2000)[90] with data discussed to generate
estimates of nominal GDP adjusted at exchange rates. A full treatment of my ap-
proach with detailed tables can be found in the appendix. The three sets of GDP
estimates generated using this procedure are expressed in millions of US$ (real PPP,
nominal PPP and nominal ER) and have been included in appendix table C.1.17
Finally I have selected a set of preferred estimates for mass from the available op-
tions. Priority has been given to nominal GDP from primary sources followed by the
use of ‘short-cut’ estimates from Crafts (2005)[24] and from my own calculations.
Nominal GDP for Great Britain are from Mitchell (1962)[62]. Nominal GDP for
Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden are from the
Historical National Accounts Database.18 Estimates for the Austrian-Hungarian
Empire are from the Global Finance Database for 1881-1911.19 This series has
15Indirect e↵ects of geography are measured in a variable constructed by Frankel et. al. (1999)[97]
that incorporates the impact of own and border countries area, population and being landlocked
on trade openness.
16Geography variables were created using information on shared borders, area and population
from the CIA World Factbook. They are explained in the appendix.
17For consistency I have converted real GDP and population data from Maddison (2010)[73] into
indexes with a 1990 benchmark. The 1990 benchmark has been taken from Penn World Tables
rather than Maddison.
18The HNA database is part of the Maddison Project at the University of Groningen and is
available online (http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/historical-national-accounts). See Smits
et. al. (2009)[102] for the related publication.
19The GFD is available online (http://eh.net/databases/Finance/). See Accominotti et. al.
(2011)[1] for the related publication.
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been spliced with estimates from Crafts (2005)[24] for 1871. Nominal GDP for Aus-
tralia are from Butlin (1962)[13]. Nominal GDP for New Zealand are from Cashin
(1995)[16]. Nominal GDP for Canada are from Urquhart (1986)[111] converted to
£s sterling at market exchange rates. Nominal GDP data for the USA are from
Williamson (2013)[116]. Nominal GDP for India are from Heston (1983)[37] and
Sivasubramonian (1997)[101]. Nominal GDP for Denmark, China, Hong Kong, In-
dia, Sri Lanka, Malaysia and South Africa have been estimated using the ‘short-cut’
method in this study. Estimates for Portugal are from the ‘short cut’ method used
in Crafts (2005)[24]. Nominal GDP for Japan for 1891-1911 are from Ohkawa, Shi-
nohara and Umemora (1974). For the period 1871-1881 these have been spliced with
my ‘short-cut’ estimates. Estimates for Norway are the geometric mean of Crafts
(2005)[24] and my ‘short-cut method’ which produce the closest fit to estimates in
other studies. All of the preferred estimates have been converted to British pounds
using market exchange rates and are shown in table 4.3.20
Inter-state trade comprises a significant portion of total trade given the distance of
each state to other foreign countries and hence market potential depends crucially
on estimates of state level GDP. Cashin (1995)[16] provides estimates of state GDP
from 1861 to 1991. No other estimates of GDP at the state level exist before 1979/80
for Australia (or before 1932/33 for New Zealand). The state GDP estimates have
been generated using data on money stocks in each colony. The colonial monetary
aggregates are multiplied by velocity to yield estimates of nominal GDP at market
prices for each state.21 Estimates from Cashin (1995)[16] have been adjusted from
$A to £A and are given in table 4.4.
III.3 Calculating Distance
The most significant empirical calculation in this exercise was the calculation of the
cost-distance measure (dij). This requires a choice of an appropriate cost metric
based on some combination of transport options. Given that my analysis is focused
on Australian states in the period before World War One there is little complication
in choosing the cheapest mode of transport. For all foreign countries sea trans-
port was chosen as the cheapest mode of transport. Ports chosen for each country
represent the primary port to have received Australian goods as recorded in Aus-
20See appendix table C.6 for a comparison of available estimates from several sources for a
selection of countries.
21For a full description of methods see Cashin (1995)[16].
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tralian State Registers.22 Measures of distances between ports can be found in the
appendix. Modern distances were calculated in nautical miles between ports using
Dataloy Systems.23 Most gravity models use distances calculated between major
cities either in a direct line or using great circle distances. These methods seem
inappropriate when trade is conduced by steamships or by rail and could vary sub-
stantially from featureless or great circle distances.
Historical distances between ports have also been collected from Statistical Regis-
ters where available. Due to missing observations on some journeys in the Statistical
Registers I have chosen to use the modern distances from Dataloy Systems for con-
sistency. In all cases there is little variation between sources. Modern distances are
generally shorter (approximately 300 miles on average) but in some cases exceed the
nineteenth century estimates (indicating deviations are likely influenced by random
errors in measurement rather than substantial di↵erences in routes taken).
Estimates of distance between cities (nodes) must also take account of distance trav-
elled on land between ports and major centres. In most cases this is an insignificant
portion of the journey but cannot be overlooked. Some countries like France had
a large share of world trade in the nineteenth century, despite Paris being located
a fair distance from major sea ports. An even more dramatic example is Vienna.
Vienna was the capital of a large European empire but was landlocked with only
the Danube to satisfy access to water transport. A 370 mile rail line to Trieste was
completed in 1859 serving as the closest link to a sea port.24 Another example was
Madrid. The second oldest rail line in Spain connected Madrid to Aranjuez in 1851
but the projected connection to the Mediterranean was initially abandoned and not
completed until 1858. Alicante was the shortest projected sea port, representing a
distance of approximately 260 miles.25 In these cases it is important to calculate
the distance from port to node using rail freight rates and convert this into a cost
equivalent value using rail freight charges specific to each country.
The process of estimating combined rail and sea cost-distance estimates involves
regressing freight rates for each mode of transport on distance travelled to get an
estimate of the cost-distance relationship. A model of this kind was set out in
Hummels (1999)[39] and Estevadeordal et. al. (2003)[27] as follows:
ln (Cost per toni) = ↵+   ln (Distancei) + ✏i (4.6)
22Some ports are noted as significant and distances to these key ports are noted in several
additions of nineteenth century State Statistical Registers.
23DataloySystemscanbeaccessedonhttp://www.dataloy.com/.
24A history on Vienna’s transport links is explained in Gingrich et. al. (2012)[31].
25This distance is based on the modern high speed line that now runs between Madrid and
Alicante.
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Where i represents the transport technology chosen.
A detail that is often overlooked or irrelevant in standard gravity models is account-
ing for structural breaks in distances between ports given the availability of better
sea routes. This issue is less likely to be significant in analysis after World War Two
but there were dramatic changes that took place in the long nineteenth century.
The opening of the Suez and the Panama Canals represented significant breaks in
shipping distances for Australia. Even so, if the changes in physical distance were
uniform for all countries then the use of a static distance term in gravity specifica-
tions may not bias the results. More likely there were certain trade routes (namely
long distance routes relying on the Cape of Good Hope or Cape Horn) that changed
physical distance asymmetrically across countries and this had asymmetric e↵ects
on trade flows. For example, in 1912 Sydney-New York via the Cape of Good Hope
was approximately 13306 miles, in 1913 Sydney-New York via Panama was 9691
miles.26 Since this study covers the period between the construction of the Suez
Canal and Panama Canal, there is little cause for concern regarding the issue of
structural breaks.
In estimating equation 4.6 I have utilised data made available from Jacks and Pen-
dakur (2010)[45] for tramp freight rates and supplemented this data with rail freight
rates for several countries.27 First I turn to the estimation of freight costs associated
with the sea portion of the dij variable. Hummels (1999)[39] reported a   of 0.8
for worldwide postwar data and 0.5 on United States and North American postwar
data. Estevadeordal et. al. (2003)[27] find a   of 0.52 using freights from Isserlis
(1938) over the period from 1870 to 1939. Results of my sea cost-distance regres-
sions over several periods are consistent with these estimates and are shown in the
appendix.
The sea cost-distance coe cients have been generated separately for grain, coal and
other general goods. Then they have been generated for short to medium hauls
( 9000 Miles) and long hauls (> 9000 Miles) assuming some variation in shipping
technology may have been used over long hauls as steam technology replaced sail.
I have re-estimated the terminal and variable shipping costs using a linear rather
than a log model to compare my results with average cost estimates in Kaukiainen
(2003)[40]. These estimates were calculated on grain and coal shipping in terms of
shillings per 100 miles. Results of these estimated shipping rates per ton are shown
26These distances before and after the canal are reported in the Statistical Register for New
South Wales after the opening of the canal.
27Jacks has made his shipping tramp rates available on his website http://www.sfu.ca/~djacks/
data/publications/. For a full description of the tramp shipping rates in this data set see Jacks
and Pendakur (2010)[45].
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in table 4.5. The two sets of estimates are closely related with version one falling
more rapidly in the variable component and version two falling more rapidly in the
terminal component. Both estimates show rising average shipping costs just before
World War One (version one in the variable component and version two in the ter-
minal component).
Table 4.6 compares estimated freight costs on shipments to London for various
years.28 These are compared to actual three year averages of freight costs on grain
shippments. The coe cients do a good job of estimating shipping costs on wheat
and grain. Clearly the freight rates faced by Australian states were significantly
higher than in countries with direct access to the Atlantic. The biggest issue for
Canadian or Argentinian wheat was getting the grain overland or via internal wa-
terways to the coast.
Unfortunately there is not enough data available on specific rail journeys to estimate
the relationship between cost and distance using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). In-
stead it is necessary to use the average freight cost per ton mile to convert rail
distances into estimated costs. Freight receipts per ton mile for European countries
requiring overland transport are shown in appendix table C.8. The cost of each
rail journey has been estimated using the freight rate specific to that country where
possible. The average freight rate for Europe has been used where country specific
data was unavailable.
A value for the distance exponent   must also be chosen to determine the e↵ect
of cost-distance estimates on market potential. Both Keeble (1982)[49] and Crafts
(2005)[24] assume   =  1. An earlier study by Chisholm and O’Sullivan (1973)[19]
based on 1962 road transport data argued that the appropriate empirical distance
exponent for road freight in Britain was -2.5, although they chose to use -1 for
technical reasons associated with the self-potential calculation. I choose to set the
distance exponent   =  1 in order to maintain consistency with previous studies
but provide alternative estimates by setting   =  0.9 and   =  1.1 in the appendix.
III.4 Tari↵ E↵ects
The calculation of market potential must incorporate not only physical barriers
(distance) but also policy barriers (tari↵s). As indicated in table 4.7, tari↵s were
relatively high during the first wave of globalisation in many countries.29 The most
28Grain includes wheat, barley, flax, oats, rice and seeds.
29Table 4.7 shows e↵ective tari↵s measured as import duties collected over total imports rather
than an average tari↵ based on the rates of each good imported. E↵ective tari↵s give a more
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practical way to deal with tari↵ e↵ects is to assume some equivalence between phys-
ical barriers and policy barriers. Once a relationship has been determined, tari↵
rates facing Australian States can be adjusted into physical distances and added to
journey lengths. An obvious approach to estimate the tari↵-distance relationship
would be to run a gravity model over di↵erent decades to determine the comparative
e↵ects of tari↵s and distance on trade. The relative tari↵ and distance elasticities
of trade in each period form an estimate of the relative importance of each type of
barrier on market potential. Alternatively, panel data regressions with fixed time
e↵ects can determine an average relationship between tari↵ rates and physical dis-
tances using information over the entire period.
As has been discussed, estimates of gravity equations for the long nineteenth cen-
tury do exist and their results can be adapted to establish the relationships desired.
Estevadeordal et. al. (2003)[27] estimate twelve specifications of the gravity model
over the long nineteenth century. First, the geometric mean of distance and tari↵
elasticities of trade for various estimation methods are calculated. Using these elas-
ticities it is possible to estimate a physical distance equivalent cost adjustment for
tari↵ e↵ects. The results of applying the relative elasticities from each specification
to get cost adjustments in each set of years are shown in appendix table C.9. In cal-
culating the final set of cost-distance estimates I assume the pooled OLS method is
most appropriate (Estevadeordal et. al. (2003)[27] consider this the preferred speci-
fication in gravity estimates).
Another important consideration was Federation and the formation of the Australian
Customs Union. The Australian Colonies Government Act of 1850 set out the con-
ditions under which pre-Federated Australian customs regulation would take place.
Namely, the act required that tari↵s be non-discriminatory and uniform across all
trade partners.30 This implied that before 1901 each state set tari↵s for foreign trade
that were also applied on inter-state trade. A key element of the push to Federation
in the 1890s was the desire to establish a barrier free intra-Australian customs union.
This Australian Customs Union came into e↵ect on the 1st of Jan, 1901. States lost
their tari↵ autonomy but commerce between the states did not become duty free
until October 1901 when a common external tari↵ had been decided.31 Although
the ad valorem rate on dutiable imports fell there was a decrease in the proportion
of free goods admitted leading to an increase in the ad valorem rate of duty on all
accurate measure of the barriers facing Australian exporters. In some cases customs and excise had
to be used rather than import duties as no information was available.
30Historical changes in the Australian Customs Union are set out in Irwin (2006)[42].
31Under the terms of the Commonwealth Constitution Act, Western Australia was given auton-
omy to levy duties on inter-state imports for a period of five years after the imposition of the federal
tari↵ subject to some restrictions.
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merchandise entering the Commonwealth. This increase was particularly dramatic
for New South Wales which had very low tari↵s relative to its population or share
in Australian trade.32
In an attempt to capture the e↵ects of this change I have applied the full foreign
tari↵ rate to the distance index for 1871, 1881 and 1891 when considering the calcu-
lation of market potential between states. For 1901 I have also applied the full tari↵
rate to account for the fact that tari↵s were still being collected on inter-state trade
until 1902. For 1911 I have applied no additional tari↵ e↵ect to the cost-distance
estimates between states. Table 4.8 shows the e↵ective tari↵s between states before
Federation and after the creation of a customs union.
III.5 Inter-State Adjustments
It will be assumed in distance calculations that inter-state trade was also conducted
by sea rather than by rail. As mentioned in the introduction, rail links between
states were unavailable or ine cient before World War One in most cases. Rail
costs per ton mile are shown in table 4.9 for New South Wales, South Australia,
Tasmania and several foreign countries. Australian rail costs for shipping goods
were high compared both with Britain and other settler economies. One significant
di↵erence between Australia and Canada or the United States was access to the sea
in the nineteenth century. Reaching the Canadian agricultural hinterland required
significantly more rail miles than in Australia. Virtually all inhabited land in Aus-
tralia was close to the sea and required only short rail journeys to bring agricultural
products to port.
In the late nineteenth century, with the introduction of steam shipping and limited
incentives to increase rail usage there was an increasing cost for inter-state rail vs.
sea transport. In Australia this began to change close to World War One when rail
had become so e cient that it was catching-up to steam shipping on short hauls.
Before the 1880s there was little evidence that overland inter-state trade was con-
ducted to any significant degree. From the 1880s to World War One, the assumption
that all trade was undertaken by sea due to higher shipping costs between state
capitals is less realistic. A considerable amount of inter-state trade was recorded
at overland border stations, as shown in figure 4.5. New South Wales and South
Australia registered very high shares of inter-state trade overland (approximately
32The rates of duty for NSW listed in the Australian Year Books[75] are somewhat misleading
since they exclude stimulants and narcotics which were approximately 80% of the import duties
collected for NSW but only 30-40% of import duties collected for other states.
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50% from the 1890s to Federation). A breakdown of New South Wales border trade
is given in the appendix. As would be expected given relative rail to sea costs there
was a large share of border trade overland between New South Wales and Victoria
and a much smaller share of New South Wales trade with Queensland. Distances
from Sydney to Melbourne vs. Sydney to Brisbane implied a longer wait to reach
the break-even point of the two technologies. In addition much of the early overland
border trade with Queensland was not conducted by rail, given the relatively late
completion of an inter-state line.
Victoria had the lowest shares of border trade overland, however it should be noted
that the share of inter-state trade on the river Murray was quite high for Victoria.
Figure 4.6 shows the share of inter-state trade conducted on the river Murray for
Victoria and South Australia. South Australia had moved from river to rail trans-
port for inter-state trade by the 1880s. Victoria was less responsive to the newer
form of transport or simply had significant cost advantages in river trade. As late as
1900, over 20% of Victoria’s inter-state trade was conducted via the river Murray.
In comparing the market potential of Australian states it would be unfair to assume
Western Australia or Tasmania had equal advantage to Victoria or New South Wales
given the assumption inter-state trade was always conducted by sea. To adjust for
this I have calculated a (transport linked) border e↵ect to reduce the terminal por-
tion of inter-state shipping cost estimates. As with tari↵s, the scale of this adjust-
ment is based on the relative elasticities of border e↵ects and distance e↵ects. The
elasticity of border e↵ects was also captured in Estevadeordal et. al. (2003)[27] by a
border dummy. Again I utilise the average elasticity from pooled OLS regressions
to calculate terminal cost adjustments. The terminal cost adjustments for each pe-
riod are shown in appendix table C.10. The inter-state cost adjustments have been
applied only on the distance calculation between border states with an economically
viable rail or river option before World War One.33
III.6 Combined Cost-Distance Indexes
Combined cost-distance estimates have been created for each state in each decade
by combining the sea shipping costs (estimated using distances from key ports and
coe cients from model version two in table 4.5) with rail shipping costs (estimated
using distances from ports to major city nodes and freight receipts per ton mile for
specific countries given in appendix table C.4 and table 4.9) and adjusting for tari↵
barriers and border trade (adjustments based on tables 4.7, 4.8 and terminal cost
33For example the adjustment has been applied for trade between SAU and NSW but not SAU
and WAU or TAS.
108
adjustments found in appendix tables C.9 and C.10). Self-cost-distance estimates
have been generated by taking the area of each state (constant after 1861 borders)
and applying it to the formula for self-potential. Cost-distance estimates for each
state in each year have then been converted to indexes with GDP in Great Britain
equal to one in 1871. This implies GDP for Britain contributes directly to the mea-
sure of market potential while the GDP of all other countries is adjusted based on
the cost-distance indexes relative to Britain. Combined cost-distance indexes (in-
cluding self-distance measures) for 1871 are contained in appendix tables C.12 and
C.13.
The combined cost-distance indexes show that there were serious barriers in trading
with Europe compared with Asia. India, China and Japan were between 50-60% of
the ‘distance’ from London. Furthermore there appear to have been two groups of
European countries, those to which Australia was ‘peripheral’ and those to which
Australia was extremely ‘peripheral’. North Sea countries like Belgium, the Nether-
lands, Denmark, Norway and Sweden had relatively low tari↵s and major markets
facilitated by sea ports. Australian states faced similar ‘distances’ in reaching ports
in these countries as in reaching London. Countries like Austria, Spain, Germany
and France were extremely ‘distant’ to the Australian states. This was due in some
part to tari↵ policy but was mostly the result of the greater distances needed to
reach major inland markets in Vienna, Madrid, Berlin or Paris. New York was a
similar ‘distance’ as London given that the Panama canal was yet to be completed.
If San Francisco were used as the node for the USA then Australian market potential
would have been higher, however it seems unlikely that the majority of Australian
trade with the USA avoided the long journey to the Atlantic East Coast. As ex-
pected, Tasmania and South Australia faced greater ‘distances’ to foreign markets
but smaller ‘distances’ in inter-state trade. Perth was well placed for European trade
after the opening of the Suez canal and had a close ‘proximity’ to Asian markets.
However, Perth was located far from its inter-state trading partners and Western
Australia had a large hinterland with a high measure of self-distance. Melbourne
and Sydney were likely the most balanced in all locational respects.
IV Results and Analysis
IV.1 Indexes of Market Potential
Market potential calculations based on cost-distance adjusted mass are shown in
table 4.10. Table 4.11 gives an indication of the relative potential of each state with
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New South Wales as a benchmark. The most striking result is the extremely high
relative market potential of Western Australia. Despite having lower self-potential
and lower market potential from inter-state trade, Western Australia benefitted sig-
nificantly from the location of Perth on the West Coast. Before World War One,
European markets loomed large and the increased market potential from shorter
sea journeys was enough to o↵set the lost market potential from other states. The
Suez Canal was opened in 1869 significantly reducing the distance from Perth to
European markets. The distance in reaching most Asian trade partners was also
shorter from Perth than from other Australian state capitals. Hence, the growth of
Japan and eventual rise of India and China presented greater potential benefits for
Western Australia than other states.
Nominal GDP per capita and merchandise exports per capita confirm the unique
position of Perth before World War One. Although the level of 1871 GDP per capita
in Western Australia was approximately 40% of the level in New South Wales (possi-
bly due to the lack of market potential before 1869), Western Australia had virtually
caught-up by Federation. In 1871, both Tasmania and Queensland had significantly
high levels of GDP per capita compared with Western Australia but both su↵ered
from relatively low levels of market potential. Western Australia had overtaken Tas-
mania and Queensland by World War One. Merchandise exports grew rapidly for
Western Australia reaching extremely high levels just after Federation. Following
Federation, Perth clearly took advantage of its relatively high market potential.
Although overshadowed by Western Australia, South Australia also had high mar-
ket potential in comparison with other states. As with Western Australia this was
evidenced by the relative growth in nominal GDP per capita and merchandise ex-
ports. South Australia appears to have had a flourishing foreign and inter-state
trade with considerably higher levels of merchandise exports per capita than most
other states. No doubt this was helped by Adelaide’s compromise position between
European markets and those of other Australian states (including New Zealand).
Victoria and New South Wales had relatively high levels of nominal GDP per capita
and merchandise exports in 1871 but their dominant positions were giving way to
Western and South Australia. They also held the middle range of market potential
in the period before World War One. Queensland and Tasmania had the lowest
levels of market potential, the lowest levels of merchandise exports and the lowest
levels of nominal GDP per capita in most years. Brisbane and Hobart were far from
both European markets and Asian markets. They were reasonably well placed for
inter-state trade although Tasmania did not have a land connection to other states.
Just as the opening of the Suez Canal loomed large in the history of Western Aus-
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tralia, the opening of the Panama Canal combined with the rise of the United States
after World War One may have significantly altered the relative ‘peripherality’ of
Tasmania and Queensland.
Table 4.12 provides annual growth rates (continuously compounded) for each state
and Australia as a whole over several periods. The incredible growth of Western
Australia from the opening of the Suez Canal until Federation is clear. Relative
to other states annual growth rates in population, nominal GDP and merchandise
exports were very high. An attempt has also been made to analyse the changing
market potential of the aggregated Australian states over time. Combined cost-
distance estimates have been deflated by creating a grain and coal price deflator.
Given that sea freight rates were based primarily on grain shipped to Britain and
coal shipped from Britain, I have chosen to focus on the price fluctuations in these
goods. Unit prices have been calculated using annual quantities and values of trade
from Mitchell (1988)[63]. The combined deflator uses the relative values of these
two goods as weights. Nominal GDP was then converted to real GDP using the
implicit UK GDP deflator from Mitchell (2013)[64]. Real cost-distance estimates
were applied to the real GDP estimates to get real market potential. Indexes of
real market potential are shown in table 4.13 alongside the real value of GDP and
merchandise exports for Australia.
Over the entire period (1871-1911) Australian market potential grew slightly faster
than output or merchandise exports but all appear closely related. The 1870s and
1880s were decades of strong growth in market potential and also significant growth
in output and exports. Growth in market potential continued but at a slower rate
in the 1890s, which was a dismal decade for output growth and a slowing period
of export growth. The period from 1901 to World War One saw export growth
collapse despite a rebounding growth in output. As expected, the pattern of overall
market potential reflects both the changes in Australian output (self and inter-state
potential) and exports (potential from foreign demand).
IV.2 Trade Diversion
An important question in the pre-World War One history of Australia is whether
‘too much’ trade was directed towards the United Kingdom, or within the empire
generally. In order to determine the level of Empire trade diversion I have decom-
posed each state’s share of market potential by region and compared these with
export shares. Table 4.14 organises the shares of exports and market potential for
each state into several broad categories: other Australian states, Great Britain,
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European Countries (excluding Britain), Western O↵shoots and Asian countries.34
The results indicate that significantly more exports were sent to Britain than were
justified by Britain’s contribution to Australian market potential. In 1871, over 50%
of exports went to Britain when 12.5% were predicted by the share of market po-
tential. Trade diversion to Britain appears to have been a problem across all states
in all periods before World War One, however there was an improvement towards
the turn of the century. The issue was less extreme in 1901 when approximately
one quarter of exports went to Britain and over one tenth was predicted by market
potential.
Trade diversion amongst Australian states also seems to have been an issue be-
fore World War One. Inter-state exports made up too large a share of total exports.
South Australia and Queensland had the highest shares of both inter-state trade and
inter-state market potential. The export shares for these states are slightly exagger-
ated since these states served as entrepts for trade going between other states and to
foreign markets. The 1903 trade figures show that almost half the exports recorded
from these states were the goods of other Australian states being re-exported. How-
ever, accounting for this does not remove the issue completely. Even after removing
re-exports there was an overly large share of inter-state exports out of total exports
in every state.
In contrast, Western O↵shoots received too little of the share of total exports given
their contribution to market potential. The problem was extreme in 1871 and started
to improve by the turn of the century mainly due to an increased share of exports
going to the United States. Other Western O↵shoots continued to receive far too
small a share of Australian exports considering their contributions to market poten-
tial. There are two possible explanations for this. Either we must view the small
share of exports to other British colonies as an ine cient response to market po-
tential or a neoclassical interpretation of trade flows must be applied. Although the
Western O↵shoots represented rapidly growing markets they did not di↵er enough
from Australia in endowments or factor prices to capture larger shares of Australian
trade.
The Asian countries show significant fluctuation in the level of trade diversion be-
fore World War One. Between 1871 and 1881, Victoria and Western Australia were
exporting a significant share of total exports to Asian countries bringing them close
to the shares of market potential from Asia. The other states traded far too little
34European countries include Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Spain, France,
Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and Sweden. Western O↵shoots include Canada, New
Zealand, South Africa and the USA. Asian countries include China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia,
Japan, Sri Lanka (Ceylon) and Malaysia (Straits Settlements).
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with Asia. The 1890s stood out as a period where exports to Asia collapsed despite
only a small decline in the market potential Asia o↵ered. There was a turn around
by Federation, Western Australia was actually trading too heavily with Asia in 1901
(some, but not all, of this can be explained by transhipments through Western Aus-
tralia).
The most under represented region in terms of export shares was Europe. Europe
represented approximately one quarter of total market potential for the Australian
states (almost 30% in 1871). Literally no trade with Europe was conducted in 1871
and there was little increase until Federation. Clearly the biggest issue of trade di-
version was in trade being diverted to Britain from the rest of Europe. Cutting the
share of trade to Britain in half and proportioning this to other European countries
would have put Australian trade significantly more in line with estimates of market
potential.
Table 4.15 provides a deeper look at the issue of trade diversion within inter-state
trade. Generally, export shares match up quite closely with shares of market poten-
tial (the biggest exception being for Queensland). New South Wales exported too
heavily to Queensland in 1871 but the issue was resolved by Federation. Victoria
diverted too much of its exports from Queensland to Tasmania. South Australia did
the reverse. Tasmania traded too heavily with Victoria. Western Australia exported
far too much to South Australia. Queensland exported virtually everything to New
South Wales. Obviously location mattered a great deal in determining patterns of
inter-state trade with Adelaide serving as vent for Perth, Victoria for Hobart and
Sydney for Brisbane. Removing re-exports does little to change the results, imply-
ing that states generally absorbed the exports of their nearest trade partner. Hence,
inter-state trade diversion was specific to each state with the greatest issue being
Queensland’s inability to export to any state beyond New South Wales.
V Sensitivity to Distance
The strength of cost-distance estimates are determined in part by the value of the
distance exponent. Adjusting the distance exponent serves as both a sensitivity
check and also to judge the e↵ect of changes in cost-distance estimates on market
potential. Actual market potential, given an assumed distance exponent of  1 (as
suggested in the literature) compared with market potential given a 10% adjustment
in the distance exponent in either direction are shown in appendix table C.14. The
results indicate that overall market potential is highly sensitive to changes in the
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distance exponent. Fortunately, the states are impacted symmetrically so that the
inter-state rankings hold. Hence, there is little sensitivity in any of the analysis
discussed when the distance exponent is altered up or down.
This exercise does highlight how important changes in the cost-distance estimates
are on market potential. When ‘peripherality’ increases or decreases there is a sig-
nificant impact on market potential. Since market potential seems highly correlated
with both exports and output, there are substantial costs to ‘distance’.
VI Decomposition of Market Potential
Consider the following question: ‘What impact did technological change and tar-
i↵ policy have on market potential before World War One?’ Annual growth rates
of each factor contributing to the rise in market potential over time are shown in
appendix table C.15. Shipping costs by sea and rail fell rapidly in the 1870s and
1880s and continued to fall at a decreasing rate up to World War One. GDP in
the sample group rose consistently with the fastest growth in the last decade before
World War One. While average tari↵s fell for both foreign countries and Australian
states, when considering the entire 1871-1911 period, there was little consistency.
Tari↵ rates fell only during particular decades and only for certain countries.
In order to determine the role of technology, output growth and tari↵ policy I calcu-
late market potential for each Australian state holding certain factors fixed at their
1871 level. Firstly, I fix the GDP of all sample countries at their 1871 levels to see
how market potential was impacted by output growth in Australia’s major trade
partners. Next, I fix the cost of transport, by sea and by rail, at the 1871 level in
all periods to see the e↵ect of technological change on market potential. Finally I
fix the tari↵ rate of all countries and states at the 1871 levels to show the impact
of trade policy on market potential. Results are shown in table 4.16. Changes in
tari↵ policies had a minimal impact before World War One. This is unsurprising
since changes in tari↵s di↵ered across countries and over time. In other words, there
was no universal push towards trade liberalisation. Alternatively, falling transport
costs and rising world output contributed significantly to increased market potential
amongst Australian states. Most striking is the fact that market potential would
have been half of its actual level in 1891 in the absence of falling transport costs but
still almost three quarters of its actual level if sample GDP growth was zero. Tech-
nological advancements that shortened the travel time between Australian states
and foreign markets played an even bigger role than the increasing size of those
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foreign markets.
VII Counterfactuals
One of the interesting aspects of this study is that it allows the researcher to address
questions on the relative importance of geography in the long-run growth of settler
economies. It is a common theme in Australian literature to lament the ‘tyranny
of distance’. Adjusting the distance between Australian states and foreign coun-
tries allows a quantitative assessment of how tyrannical distance was for Australia
before World War One. Using this approach, I ask the following counterfactual ques-
tions: ‘What if Australia had been located 1,000 miles closer to its trade partners?’,
‘How would market potential change for Australia if it were located similarly to
Argentina?’ and ‘How would market potential change for Australia if the shares of
foreign GDP before World War One matched those of 1990?’. The first counterfac-
tual places every foreign country 1,000 miles closer to Australia, e↵ectively shrinking
the world map with Australia in the centre. The second counterfactual shifts Aus-
tralia into the position of Argentina with direct access to Atlantic shipping routes.
The third counterfactual alters the relative size of trade partners before World War
One to match 1990 proportions (e↵ectively shrinking the distance of Australia with
its key markets given the relative rise of Japan and the relative decline of Europe).35
The e↵ects of these changes on market potential are shown in table 4.17.
The counterfactuals show, ceteris paribus, that market potential before World War
One would have been similar if Australia were brought 1,000 miles closer to all for-
eign countries as if foreign GDP shares matched their 1990 values. In other words,
Australia was a lot less ‘peripheral’ to the global economy given 1990 shares of GDP,
irrespective of advancements in transport and communications technology or trade
liberalisation. However, the most dramatic shift in market potential occurs when
the Australian continent is relocated to the Atlantic. In this scenario Australian
cities face the same distance to markets as Buenos Aires. All of the counterfactual
scenarios represent exogenous shifts and as such I can project their e↵ects on GDP.36
Figure 4.7 shows what would happen to GDP under each counterfactual scenario if
it were impacted in the same magnitude as market potential. The increase in GDP
from any of these counterfactuals would significantly reduce the decline Australia
su↵ered before World War One relative to other settler economies.
351990 shares of foreign GDP were calculated using the Penn World Tables.
36Setting the shares of GDP at their 1990 levels is exogenous since only foreign countries have
had GDP shares adjusted.
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VIII Geography Rules
How does the importance of geography help explain the relative performance of set-
tler economies? In the past there has been a great deal of debate over the relative
importance of institutions and geography in determining long-run growth. Some
believe that institutions rule while others have argued for geographical determin-
ism. This debate holds powerful implications for economic development. Settler
economies o↵er a unique laboratory to evaluate the relative importance of these
deep determinants. This work has shown that access to markets, a measure of geo-
graphical isolation, can be closely linked with performance. Australia’s growth rate
from 1871-1911 was remarkably similar to its growth in market potential. This is
surprising as its market potential was shaped primarily by exogenous factors. A
similar and convincing pattern was present at the state level. Western Australia
and South Australia both had rapid growth in real output and market potential
from 1871-1911. Presumably all of the Australian states shared similar institutions,
had similar access to capital, received similar flows of labour, and experienced sim-
ilar exogenous economic shocks. Hence, one can assume that di↵erences in relative
performance can be explained either by di↵erent geographical factors or policy de-
cisions. I would argue that these two factors are intertwined.
The link between market potential and long-run growth permits several observations
on the relative success of settler economies. Firstly, it is clear that Canada, South
Africa and Argentina must have had substantially higher levels of market potential
compared with Australia and New Zealand given the counterfactual experiment in
section VII. This suggests proximity to Britain, Europe and the United States was
vital for sustained long-run growth.
It is also possible that policy had an important role to play in the long-run growth
of settler economies precisely because of the geographical issues present. Consider
an example, the United States and Canada both pursued policies of cheap land for
settlers while Australia and New Zealand typically sold land at a premium. In 1831
no Crown land was to be sold in Australia for less than five shillings an acre, roughly
equaling the selling price of land in North America. South Australia was founded
in 1836 and the government began selling land for twelve shillings an acre. Land in
eastern Australia was being sold at a similar price by 1838. By 1842 the government
had set the minimum price on land in Australia to twenty shillings. While this policy
continued in Australia, the United States was e↵ectively o↵ering free land to settlers
with the introduction of the Homestead Act in 1862. Canada followed the United
States model with its own free land act in 1872. The di↵erent policy decisions were
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largely related to the geography of each settlement. While the United States and
Canada could attract settlers with free land, Australia needed to use land revenues
to subsidise the high cost of passage paid by settlers. The Australian policy allowed
free (or heavily discounted) transport to be o↵ered to settlers who paid a premium
for their land.37
One can also speculate that relative Canadian and Argentinian success from 1870 to
World War One was linked to the interplay of technology and favourable geography.
This paper has shown that technological change before World War One played a
dominant role in determining market potential. Hence, it is likely that Canada and
Argentina were able to take part asymmetrically in the growth of nineteenth century
technological change relative to Australia and New Zealand. This point was first
suggested by Blainey (2001, pg. 178)[8],
When the industrial revolution and the power of steam were reshap-
ing commerce in western Europe and North America, and railways and
steamships and telegraphs were ceasing to be miracles, Australia still
relied on the strength of winds and animals to carry virtually all its
goods.
Possibly the most important issue connected to geography was that of trade. From
1870 to World War One, Canada pursued a policy of transitioning its trade from
Britain to the United States. This made sense given the shift in significance of the
United States economy and its close proximity. In contrast, the Australian colonies
did not transition away from Britain towards alternative markets despite the de-
cline in the share of market potential generated by Britain. Hence, it is important
to remember that various policies on the direction of trade also interacted with ge-
ography. Before World War One the decision of Australia to pursue a strong and
unwavering trade relationship with Britain, despite the vast distances connecting the
two countries, may have facilitated the rapid catching-up of rival settler economies.
IX Conclusion
This study has taken a first step in quantitatively assessing the market e↵ect of
location on the comparative growth of the Australian states before World War One.
It would be hard not to agree with those who feel Australia su↵ered from a ‘tyranny
of distance’. Counterfactual estimates of GDP show how realistic the ‘tyranny of
37See Blainey (2001)[8] for a full treatment of this issue.
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distance’ was for Australia. By Federation the USA had overtaken Australia in
terms of GDP per capita, an event that would not have occurred until much later
had Australia been located closer to its trade partners. Other settler economies such
as Argentina and Canada obviously benefitted from their location on the Atlantic
with better access to Europe and the USA. Estimates in this paper show that the
e↵ect on long-run growth would have been substantial and may help (if not entirely)
explain the falling behind of Australia when compared with other settler economies
before World War One.
For Australia, distance to major markets interacted with changes in technology and
changes in the share of world GDP before World War One. Physical distance to
Europe was certainly key but inter-state distances were also important. Distance
to Asian markets mattered as well but the relative importance of Asian markets
declined before World War One. Improving sea and rail technology meant that the
cost of long distance travel was changing relative to short distance travel. This had
asymmetric e↵ects on the Australian states which were located at varying distances
to Europe and Asia. Policy changes also occurred before World War One that had
an e↵ect on total ‘distance’ calculations. Asian tari↵ policy was controlled directly
or indirectly during the nineteenth century by colonial European powers. This
meant Asian countries had relatively low tari↵s before World War One. The USA
was highly protectionist before World War One, as were many European o↵shoots.
Australian Federation in 1901 created a barrier free inter-state trade union which
unevenly increased the market potential of states located closer together. While all
of these factors (falling tari↵s, falling transport costs and rising GDP) contributed
to the increasing market potential of Australia, the most important seems to have
been the decline in shipping costs.
A state-by-state comparison has shown that Western Australia was actually far less
remote than Queensland or Tasmania. Western Australia had approximately 110%
of the market potential of New South Wales before World War One. In other indica-
tors of development, GDP per capita and merchandise exports, Western Australia’s
growth from 1870 to World War One was impressive. Hence, the modern bias of
viewing Perth as extremely remote given its distance from any other major centres
(Australian or otherwise) is period specific.38 In actual fact, Perth was arguably the
most ideally located of the Australian capital cities after the opening of the Suez
Canal in 1869 and before the opening of the Panama Canal in 1914. This was due
to the significant savings on sea voyages from Perth to London (or Perth to New
38Perth has been called the most remote place on earth. This is likely an artifact of its time
during the 1970s to 1990s where it briefly occupied the title of capital city of over a million people
farthest removed from any other city of over a million people.
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York) over Hobart or Brisbane.
Looking at comparisons of where market potential was highest and where actual
trade was observed has shed further light on the failure of the Australian states
to reorientate themselves towards key markets. This however has highlighted the
importance of addressing a series of questions on private and public decision mak-
ing. Why would Australians have chosen to direct so much trade towards a far
flung British ‘metropole’ when opportunities to increase ties in the Pacific Region
existed? Why was the decision di↵erent when considering trade with other econom-
ically important European countries like France or Germany? If ‘Britishness’ was,
as has been argued, such a strong cultural and geo-political concept that it could
supersede economic self-interest then why did Australia trade so little with other
British ‘settler economies’?
Recent studies have suggested a necessary movement away from old historiographi-
cal binaries of British ‘metropole’ and colonial ‘periphery’.39 New theories consider
settler economies to be part of an interconnected network with various points of con-
tact and exchange that were often as significant as the core-periphery relationship.
I would argue that any competent assessment of trade, immigration and investment
data should reinforce rather than refute the old binaries before World War One.
Many of the logical explanations for inter-empire trade (shared language, currencies,
tastes, institutions and expectations) cannot be used to explain the core-periphery
relationship while ignoring the limited periphery-periphery relationships.
This work has wider implications since it emphasises the role of economic geography
in a comparative context and highlights the role location played in the relative suc-
cess of settler economies during the nineteenth century. The most successful settler
economy of the period, Canada, likely benefitted more from its proximity to Britain
(and Europe) than from its land connection to the United States. It is important
to remember that coastal shipping was still preferred to rail before World War One.
In other words, it was the location to European markets that mattered most for the
relative success of settler economies before World War One. This may have implied
that market potential would not have been much higher in Canada before World
War One than Argentina or even Australia if they were all located equidistant to
London.
While sea transport was the most e cient method for transporting freight before
World War One, the wide scale introduction of the motor car in the interwar pe-
riod resulted in a drastic shock to global market potential. This further heightened
the relative ‘peripherality’ of Australia. Land transport eventually became more
39For coverage of this issue see Magee and Thompson (2010)[56].
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cost e↵ective for all distances. Coupled with the hegemony of the United States
after World War Two, Canada had extreme locational advantages over Australia.
The paradox in a comparative context was less the falling behind of Australia but
rather its early lead. As world leaders in GDP per capita before 1870 the Aus-
tralian colonies overcame a very real ‘tyranny of distance’ which placed significant
and measurable limitations on market potential.
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Table 4.1: Real PPP Adj. $1990 GDP (W.Europe = 100)
Region 1870 1900 1913 1950 1990
W. Europe 100 100 100 100 100
USA & CAN 31 53 66 112 105
AUS & NZL 2 3 4 6 6
L. America 8 12 14 30 37
E. Asia 115 80 73 61 125
Asia 126 89 81 71 143
Africa 13 11 9 15 15
Sources: Maddison (2003)[3]
Notes: W. Europe is the most significant 30 countries in Western Europe. L. America is
for all of Latin America. E. Asia is for the most significant 16 countries of East
Asia. Asia is for all of Asia. Africa is for all of Africa. Groupings are based on
major groupings found in Maddison (2003)[3].
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Table 4.2: Share of State Trade by Principal Destination (%)
1875 1903
Destination NSW VIC SAU WAU TAS QLD NSW VIC SAU WAU TAS QLD
Britain 57.2 47.0 55.4 60.1 44.7 31.5 26.6 24.6 24.9 39.0 22.2 28.9
Austria 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
France 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 2.9 2.3 0.4 0.1 0.5
Germany 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.2 3.6 3.0 1.9 5.4 1.9
Netherlands 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.0
Belgium 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.1 1.6 2.3 0.4 0.0 0.3
Italy 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
Spain 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Portugal 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Denmark 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Norway 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.0
Sweden 0.0 0.2 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
New Zealand 2.3 6.7 0.6 1.3 4.4 0.2 4.0 4.2 0.4 1.2 0.8 0.4
South Africa 0.0 0.0 2.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 3.3 0.6 4.8 0.5 3.7
United States 1.6 1.5 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.2 8.8 6.1 2.7 3.8 8.6 2.9
Canada 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.4
Hong Kong 1.3 0.6 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.7
China 1.7 2.2 0.9 6.2 0.0 2.7 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1
Japan 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.3
Sri Lanka 2.7 13.6 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 1.3 3.7 3.1 11.3 0.0 0.2
India 0.1 0.9 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 7.5 3.1 13.9 0.1 0.5
Indonesia 1.5 1.6 0.7 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.1 1.5 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0
Malaysia 0.0 0.1 0.1 7.7 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1
Other 3.1 1.6 2.0 2.4 2.9 0.2 3.4 1.4 0.3 2.1 0.5 2.1
NSW – 18.3 12.9 0.1 10.1 57.2 – 20.6 31.9 6.1 24.1 44.7
VIC 8.5 – 18.6 9.9 35.2 3.6 14.3 – 14.0 8.6 34.2 7.4
SAU 3.7 2.3 – 11.5 1.3 3.4 7.7 4.7 – 4.7 0.9 4.2
WAU 0.1 0.2 1.1 – 0.0 0.0 1.9 3.9 5.9 – 0.9 0.1
TAS 1.0 2.1 0.5 0.0 – 0.3 2.2 5.2 0.3 0.3 – 0.6
QLD 15.1 0.6 2.7 0.0 1.4 – 12.5 3.0 2.5 0.2 1.4 –
Britain 57.2 47.0 55.4 60.1 44.7 31.5 26.6 24.6 24.9 39.0 22.2 28.9
Europe 0.0 0.6 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.0 8.8 8.3 3.2 5.8 2.7
W. O↵shoots 3.9 8.3 3.2 1.3 4.4 0.4 14.2 13.7 3.7 10.0 9.9 7.4
Asia 7.4 9.0 2.8 14.7 0.0 3.4 4.4 14.1 18.2 25.8 0.1 1.9
Inter-State 28.4 23.5 35.8 21.5 48.0 64.5 38.6 37.4 54.6 19.9 61.5 57.0
Sources: SRNSW (Various)[78], SRVIC (Various)[87], SRSAU (Various)[4], SCQLD (Various)[93]
SCTAS (Various)[104]
Notes: Zero share values of trade are not actually zero but have been rounded to zero. Countries left
from this table have actual zero values in most years before WWI. Western O↵shoots includes
New Zealand, South Africa, Canada & The United States. Europe excludes Britain. Other is
mainly Pacific islands
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Table 4.3: Preferred Nominal ER Adjusted GDP Estimates (£mn)
Year AUS AUT- BEL CAN CHN DEU DNK ESP FRA GBR HKG IND
HUN
1871 78.4 591.3 187.6 81.7 838.9 732.7 40.3 256.4 947.3 1015 0.7 583.8
1881 142.4 580.3 218.5 112.7 893.5 876.7 45.7 376.7 1048.7 1117 1.6 579.2
1891 202.8 658.9 219.9 142.4 941.3 1146.8 58.5 335.0 1162.5 1373 2.6 477.2
1901 189.8 719.1 244.0 199.1 972.2 1571.2 74.5 310.0 1230.1 1727 2.9 570.6
1911 329.3 1178.2 317.4 449.7 1250.9 2173.0 118.3 463.9 1785.1 2076 3.5 808.0
Year IDN ITA JPN LKA MYS NLD NOR NZL PRT SWE USA ZAF
1871 109.5 458.6 141.6 6.9 1.9 81.0 32.5 6.6 45.9 55.3 1564.4 26.4
1881 128.0 516.5 149.1 6.5 3.4 92.7 36.6 16.8 49.7 73.5 2395.5 44.1
1891 140.6 586.7 194.4 9.0 5.0 103.3 43.0 28.6 65.8 82.3 3164.1 63.8
1901 170.9 648.0 461.2 10.5 10.9 123.0 56.2 30.3 63.5 118.5 4583.5 73.1
1911 257.1 854.4 862.4 24.4 15.4 182.2 80.6 41.3 86.2 183.6 7057.9 97.6
Sources: See text section III.2 for description of sources.
Notes: Austria-Hungary based on old empire borders. China based on ‘low ball’ version of PWT.
1871 estimates from HNA converted with exchange rate of 25 francs, 20 marks, 25 lire, 25
pesetas, 18 krona, 12 Gulden per £ from the Statistical Abstract of Principal Foreign
Countries. ERs after 1881 from Accominotti et. al. (2011)[1]. All estimates for the United
States were converted at $4.86 per £. All estimates for Canada were converted at 4s 2d per $.
Table 4.4: Australian GDP Estimates by State
Nominal ER Adjusted GDP (£mn) Real ER Adjusted GDP (1990 £mn)
Year NSW VIC SAU WAU TAS QLD NSW VIC SAU WAU TAS QLD
1871 25.90 40.85 7.05 0.55 3.30 5.10 1222.9 1929.7 332.2 25.9 155.5 242.7
1881 51.90 55.65 14.45 1.05 6.80 12.80 2445.7 2622.4 680.9 49.5 320.5 603.2
1891 72.95 81.70 17.95 2.65 8.00 20.80 3614.4 4047.9 890.6 129.6 398.3 1032.0
1901 77.65 69.65 16.90 10.10 7.55 28.20 4017.3 3600.3 874.1 523.1 391.2 1458.4
1911 136.05 105.65 31.45 19.15 9.90 40.70 6411.2 4978.6 1482.0 902.4 466.6 1917.9
Sources: Cashin (1995)[16]
Notes: Converted from Australian $ to pre-1960s £s
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Table 4.5: Shipping Rates per Ton on Grain & Coal (Shillings)
Estimates v.1 Estimates v.2
Range Terminal Per 100 Miles Range Terminal Per 100 Miles
(Constant) (Coe cient) (Constant) (Coe cient)
1872-1874 13.264 0.3815 1869-1873 12.188 0.3203
1879-1880 11.040 0.2500 1879-1883 7.532 0.2784
1888-1889 8.708 0.1680 1889-1893 3.537 0.2270
1898-1899 6.572 0.1520 1899-1903 3.192 0.1932
1911-1913 5.810 0.1680 1909-1913 4.132 0.1795
Sources: Estimates v.1 are from Kaukiainen (2003)[40], Estimates v.2 were calculated in this study
Notes: Kaukiainen (2003)[40] averages for grain & coal are reported in Crafts (2005)[24], Estimates v.2
use on shipping freight rates from Jacks & Pendakur (2010)[45].
Table 4.6: Estimated/Actual Freight to London on Grains (£ per ton)
Sydney Melbourne Buenos Aires
Dist. (m.) 11771 11298 6374
Year Est. Est. Act. Est. Est. Act. Est. Est. Act.
(1) (2) (Avg.) (1) (2) (Avg.) (1) (2) (Avg.)
1871 2.505 2.494 – 2.297 2.419 – 1.836 1.630 –
1881 1.820 2.015 – 1.679 1.949 – 1.711 1.264 –
1891 1.910 1.513 – 1.867 1.459 1.410 0.981 0.900 1.170
1901 1.305 1.297 1.484 1.267 1.251 1.200 0.769 0.775 0.874
1911 1.226 1.263 1.269 1.183 1.221 1.242 0.754 0.779 0.734
New York Montreal Odessa
Dist. (m.) 3375 3230 3457
Year Est. Est. Act. Est. Est. Act. Est. Est. Act.
(1) (2) (Avg.) (1) (2) (Avg.) (1) (2) (Avg.)
1871 1.282 1.150 2.751 1.276 1.127 1.563 1.322 1.163 2.246
1881 1.088 0.846 1.024 1.081 0.826 1.068 1.130 0.858 1.252
1891 0.659 0.560 0.768 0.655 0.544 0.719 0.681 0.569 0.775
1901 0.545 0.486 0.573 0.543 0.472 – 0.562 0.494 0.529
1911 0.543 0.510 0.520 0.541 0.497 – 0.559 0.517 0.627
Sources: Calculated from estimated coe cients in table 4.5 and distances from Dataloy
Systems (http://www.dataloy.com/)
Notes: Est. (1) are based on the log model which considers short vs. long hauls for all goods,
Est. (2) are based on the linear model which considers coal & grain over all distances.
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Table 4.7: Foreign E↵ective Tari↵ Rates (Import Duties/Imports)
Year AUS AUT- BEL CAN CHN DEU DNK ESP FRA GBR HKG IND
HUN
1871 11.92 4.45 0.97 12.67 16.63 2.79 7.85 11.33 3.24 6.10 6.10 11.44
1881 10.42 4.60 0.96 17.40 5.44 4.00 8.71 13.23 5.46 4.84 4.84 8.13
1891 11.70 6.91 1.05 20.99 5.26 8.45 7.35 10.35 6.63 4.52 4.52 4.70
1901 11.70 6.18 1.39 16.61 3.09 9.14 5.92 15.06 6.84 5.10 5.10 8.69
1911 19.70 7.53 0.96 16.28 3.06 7.51 4.62 14.01 7.62 4.87 4.87 7.26
Year IDN ITA JPN LKA MYS NLD NOR NZL PRT SWE USA ZAF
1871 15.58 5.62 5.02 6.15 2.38 0.80 8.08 18.86 26.08 8.96 33.93 14.06
1881 5.66 10.64 4.53 7.65 1.89 0.54 8.93 19.80 22.91 10.22 30.16 14.03
1891 5.48 17.70 3.82 6.85 1.77 0.43 9.37 24.24 20.93 10.11 25.67 12.53
1901 4.82 14.12 5.84 6.69 1.47 0.49 12.15 19.31 20.04 10.61 28.37 9.00
1911 5.49 9.25 8.38 6.39 1.41 0.39 10.52 16.89 17.06 8.73 19.96 14.20
Sources: SAPOFC (Various)[106], SASCOPUK (Various)[105], SABE (Various)[82],
SRNSW (Various)[78], SRVIC (Various)[87], SRSAU (Various)[4], SCTAS (Various)[104],
SCQLD (Various)[93], SABI (Various)[85], NZLYB (Various)[86], CYB (Various)[18].
Mitchell (2013)[64].
Notes: Austrio-Hungarian, Canadian & Dutch Tari↵s are based on imports for home consumption.
Indian tari↵s are calculated as import duties by sea (including duties on salt) over merchandise
trade (excluding government stores). Sri Lanka includes export duties. Denmark is for 1874
not 1871. Non-British colonies are for 1872 not 1871 (compared with Mitchell for 1871 yields
same results). Data for Indonesia from 1871-1891 are from Mitchell (2013)[64].
Data for Japan in 1871 are from Mitchell (2013)[64]. Data for South Africa for 1911 are from
Mitchell (2013)[64]. Data for Australia for 1911 are from Mitchell (2013)[64] and exclude
inter-state trade since Australia was a customs union with free trade between states. Data for
Canada in 1911 are from Mitchell (2013)[64] and exclude Newfoundland. Estimates for Sri Lanka
in 1911 are based on the change in British Tari↵s from 1901 to 1911. Estimates for Malaysia in
1911 are based on the change in British Tari↵s from 1901 to 1911, Estimates for 1871 & 1881 are
based on the change in British Tari↵s from 1871 to 1901. Imports are merchandise only (exclude
specie). Some countries include export duties, see text.
Table 4.8: Inter-State E↵ective Tari↵ Rates (Customs/Imports)
Year
New
South
Wales
Victoria
South
AUS
Western
AUS
Tasmania
Queens-
land
1871 13.19 14.97 11.36 22.73 18.12 21.53
1881 8.52 10.40 10.84 26.43 19.04 13.22
1891 9.46 12.13 6.45 20.33 19.96 25.02
1901 7.01 12.65 9.45 16.47 21.60 21.39
1911 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sources: SASCOPUK (Various)[105], SABE (Various)[82], AYB (1908)[75]
Notes: Imports are merchandise only (exclude specie) except for 1901.
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Table 4.9: Comparative Rail Freight Receipts (d. per ton mile)
Year South New South Tasmania United Canada Algeria Britain Europe
Australia Wales States (CPR) & Tunis
1871 3.073 3.600 3.684 0.845 0.987 2.129 0.426 1.583
1881 3.006 2.810 3.603 0.604 0.623 1.522 0.306 1.132
1891 1.610 2.020 1.700 0.442 0.455 1.114 0.228 0.809
1901 1.05 1.230 1.730 0.370 0.364 1.288 0.183 0.731
1911 1.02 0.440 1.681 0.374 0.403 0.942 0.188 0.701
Sources: SRNSW (Various)[78], SRSAU (1871-1911)[4], SCTAS (1871-1911)[104],
ASASCA (Coghlan 1891-1904)[22], Foxwell & Farrer (1889)[30], SAUS (1878-1911)[79],
Urquhart & Buckley (1965)[112], Mitchell (1988)[63], SASCOPUK (1871-1911)[105],
SAPOFC (1871-1911)[106]
Notes: Europe is based on a weighted average of several European countries, see appendix table C.8.
Observations for NSW between 1871 & 1901 are from linear interpolation. Observations
for TAS before 1887 are estimated based on costs relative to NSW and extrapolation.
Observations for SAU are an avg. over all major rail lines listed in the Statistical Registers.
Observations for the United States are an avg. over all lines listed in the US Statistical
Abstract for 1871. Other US observations are provided directly.
Table 4.10: Market Potential (£mn)
Year NSW VIC SAU WAU TAS QLD Mean Median
1871 8254 8332 8403 9152 8135 8237 8419 8293
1881 12847 12969 13049 14212 12634 12773 13081 12908
1891 21337 21552 21448 23212 20804 21027 21563 21393
1901 30609 30828 30825 33541 29903 30317 31004 30717
1911 44816 45122 45275 48906 44006 44440 45427 44969
Sources: Based on several tables previously mentioned.
Notes: Calculated as nominal £ mn. Mean is the arithmetic mean. See section IV.1 for a description of
methods used.
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Table 4.11: Comparative Indexes (NSW=100)
Nominal GDP Per Capita
Year NSW VIC SAU WAU TAS QLD
1871 100.0 108.7 73.9 42.2 63.1 82.6
1881 100.0 93.4 74.8 51.2 85.1 86.8
1891 100.0 114.4 89.5 85.0 87.1 84.4
1901 100.0 101.5 81.5 96.0 76.6 99.4
1911 100.0 97.2 93.2 82.2 62.7 81.3
Merchandise Exports Per Capita
Year NSW VIC SAU WAU TAS QLD
1871 100.0 96.5 178.5 72.8 66.1 140.1
1881 100.0 71.1 82.9 90.4 62.1 65.3
1891 100.0 61.8 164.8 72.6 45.3 83.0
1903 100.0 83.4 116.3 285.0 82.6 97.4
Market Potential
Year NSW VIC SAU WAU TAS QLD
1871 100.0 100.9 101.8 110.9 98.6 99.8
1881 100.0 100.9 101.6 110.6 98.3 99.4
1891 100.0 101.0 100.5 108.8 97.5 98.5
1901 100.0 100.7 100.7 109.6 97.7 99.0
1911 100.0 100.7 101.0 109.1 98.2 99.2
Sources: Population & Merchandise Exports from Statistical Abstract for the Several
Colonial and Other Possessions of the United Kingdom. See tables 4.4 &
4.10 for Nominal GDP & Market Potential.
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Table 4.12: Annual Growth Rates (%)
Population
Range NSW VIC SAU WAU TAS QLD AUS
1871-1881 4.08 1.66 4.19 1.60 1.29 5.92 3.05
1881-1891 4.48 2.83 1.36 5.30 2.40 6.31 3.63
1891-1901 1.55 0.52 1.25 13.97 1.63 2.35 1.62
1901-1911 1.94 0.91 1.19 4.36 1.04 2.01 1.65
1871-1901 3.36 1.67 2.26 6.83 1.77 4.85 2.76
1871-1911 3.00 1.48 1.99 6.21 1.59 4.13 2.48
Nominal GDP
Range NSW VIC SAU WAU TAS QLD AUS
1871-1881 7.20 3.14 7.44 6.68 7.50 9.64 5.60
1881-1891 3.46 3.91 2.19 9.70 1.64 4.97 3.64
1891-1901 0.63 -1.58 -0.60 14.32 -0.58 3.09 0.29
1901-1911 5.77 4.25 6.41 6.61 2.75 3.74 5.02
1871-1901 3.73 1.79 2.96 10.19 2.80 5.87 3.15
1871-1911 4.23 2.40 3.81 9.28 2.78 5.33 3.62
Merchandise Exports
Range NSW VIC SAU WAU TAS QLD AUS
1871-1881 9.97 4.19 1.96 9.70 6.35 3.70 5.90
1881-1891 4.60 1.52 8.69 3.13 -0.66 9.02 4.54
1891-1903 1.61 3.30 -1.54 25.38 6.91 3.65 3.12
1903-1913 – – – – – – 0.16
1871-1903 5.10 3.02 2.67 13.13 4.31 5.31 4.42
1871-1913 – – – – – – 3.39
Sources: Population & Merchandise Exports from Statistical Abstract for the Several Colonial
and Other Possessions of the United Kingdom. See tables 4.4 & 4.10 for Nominal GDP
Notes: Growth rates are compounded continuously. Merchandise exports for 1913 are from
Maddison (2003)
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Table 4.13: Australian Potential Over Time
Indexes (1911=100) Annual Growth Rates (%)
Year
Real
GDP
Real
Exports
Real
Market
Potential
Range
Real
GDP
Real
Exports
Real
Market
Potential
1871 23.5 24.9 23.0 1871-81 6.27 6.57 4.88
1881 43.2 47.1 37.0 1881-91 4.01 4.91 4.49
1891 64.0 76.0 57.4 1891-01 -0.23 3.35 1.74
1901 62.6 105.6 68.2 1901-11 4.80 -0.55 3.90
1911 100.0 100.0 100.0
1871-11 3.69 3.54 3.74
Sources: Real Merchandise Exports from SAPOFC (Various)[106], see text for Real GDP & Real Market
Potential.
Notes: GDP & Exports deflated using UK GDP deflator from Mitchell (2013)[64]. See section IV.1
for description of the deflator for Market Potential. Growth rates are compounded
continuously. Merchandise Exports are for 1903 & 1913 not 1901 & 1911.
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Table 4.15: Inter-State Exports vs. Market Potential by State (%)
New South Wales
Share of Exports to: Share of Market Potential from:
Year NSW VIC SAU WAU TAS QLD NSW VIC SAU WAU TAS QLD
1871 – 66.5 2.8 0.0 1.0 29.7 – 72.8 11.6 0.7 5.8 9.1
1881 – 61.8 6.9 0.0 1.3 29.9 – 62.6 14.6 0.8 7.4 14.6
1891 – 48.1 40.0 0.3 2.2 9.4 – 64.3 12.2 1.2 6.0 16.3
1901/3 – 40.5 27.4 4.8 4.5 22.7 – 55.4 11.6 4.8 5.7 22.5
Victoria
Share of Exports to: Share of Market Potential from:
Year NSW VIC SAU WAU TAS QLD NSW VIC SAU WAU TAS QLD
1871 64.5 – 12.5 2.4 17.8 2.7 62.5 – 17.4 1.1 8.1 10.9
1881 62.7 – 19.9 2.0 14.8 0.7 60.8 – 17.3 0.9 8.1 12.9
1891 55.5 – 18.1 4.1 15.7 6.6 61.8 – 15.9 1.5 6.9 13.9
1901/3 52.0 – 10.1 14.6 14.7 8.7 58.9 – 13.2 5.1 5.8 17.0
South Australia
Share of Exports to: Share of Market Potential from:
Year NSW VIC SAU WAU TAS QLD NSW VIC SAU WAU TAS QLD
1871 36.6 53.5 – 1.1 0.0 8.8 32.6 56.7 – 0.6 4.3 5.8
1881 45.7 32.7 – 8.6 0.1 12.9 38.6 47.2 – 0.7 5.3 8.3
1891 79.8 12.3 – 4.6 0.3 3.0 36.5 49.6 – 1.1 4.2 8.5
1901/3 58.7 20.4 – 15.7 0.6 4.5 38.7 41.5 – 4.3 3.9 11.5
Western Australia
Share of Exports to: Share of Market Potential from:
Year NSW VIC SAU WAU TAS QLD NSW VIC SAU WAU TAS QLD
1871 2.9 19.7 77.4 – 0.0 0.0 30.0 51.2 9.4 – 4.0 5.4
1881 0.0 27.0 73.0 – 0.0 0.0 34.8 41.1 11.5 – 4.8 7.7
1891 4.8 59.0 36.2 – 0.0 0.0 33.9 43.1 10.6 – 4.0 8.3
1901/3 68.8 24.1 7.0 – 0.1 0.1 37.0 37.4 10.1 – 3.8 11.7
Tasmania
Share of Exports to: Share of Market Potential from:
Year NSW VIC SAU WAU TAS QLD NSW VIC SAU WAU TAS QLD
1871 23.3 71.1 3.4 0.0 – 2.1 32.3 52.9 8.6 0.5 – 5.7
1881 47.0 49.2 3.3 0.0 – 0.5 38.2 42.9 10.2 0.6 – 8.2
1891 41.5 56.2 1.8 0.0 – 0.4 37.3 44.7 8.7 0.9 – 8.4
1901/3 55.4 36.2 1.2 3.2 – 4.0 39.5 37.6 8.1 3.4 – 11.5
Queensland
Share of Exports to: Share of Market Potential from:
Year NSW VIC SAU WAU TAS QLD NSW VIC SAU WAU TAS QLD
1871 99.2 0.7 0.1 0.0 0.0 – 36.5 50.8 8.2 8.2 4.1 –
1881 99.4 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.0 – 44.5 40.6 9.6 9.6 4.8 –
1891 90.8 8.6 0.5 0.0 0.1 – 46.5 40.9 8.0 8.0 3.9 –
1901/3 87.6 7.5 4.4 0.3 0.2 – 50.1 35.3 7.6 7.6 3.7 –
Sources: See tables 4.10 & 4.11 for sources.
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Table 4.16: Alternative E↵ects on Market Potential
Avg. AUS Market Potential (£mn) Avg. AUS Market Potential (Actual=100)
Year Actual No Chng. No Chng. No Chng. Actual No Chng. No Chng. No Chng.
GDP T. Costs Tari↵s GDP T. Costs Tari↵s
1871 8419 8419 8419 8419 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1881 13081 10910 10127 13046 100.0 83.4 77.4 99.7
1891 21564 15358 11842 21488 100.0 71.2 54.9 99.6
1901 31004 17720 14903 30909 100.0 57.2 48.1 99.7
1911 45427 17718 21800 45215 100.0 39.0 48.0 99.5
Sources: See tables C.15 for sources.
Notes: Alternative calculations are based on constant sample output, constant transport costs and
constant tari↵s. See section VI for a description of calculations.
Table 4.17: Counterfactuals
Avg. AUS Market Potential (£mn) Avg. AUS Market Potential (Actual=100)
Year Actual
1,000
Mile
Argentina
1990
GDP
Actual
1,000
Mile
Argentina
1990
GDP.
Shrink Relocation Shares Shrink Relocation Shares
1871 8419 9127 9423 8692 100.0 108.4 111.9 103.2
1881 13081 14306 15338 13684 100.0 109.4 117.3 104.6
1891 21564 23847 26374 23004 100.0 110.6 122.3 106.7
1901 31004 34262 38825 33169 100.0 110.5 125.2 107.0
1911 45427 49737 56826 48606 100.0 109.5 125.1 107.0
Sources: See table C.15 for sources.
Notes: See section VII for a description of calculations.
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Figure 4.2: Grain Freight Rates to Britain (£ per ton)
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Figure 4.3: Length of Railway Miles Open by Country (m. per 10,000 sq. m. )
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Sources: Mitchell (2013)[64], Coghlan (1904)[22], SAPOFC (Various)[106], SASCOPUK
(Various)[105], Year Books NSW (Various)[77], Statistical Abstracts and Statistical Registers for
each country.
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Figure 4.4: Length of Railway Miles Open by State (m. per 10,000 sq. m. )
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Sources: Mitchell (2013)[64], Coghlan (1904)[22], SAPOFC (Various)[106], SASCOPUK
(Various)[105], Year Books for NSW (Various)[77], Statistical Abstracts and Statistical Registers
for each country.
Figure 4.5: Overland Trade Share in Inter-State Trade (%)
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Figure 4.6: River Murray Trade Share in Inter-State Trade (%)
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Figure 4.7: Counterfactual Australian GDP
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Appendix A
I
Table A.1: 1936/37 PPP by Agricultural subsectors
Agriculture
Australia Canada
Crop Unit Quantity Value (£) Quantity Value ($)
PPP
($/£)
All Barley Bushels 7336767 1522051 71922000 49512000 3.32
Corn (Husking) Bushels 7246383 1784716 9211400 14830000 6.54
Rye Bushels 126011 21011 4281000 2980000 4.17
Wheat Bushels 151389952 40471041 219218000 205327000 3.50
Hay (Total) Tons 3447647 12104079 14813000 112176000 2.16
Beans Bushels 64008 52607 876000 1790400 2.49
Peas Bushels 714105 205767 1229300 1991000 5.62
Potatoes Tons 474738 2235063 1796851 45125000 5.33
Beet (Sugar) Tons 31079 65266 595000 3416000 2.73
Turnips Tons 57960 183304 1733077 13382000 2.44
Grapes Tons 409016 4232694 10394 495200 4.60
Tobacco lb. 5198352 437446 46084000 9420200 2.43
Apples Bushels 10998866 2794633 13501971 9789000 2.85
Apricots Bushels 830280 288826 1300 4042 8.94
Cherries Bushels 218699 174580 186800 480300 3.22
Peaches Bushels 2132654 640433 429900 658000 5.10
Pears Bushles 2692207 669782 431300 602500 5.62
Plums Bushels 1115129 333186 158700 241700 5.10
Raspberries cwt. 74706 82938 84778 703900 7.48
Strawberries cwt. 23214 54637 308679 1929100 2.66
Pastoral
Australia Canada
Crop Unit Quantity Value (£) Quantity Value ($)
PPP
($/£)
Wool lb. 982831449 67487759 18929000 2782000 4.25
Beef lb. 233851658 3036239 12416000 830000 5.15
Pork lb. 32956097 1022121 174493000 28097000 5.19
Mutton lb. 208458246 5233652 232000 39000 6.70
Dairying & Fishing
Australia Canada
Crop Unit Quantity Value (£) Quantity Value ($)
PPP
($/£)
Butter lb. 19296080 1218908 106381000 19704000 2.93
Cheese lb. 762231 36640 1032300 138028 2.78
Eggs doz. 16473894 954578 1204000 326000 4.67
Fish cwt. 556645 1369332 9443776 30705714 1.32
Lobsters doz. 151838 142943 1888487 4383428 2.47
Oysters cwt. 74283 102683 42466 189922 3.24
Sources: Australian Production Bulletin #31, Summary of Australian Production Statistics for 1936/37,
CBCS (1936/37)[76], Urquhart & Buckley (1965)[112], CYB (1937)[18]
Notes: Conversions Used: 32 dry quarts = 1 bushel, 1 bushel (fruit) = 0.021772 metric ton, 1 metric ton
= 22.04623 cwt (short), doz. lobsters = 15 lbs (average), 1 lb = 0.01 cwt. (short), 1 bbl. = 3.281
bushels. Data on Cattle, Pork & Mutton is based on value and quantity of exports of major
agricultural products, Data for Canada on Butter and Cheese are based on Farm (Dairy) Butter
and Farm Cheese while data for Australia are based on average metropolitan prices by state of
Cheese and Prime Quality Butter
II
Table A.2: 1936/37 PPP by Manufacturing subsectors
Class I - Treatment of Non-metalliferous & Quarry Products
Australia Canada
Product Unit Quantity Value (£) Quantity Value ($)
PPP
($/£)
Coke Tons 1489896 1755150 2246306 17162838 6.49
Tar (Crude) gal. 24997979 342159 32192130 1340754 3.04
Tar (Refined) gal. 2822305 43883 6411014 610209 6.12
Quick Lime Tons 73091 195356 372511 2843185 2.86
Hydrated Lime Tons 15397 56044 91742 587657 1.76
Cement (Portland) Tons 720093 2566740 769187 6908192 2.52
Class II - Bricks, Pottery, Glass, Etc.
Australia Canada
Product Unit Quantity Value (£) Quantity Value ($)
PPP
($/£)
Bricks 000s 636815 1986731 130181 1934660 4.76
Fire Bricks 000s 30640 410519 2548 118923 3.48
Tiles sq. yd. 161751 124900 10860 13798 1.65
Class III - Chemicals, Dyes, Explosives, Paints, Oils & Grease
Australia Canada
Product Unit Quantity Value (£) Quantity Value ($)
PPP
($/£)
Acetylene Gas c. ft. 17456284 144632 41315830 1016256 2.97
Oxygen c. ft. 54502865 142854 151500660 1438799 3.62
Paints (Water) lb. 3900204 74178 8802870 524415 3.13
Paints & Varnish gal. 2999711 1524359 4967042 8999542 3.57
White Lead cwt. 141809 281105 136349 935442 3.46
Putty cwt. 61259 27179 57894 203412 7.92
Cooking Oils Tons 39187 688817 4994 595948 6.79
Linseed Oil gal. 3121846 608184 4232027 3042278 3.69
Tallow & Glue cwt. 1117334 1160431 749984 3424327 4.40
Oil (Neatsfoot) gal. 148253 29266 323157 197501 3.10
Hides & Skins No. 1410350 928915 1327417 1739309 1.99
Soap cwt. 942125 1777466 1302582 7869191 3.20
Glycerine cwt. 60915 306203 95201 1176330 2.46
S. phosphate Tons 1090225 3579215 79724 990216 3.78
A. Sulphate Tons 22412 195967 91053 1936135 2.43
III
Class IV - Industrial Metals, Machines & Conveyances
Australia Canada
Product Unit Quantity Value (£) Quantity Value ($)
PPP
($/£)
Pig Iron Tons 913406 2146118 170751 3327716 8.29
Castings Tons 57164 609562 136449 17249832 11.86
Motors & Batteries No. 14089867 711504 33609242 5600310 3.30
Car Parts No. 2717570 6546087 7241602 93278540 5.35
Complete Cycles No. 78059 370357 48571 947039 4.11
Vessels & Boats No. 392 73249 3255 621903 1.02
Farm Implements No. 218509 845333 892468 3390745 0.98
Metal Rods cwt. 74140 343236 66625 1060307 3.44
Wire Tons 113288 1806948 39158 2714748 4.35
Nails Tons 8834 211051 56162 4022216 3.00
Stoves (All) No. 34440 180667 302475 9457364 5.96
Gas Meters No. 37165 130930 13240 165251 3.54
Lead Products cwt. 79711 174915 43228 413467 4.36
Class VI - Textiles & Textile Goods
Australia Canada
Product Unit Quantity Value (£) Quantity Value ($)
PPP
($/£)
Woollens s. yd. 30324063 4987265 16309907 18067206 6.74
Blankets Pairs 628131 638391 1810473 3866123 2.10
Rugs & Shawls No. 206513 134761 16212 156288 14.77
Underwear doz. 1874563 2137998 4519534 43742157 8.49
Bathing Suits doz. 47260 194108 58324 898276 3.75
Cardigans doz. 378107 1201544 502362 5960523 3.73
Rope & Twine cwt. 208551 817012 817219 7373596 2.30
Class VII - Skins & Leather (not Clothing or Footwear)
Australia Canada
Product Unit Quantity Value (£) Quantity Value ($)
PPP
($/£)
Leathers lb. 28817491 1801546 22316095 6861453 4.92
Upholstery sq. ft. 30309733 1525683 69908742 11967307 3.40
Harness No. 24371 47595 119783 320929 1.37
Trunks No. 4660 3543 72202 403789 7.36
Bags No. 528447 263155 1373979 1575532 2.30
Leather Coats No. 15305 35713 183660 910157 2.12
IV
Class VIII - Clothing
Australia Canada
Product Unit Quantity Value (£) Quantity Value ($)
PPP
($/£)
Coats No. 156401 123074 625760 1170324 2.38
Corsets & Belts doz. 297536 826517 137463 2429896 6.36
Hats & Caps doz. 404391 1174017 804359 9230965 3.95
Boots & Shoes Pairs 13307924 6035609 280247 283091 2.23
Slippers & Uppers Pairs 9611083 970386 25066866 35672223 14.09
Umbrellas No. 137233 48772 293916 380680 3.64
Class IX - Food, Drink & Tobacco
Australia Canada
Product Unit Quantity Value (£) Quantity Value ($)
PPP
($/£)
Wheat Tons 1499731 14858174 1572480 70244280 4.51
Screenings Tons 6443 64600 7382 125883 1.70
Breakfast Foods cwt. 289809 800291 926316 11751616 4.59
Pasta cwt. 34747 58535 377039 1849748 2.91
Other Grains cwt. 1088905 1056651 1925037 4073980 2.18
Bread (2lb loaf) 000s 365851 5853478 454644 47658574 6.55
Biscuits lb. 70933578 2308415 111659726 13282512 3.66
Sugar Tons 1106547 22086266 481041 38067368 3.96
Molasses gal. 13445542 58102 3744741 352285 21.77
Syrup Tons 7766 185664 2472 169096 2.86
Confectionary lb. 94219869 5055835 80924732 14146081 3.26
Co↵ee & Spice lb. 15058982 532287 72668549 11702158 4.56
Peanut Butter lb. 995521 79322 10045477 1106982 1.38
Baking Powder lb. 2056526 136247 10062499 1684243 2.53
Self-Raising Flour cwt. 662865 746126 64231 527549 7.30
Jam & Fruit lb. 190306245 3801367 101281264 8777989 4.34
Tomato Pulp cwt. 183848 94432 194968 710369 7.09
Pickles Pints 5542999 214272 9441289 1695230 4.64
Soups Pints 5129669 153260 57398310 6256444 3.65
Vinegars gal. 2902199 120599 4606993 1518543 7.93
Bacon & Ham lb. 70696566 2978401 168941239 31358801 4.41
Butter & Lard lb. 377612775 21227332 304718253 64138941 3.74
Milk & Cheese lb. 121352547 3355378 221265214 29066646 4.75
Preserved Meat lb. 27475965 569801 98052924 14687580 7.22
Ice Tons 372822 680515 343811 1393121 2.22
Salt (Refined) Tons 74117 170452 354996 1773144 2.17
Ale & Beer gal. 74178368 7938627 56916859 43344707 7.12
Spirits p. gal. 4104479 631346 4098449 1838203 2.92
Wine gal. 18361009 1545579 4380686 4158122 11.28
Tobacco lb. 11514020 3864896 22965056 23017449 2.99
Cigarettes, &c. No. 2598675 3401059 5727055 49045529 6.54
Ice Cream gal. 3080745 951111 7517830 8926031 3.85
V
Class X -Forest Products & Milling
Australia Canada
Product Unit Quantity Value (£) Quantity Value ($)
PPP
($/£)
Lumber Sawn s. ft. 30056439 222321 3412151000 61965540 2.46
Floorboards s. ft. 50041609 697263 41218000 2263702 3.94
Boxes (Butter) No. 5390734 295718 1530685 320524 3.82
Class XI - Furniture, Bedding, Etc.
Australia Canada
Product Unit Quantity Value (£) Quantity Value ($)
PPP
($/£)
Mattresses No. 149928 236777 624309 4208282 4.27
Class XIII - Rubber
Australia Canada
Product Unit Quantity Value (£) Quantity Value ($)
PPP
($/£)
Rubber Footware Pairs 3609978 507144 16895643 19274250 8.12
Tyres & Tubes No. 3495089 4027176 5277077 28864301 4.75
Rubber Garments No. 153501 80820 571912 994161 3.30
Floor Mats lb. 386602 25525 4248915 562581 2.01
Rubber (Gloves) Pairs 194016 12288 725244 236776 5.15
Class XV - Miscellaneous Products
Australia Canada
Product Unit Quantity Value (£) Quantity Value ($)
PPP
($/£)
Brushes Gross 31294 209081 35309 1112512 4.72
Brooms Gross 14937 191743 24755 1210728 3.81
Balls (Golf) doz. 84598 67961 50204 212524 5.27
Sources: Australian Production Bulletin #31, Summary of Australian Production Statistics for 1936/37,
CBCS (1936/37)[76], Urquhart & Buckley (1965)[112], CYB (1937)[18]
Notes: Conversions Used: see above. Only a selection of manufacturing sub categories were included.
Table A.3: 1936/37 PPP by Construction subsectors
Housing
Dwellings Unit Quantity Value (£) Quantity Value ($)
PPP
($/£)
Monthly House
Rent
6 Room
Unit
1 4.59 1 19.35 4.21
Sources: Australian Production Bulletin #31, Summary of Australian Production Statistics for 1936/37,
CBCS (1936/37)[76], Pg. 13 & 15, Table 12 & 16.
Notes: House Rents are based on a geometric mean of modern & non-modern houses averaged monthly.
VI
Table A.4: 1936/37 PPP by Mining subsectors
Metals
Metal Unit Quantity Value (£) Quantity Value ($)
PPP
($/£)
Arsenic & Ore Tons 3592 66525 619 42491 3.70
Bismuth & Ore cwt. 365 8167 3642 360523 4.42
Cadmium cwt. 673 10799 7859 699465 5.55
Copper Tons 18892 796686 190978 39514101 4.91
Gold F. Oz. 1179751 10214404 3748028 77478612 2.39
Lead Tons 44871 766094 383180909 14993869 5.05
Silver Oz. 4162203 368481 18334487 8273804 5.10
Zinc Tons 269979 934921 151132 11045007 21.10
Minerals (Silicates, Sulfates, Phosphates & Others)
Mineral Unit Quantity Value (£) Quantity Value ($)
PPP
($/£)
Felspar Tons 3691 10347 17846 154475 3.09
Fluorspar Tons 836 2166 75 900 4.63
Gypsum Tons 125594 92430 833822 1278971 2.08
Salt Tons 66326 149234 391316 1773144 2.01
Rocks & Other Mining
Rock Unit Quantity Value (£) Quantity Value ($)
PPP
($/£)
Asbestos cwt. 4780 4193 6642242 9958183 1.71
Coals Tons 14415306 6987165 15229182 45791934 6.20
Diato. Earth Tons 2778 6190 615 13650 9.96
Fireclay Tons 35408 12666 2437 17639 20.23
Limestone Flux Tons 409581 111161 3731548 3143872 3.10
Sources: Australian Production Bulletin #31, Summary of Australian Production Statistics for 1936/37,
CBCS (1936/37)[76], Pg. 47 & 48, Table 75 & 77
Notes: Conversion Used: 1 lb = 0.0004536 metric tons, 1 metric tons = 22.04623 cwt. (short)
VII
Table A.5: 1936/37 PPP by Service subsectors
Transport & Communications
Australia Canada
Service Unit Quantity Value (£) Quantity Value ($)
PPP
($/£)
Rail (Passenger) Earning M. 1 0.005 1 0.021 4.55
Rail (Freight) Earning M. 1 0.008 1 0.010 1.27
Property & Finance
Australia Canada
Service Unit Quantity Value (£) Quantity Value ($)
PPP
($/£)
Wages/Salaries Employees 53300 11340000 82000 113000000 6.48
Professional, Personal & Domestic Services
Australia Canada
Service Unit Quantity Value (£) Quantity Value ($)
PPP
($/£)
Wages & Salaries Employees 323372 67362000 552000 312000000 2.71
Sources: AYB (1938)[75], Butlin (1962)[13], Table 103, pg. 195, Butlin & Dowie (1969)[14], Table 6, pg.
Buckley (1983)[110], Table C152-162, pg. 65.
Notes: For Australian “Average Earnings per Passenger Mile” I have weighted the receipts per
passenger & pounds from shillings 4 railway lines reported in the Australian Yearbook
according to earnings (Converted into £ and pennies) see appendix below for weights. I have
removed transport salaries and employees from the total of services for Australia
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Figure A.2: Man Days Lost Due to Strikes (CAN/AUS)
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Sources: Mitchell (2013)[64]
Figure A.3: United States/United Kingdom Immigration into Canada
Sources: CYB (Various)[18], Buckley et. al. (1983)[110], CIS (Various)[70]
X
Figure A.4: United States/United Kingdom Foreign Investment in Canada
Sources: Buckley et. al. (1983)[110]
Figure A.5: Share of Canadian Patents Issued by Inventors Country of Residency
Sources: CYB (Various)[18], CIPO (Online)[84]
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Appendix B
DEA Primal and Dual Approach
There are 2 ways to solve the LP problem: Primal (LP) and Dual (DLP).
For each country c in industry i the Primal LP Problem can be solved as:1
✓i
⇤
= max
vij
Qic (B.1)
subject to
vi1x
i
c + v
i
2y
i
c + v
i
3z
i
c = 1
Qic  vi1xic + vi2yic + vi3zic 8c = CAN, V IC, ..., CPE
vi1, v
i
2, v
i
3   0
where Qic represents output in industry i and country c, x,y,z represent the
three factors of production in industry i and vj(j = 1, 2, 3) represent the three
weights on inputs when the optimal solution to the LP problem is obtained.
For each country c in industry i the Dual LP Problem can be solved as:2
min
✓i, i
✓i (B.2)
1This is the input oriented LP problem, the output oriented LP problem has not been shown
2This is the input oriented DLP problem, the output oriented DLP problem has not been shown
XII
subject to
✓ixic    iCANxiCAN +  iV ICxiV IC + ...+  iCPExiCPE
✓iyic    iCANyiCAN +  iV ICyiV IC + ...+  iCPEyiCPE
✓izic    CANzCAN +  V ICzV IC + ...+  CPEzCPE
 iCANQ
i
CAN +  
i
V ICQV IC + ...+  
i
CPEQ
i
CPE   Qic
 iCAN , 
i
V IC , ..., 
i
CPE   0
where Qic represents output in industry i and country c, x,y,z represent the
three factors of production in industry i and  c represents the combination of weights
of inputs and outputs for each country c needed to produce the optimal input-output
combination to the DLP problem.
New Technical and Cost E ciency Under Di↵erent Unit-
Costs
New Technical E ciency
New Technical E ciency (✓¯i
⇤
) can be calculated for each country c in industry i by
solving the LP problem given by:3
✓¯i
⇤
= min
✓¯i, i
✓¯i (B.3)
subject to
✓¯ix¯c  X¯i i
Qic  Qi i
 i   0
where Qic represents output in industry i and country c, subscript 1,2,3 repre-
sent the three factors of production in industry i and  c represents the combination
of weights of inputs and outputs for each country c needed to produce the optimal
input-output combination to the DLP problem. X¯i = (x¯iCAN , x¯
i
V IC , ..., x¯
i
CPE) and
x¯ij,c = (x¯
i
1,CANp
i
1,CAN , x¯
i
2,CANp
i
2,CAN , x¯
i
3,CANp
i
3,CAN , ...,
x¯i1,CPEp
i
1,CPE , x¯
i
2,CPEp
i
2,CPE , x¯
i
3,CPEp
i
3,CPE).
3For a description of all other variables see section VI.1
XIII
New Cost E ciency
New Cost E ciency (⌘¯i
⇤
= ex¯
i⇤
c
ex¯ic
) can be calculated for each country c in industry i
by solving the LP problem given by:
ex¯i
⇤
c = min
x¯i, i
ex¯ic (B.4)
subject to
x¯i  X¯i i
Qic  Qi i
 i   0
where e is a row vector with all elements being equal to 1, Qic represents
output in industry i and country c, x,y,z represent the three factors of production
in industry i and  c represents the combination of weights of inputs and outputs
for each country c needed to produce the optimal input-output combination to the
DLP problem.
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Figure B.1: Agricultural Implement Exports as a Share of Total Exports (%)
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Figure B.2: Share of Agricultural Implement Exports by Destination (%)
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Appendix C
‘Short-Cut’ Method
There is a stable and direct relationship between nominal exchange rate adjusted
GDP and real PPP adjusted GDP. This relationship can be exploited empirically by
considering each country relative to a base country. The price level as determined
by the ratio of nominal to real GDP at any time in any country relative to a base
country depends on the price of traded and non-traded goods in those countries.
As markets become integrated price gaps will be eliminated and the price of traded
goods will equalise for all countries with the base country. The price of non-traded
goods will be directly related to the level of income in each country and the overall
price level will thus vary systematically with measures of development and openness.
The major source of error in calculating nominal GDP does not reside in the short-
cut approach but in the application of the structural relationships found in post-
World War Two data used to extrapolate out of sample estimates. This data reflects
a particular set of benchmark countries that experienced often unique events in a
historical context. Structural relationships from this data are projected over time
and space to form the estimates of nominal ER adjusted GDP. However, despite
these concerns the estimates do extremely well in forecasting out of sample and
are arguably preferred for cross country comparisons than the very long-run PPP
adjusted real GDP series usually employed.
There are two theoretically valid estimation techniques available. Both are given by
the following functional relationships:
PLij = f(GDP
PPP
ij , Xij) (C.1)
GDPERij = g(GDP
PPP
ij , Xij) (C.2)
XXV
where PLij =
PPPij
ERij
is the price level for country j in year i, GDPPPPij is the level of
nominal GDP for country j in year i in US$ converted at Purchasing Power Parities,
GDPERij is the level of nominal GDP for country j in year i in US$ converted at
market exchange rates, and Xij is a matrix of explanatory variables.
If GDPPPPij and PLij =
PPPij
ERij
are known then we can obtain
GDPERij = (GDP
PPP
ij )(
PPPij
ERij
).
The problem in working with historical data is that we do not know PPPs
and have limited knowledge of PPP adjusted GDP. Maddison (2010)[73] gives the
most complete estimates of deflated GDPPPPij using backward projections from
modern benchmarks. These can be reflated using an appropriate price series to
form estimates of nominal GDPPPPij in each year. The empirical goal is to estimate
either PPPijERij in order to calculate GDP
ER
ij or to use this relationship to estimate
GDPERij directly from GDP
PPP
ij . Prados (2000) attempts the former while Klasing
& Milinios (2012) the latter. Both studies use data from the Penn World Tables from
1950 to 1990 for a set of benchmark (mostly developed) countries.1 Unlike these
studies I have presented results using the full sample of countries (189 countries)
over the full period of coverage (1950-2010). I find that restricting the sample to the
period before 1990 does improves the forecasts over the period before World War
One.2
My estimation of exchange rate adjusted nominal GDP has been conducted using
the following equation:
lnGDPERi =  0 +  1 lnGDP
PPP
i +  2(lnGDP
PPP
i )
2 +
 3 lnPopi +  4 lnAreai +  5Landlocki + ✏i
In this equation the price e↵ect of non-traded goods is captured by the mea-
sures of population and area. Whether a country is landlocked serves as a natural
measure of openness. In place of the landlocked variable, Klasing and Milinios
(2012) include a variable intended to capture the natural openness of countries us-
ing the geographic share of trade as constructed by Frankel and Romer (1999). This
1Prados (2000) uses data on 20 benchmark countries.
2Both Mean Square Error and Mean Absolute Error improve for the forecasts when compared
with existing estimates of nominal GDP
XXVI
measure relies on the relationship between geography and border countries. I have
constructed several variables to measure the natural level of openness by taking the
area and population characteristics of each country’s neighbours that share a com-
mon border. In all cases these border measures did little or nothing to improve the
forecasts out-of-sample and were dropped from the analysis.
I have further improved the fit of the forecasts by including a low income inter-
cept dummy. The low income dummy takes a value of 1 if any countries nominal
PPP adjusted GDP per capita is less than 25% of the United States.3 Two low
income slope dummies have been included by interacting the low income variable
with lnGDPPPPi and (lnGDP
PPP
i )
2. A set of intercept and slope dummies have
also been generated to separate the post World War Two Bretton Woods period.
Although the adjusted R2 increases with the inclusion of these currency regime
dummies the pre-WWI forecast error increases so they have been omitted from the
optimal model chosen. Lastly a Great Britain dummy captures the unique charac-
teristics of Britain before World War One against all other countries.
For all variables (except intercept dummies) observations have been set relative to
the United States and logarithms have been taken. The United States has been
omitted from the regression as it is restricted to 1 for all observations. Results
of these regressions are shown in table C.5. Model 5 has been chosen based on a
criteria of minimum absolute mean error in forecasts before 1913. Forecasts have
been generated for 1871, 1881, 1891, 1901 & 1911 using nominal PPP adjusted GDP
per capita estimates from Maddison (2010)[73] indexes and Penn World Table 2005
benchmarks. Predicted nominal exchange rate adjusted GDP estimates have been
converted into US$ using observations on United States nominal GDP and £ using
market exchange rates. Figure C.1 gives an indication of the accuracy of the models
in predicting British GDP before World War One.
3The low income level was tested at 15%, 20%, 25% 30%, 35%, 40% & 45% with 25% yielding
the best forecasts
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Table C.4: Distances from AUS Ports to Several Key Foreign Ports (Nautical Miles)
Destination Sydney Melbourne Adelaide Perth Brisbane Hobart
Europe
London (via Suez) 11771 11298 10971 9852 12271 12227
London (Via Cape of Good Hope) 12625 12156 11892 10970 13125 12228
London (Via Cape Horn) 13564 13840 14218 15396 13778 13621
Marseilles 10066 9593 9266 8147 10567 9866
Bremen 12041 11567 11241 10121 12541 12497
Hamburg 12064 11590 11264 10145 12564 12520
Antwerp 11797 11324 10997 9878 12297 12253
Brindisi 9429 8955 8629 7509 9929 9229
Naples 9604 9131 8804 7685 10105 9404
Trieste 9816 9342 9016 7897 10316 9616
Lisbon 10714 10241 9914 8795 11214 11204
Alicante 10159 9685 9359 8239 10659 9959
North America
San Francisco 6467 6982 7375 8555 6229 6936
New York (via Cape of Good Hope) 13252 12783 12519 11597 13752 12855
New York (via Cape Horn) 13092 17090 13746 14924 13306 13149
Vancouver 6846 7365 7758 8620 6531 7355
Montreal (via Cape of Good Hope) 13584 13115 12851 11929 14084 13187
Montreal (via Cape Horn) 13092 13963 14341 15519 13901 13744
Asia
Shangahi 4573 5139 5317 4025 4158 5186
Hong Kong 4480 5045 4780 3488 4064 5093
Yokohama 4350 4916 5309 4522 3932 4963
Colombo 5186 4712 4386 3143 5487 4849
Jakarta 3873 3399 3073 1784 3633 3536
Calcutta 5778 5305 4978 3703 5590 5442
Bombay 6037 5563 5237 3998 6350 5700
Singapore 4361 4054 3727 2460 3945 4191
Africa
Cape Town 6486 6018 5754 4831 6987 6089
South America
Valparaiso 6441 6701 7094 8195 6606 6498
Australasia
Auckland 1287 1657 2051 3230 1370 1532
Sydney – 597 990 2170 532 646
Melbourne 597 – 516 1696 1098 477
Adelaide 990 516 – 1370 1491 775
Perth (Freemantle) 2170 1696 1370 – 2670 1833
Brisbane 532 1098 1491 2670 – 1145
Hobart 646 477 775 1833 1145 –
Sources: Dataloy Systems (http://www.dataloy.com/)XXXII
Table C.5: ‘Short-Cut’ Method Regressions
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: lnNGDPER
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
lnNGDPPPP 1.362*** 1.326*** 0.888*** 1.315*** 0.910***
(0.017) (0.028) (0.050) (0.036) (0.059)
(lnNGDPPPP )2 0.078*** 0.100*** -0.350*** 0.104*** -0.269***
(0.004) (0.008) (0.038) (0.010) (0.043)
lnPop -0.040*** -0.046*** -0.056*** -0.040*** -0.052***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
lnArea 0.055*** 0.072*** 0.076*** 0.069*** 0.073***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Landlocked -0.169*** -0.186*** -0.198*** -0.219*** -0.235***
(0.016) (0.022) (0.022) (0.026) (0.026)
Periphery -0.143 -0.072
(0.131) (0.164)
Periphery ⇤ lnNGDPPPP 0.402*** 0.398***
(0.118) (0.147)
Periphery ⇤ (lnNGDPPPP )2 0.441*** 0.379***
(0.044) (0.051)
Currency -0.223***
(0.034)
Currency ⇤ lnNGDPPPP -0.107**
(0.049)
Currency ⇤ (lnNGDPPPP )2 0.003
(0.014)
GBR 0.121***
(0.033)
Constant -0.150*** -0.240*** -0.152*** -0.275*** -0.263***
(0.014) (0.022) (0.019) (0.028) (0.021)
Years 1950-2010 1950-1990 1950-1990 1960-1985 1960-1985
Observations 8,787 5,112 5,112 3,630 3,630
R-squared 0.875 0.831 0.838 0.820 0.825
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table C.7: Sea Cost-Distance Coe cients
Grain Coal Other Short Haul Long Haul
( 9000 miles) (> 9000 miles)
Range ↵   ↵   ↵   ↵   ↵  
1869-1873 -4.193 0.585 -3.685 0.454 -4.741 0.669 -4.186 0.548 -18.931 2.118
1879-1883 -5.854 0.724 -3.841 0.438 -7.958 1.036 -5.516 0.692 -17.823 1.965
1889-1893 -6.200 0.704 -3.841 0.383 -6.227 0.765 -5.346 0.609 -4.632 0.563
1899-1903 -6.903 0.760 -4.301 0.436 -4.530 0.526 -4.855 0.525 -6.425 0.714
1909-1913 -6.073 0.666 -4.250 0.431 -4.023 0.451 -4.673 0.502 -7.857 0.86
Sources: Estimated using shipping freight rates from Jacks (2010).
Notes: Based on log regressions of freight rates in £ and distance in miles. See section III.3 for methods.
Table C.8: European Rail Freight Receipts (d per ton mile)
Year AUT BEL CHE DEU FIN FRA NLD NOR SWE Europe
1871 1.700 1.398 3.332 1.514 1.792 1.487 1.331 1.972 1.750 1.583
1881 1.215 0.999 2.382 1.082 1.281 1.063 0.951 1.409 1.251 1.132
1891 0.720 0.731 1.432 0.792 0.937 0.842 0.696 1.031 0.961 0.809
1901 0.736 0.612 1.497 0.695 0.785 0.740 0.589 1.025 0.853 0.731
1911 0.753 0.619 1.475 0.660 0.793 0.658 0.589 0.873 0.774 0.701
Sources: SAPOFC (Various)[106], SAUS (1878-1911)[79]
Notes: France & Austria in 1891 are actually for 1892. Sweden for 1891 is the geometric mean of
state & company railways. All missing observations shown in bold were estimated based on
each countries relative e ciency in 1911 to the USA (Britain was also tested with little
change). European average is weighted by each countries share of total receipts from goods.
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Table C.9: Cost-Distance E↵ect of Tari↵s (Shillings per 1% Tari↵ Increase)
Year OLS Pooled 2SLS Pooled
Country FE
(OLS)
Avg. 3
Methods
1871 0.02002 0.02007 0.03897 0.02502
1881 0.01740 0.01744 0.03387 0.02175
1891 0.01419 0.01422 0.02762 0.01773
1901 0.01208 0.01211 0.02350 0.01509
1911 0.01122 0.01125 0.02184 0.01402
Sources: See section III.4 for description of elasticities. Terminal shipping costs
from table 4.5
Notes: See section III.4 for a description of methods used.
Table C.10: Cost-Distance E↵ect of a Common Border (Shillings)
Year OLS Pooled 2SLS Pooled
Country FE
(OLS)
Avg. 3
Methods
1871 -0.01174 -0.01174 -0.01745 -0.01340
1881 -0.01020 -0.01020 -0.01517 -0.01164
1891 -0.00832 -0.00832 -0.01237 -0.00949
1901 -0.00708 -0.00708 -0.01053 -0.00808
1911 -0.00658 -0.00658 -0.00978 -0.00751
Sources: See section III.5 for description of elasticities. Terminal shipping costs
from table 4.5
Notes: See section III.5 for a description of methods used.
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Table C.11: Share of NSW Trade with Border States Overland (%)
Imports from Exports to Total Trade with
Year VIC QLD SAU VIC QLD SAU VIC QLD SAU
1873 – 0.4 – – 8.3 – – 2.9 –
1880 44.1 10.4 35.3 83.5 18.0 84.1 70.8 13.3 61.9
1885 47.0 23.0 43.4 71.0 15.5 76.2 59.2 19.8 59.0
1890 47.0 39.4 76.7 78.7 19.0 93.8 69.8 34.6 87.7
1895 38.0 14.8 68.1 68.4 35.8 92.3 58.4 20.3 85.5
1899 48.3 17.6 80.2 65.3 15.7 84.9 57.8 17.1 83.4
Sources: SRNSW (1873-1901)[78], SRVIC (1873-1901)[87], SRSAU (1873-1901)[4]
Notes: Share of border trade for SAU is trade with NSW & VIC overland
relative to sea & land in those states (does not consider SAU other
borders in the denominator since no overland trade was conducted
with WAU)
Table C.12: Combined Cost-Distance Indexes in 1871 (GBR=1)
State AUT- BEL CAN CHN DEU DNK ESP FRA GBR HKG IND
HUN
NSW 1.92 1.06 1.12 0.54 1.46 1.04 1.58 1.45 1.00 0.53 0.62
VIC 1.95 1.07 1.12 0.60 1.47 1.04 1.60 1.46 1.00 0.59 0.61
SAU 1.97 1.07 1.13 0.62 1.48 1.04 1.62 1.48 1.00 0.58 0.60
WAU 2.05 1.07 1.15 0.58 1.52 1.04 1.67 1.51 1.00 0.54 0.55
TAS 1.86 1.06 1.06 0.57 1.45 1.04 1.53 1.44 1.00 0.56 0.58
QLD 1.89 1.06 1.10 0.50 1.45 1.04 1.57 1.44 1.00 0.49 0.59
Year IDN ITA JPN LKA MYS NLD NOR PRT SWE USA ZAF
NSW 0.50 1.29 0.57 0.58 0.52 1.00 1.04 0.94 1.08 1.10 0.66
VIC 0.48 1.30 0.63 0.57 0.52 1.00 1.04 0.94 1.08 1.11 0.65
SAU 0.47 1.30 0.67 0.56 0.51 1.00 1.04 0.94 1.08 1.12 0.65
WAU 0.42 1.33 0.66 0.51 0.46 1.00 1.04 0.93 1.09 1.14 0.64
TAS 0.46 1.24 0.59 0.54 0.50 1.00 1.03 0.94 1.08 1.05 0.62
QLD 0.47 1.28 0.53 0.58 0.48 1.00 1.03 0.94 1.08 1.08 0.68
Sources: See section III.6 & accompanying tables
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Table C.13: Combined Cost-Distance Indexes in 1871 (GBR=1)
State NSW VIC SAU WAU TAS QLD NZL
NSW 0.25 0.29 0.31 0.39 0.29 0.29 0.33
VIC 0.30 0.25 0.29 0.37 0.29 0.33 0.37
SAU 0.33 0.30 0.26 0.36 0.32 0.37 0.40
WAU 0.44 0.41 0.38 0.29 0.42 0.48 0.52
TAS 0.28 0.27 0.29 0.36 0.24 0.32 0.34
QLD 0.27 0.31 0.33 0.41 0.31 0.25 0.33
Sources: See section III.6 & accompanying tables
Table C.14: Distance Coe cient E↵ect on Market Potential
Avg. AUS Market Avg. AUS Market
Potential (£mn) Potential (Indexes)
Year   =  1   =  0.9   =  1.1   =  1   =  0.9   =  1.1
1871 8419 12265 5790 100.0 145.7 68.8
1881 13081 18551 9251 100.0 141.8 70.7
1891 21564 29441 15858 100.0 136.5 73.5
1901 31004 41858 23040 100.0 135.0 74.3
1911 45427 61438 33686 100.0 135.2 74.2
Sources: See table 4.10 for sources.
Notes: See section V for a description of calculations.
XXXVIII
Table C.15: Growth of Factors Determining Market Potential
Annual Growth Rates (%)
Year Ship Costs Rail Costs
Foreign
Tari↵s
State Tari↵s Sample GDP
1871-81 -2.27 -3.30 -0.23 -3.26 1.88
1881-91 -3.03 -3.30 0.18 1.64 1.66
1891-01 -1.51 -1.01 1.20 -0.34 2.38
1901-11 -0.14 -0.42 -2.06 -10.00 3.86
1871-11 -1.74 -2.02 -0.92 -2.50 2.44
Sources: See tables 4.3, 4.5, C.8, 4.7 & 4.8 for sources.
Notes: All variables are in current prices. Ship costs based on 9000 miles sea journey. Growth rates are
compounded continuously, except for State Tari↵s using 1911 which are annual average growth
since inter-state tari↵s dropped to zero. See section VI for methods.
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